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ABSTRACT
BENEATH CONSENSUS; BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE POST-WAR ORDER
SEPTEMBER 19 90
ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert Griffith
In 1945, the business community worried about its
ability to snape the post-war political and economic
reconstruction. Industrialists had lost enormous prestige
in the depression, and during the New Deal faced sharp
challenges from liberalism and organized labor. World War
II provided business leaders with an opportunity to
restore their reputation if not their dominance, but in
the post-war decade there were a number of major national
issues still open to debate. American society had yet to
reach a consensus on the relationship of government to the
economy, on the proper size of the welfare state, and on the
scope of union power in the factory.
The business community began mobilizing to regain the
political and economic initiative in this debate. This
study explores the business community's ideological attack
against its primary opponent, organized labor, and against
the liberal. New Deal philosophy unions represented. It also
examines the ways workers and their unions both resisted and
reshaped employer actions. In the years after World War II,
i V
the business leaders engaged in an attempt to restructure
the ideas and images that constituted America's political
culture. They conducted a widespread and intensive campaign
to sell Americans on the virtues of individualism as opposed
to collectivism or unions, freedom as opposed to state
control and centrality of the free enterprise system to the
American way of life.
The most obvious efforts to shape ideology and to
create the more conservative, consensual political climate
that historians associate with the fifties took place at
the national level. National business organizations like
the Advertising Council orchestrated massive public
relations campaigns that relied on the mass media to sell
business and capita lism. Employers also recognized the need
for more direct connection with the public. Sensing that
organized labor challenged their ability to shape worker
attitudes and provide political leadership, moderate as well
a conservative employers sought to undermine union power
through a program that drew upon human relations and
welfarism in order to build worker allegiance to the firm.
Fearing for lost authority beyond their factory gates,
employers also instituted sophisticated community relations
programs promoting the free enterprise system.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It has become almost axiomatic among historians to
characterize the 1950s as "the age of consensus." Summing
up a 1956 Advertising Council "Round Table" discussion, Yale
historian David Potter outlined the important characteris-
tics of this consensus: an equality of opportunity for
individuals; an open, classless society; an econom.y capable
of dynamic growth and change; and a socially responsible
business community promoting the essential harmony of
interests shared by managers and workers. ' Most historians
attribute this consensus to broad historical forces -- to
the "exhaustion of ideology" in the wake of two decades of
depression and war, to the impact of the Cold War and
McCarthyism, to the spread of consumerism and mass culture,
to the failure of the New Deal to successfully challenge
American capitalism, and to the decline of labor and the
left as vital forces in American life. Indeed, in most
textbook accounts the emergence of consensus is depicted as
. . . 2
a sweeping, almost deterministic process.
Yet the post-war consensus was neither as simple nor as
complete as these accounts suggest. Business purchased calm
industrial relations at a high price, while a less conten-
tious political atmosphere masked a lively ideological
debate between capital and labor. Not surprisingly,
the
fundamental precepts of the consensus were themselves
1
contested. By focusing on the struggle between capital and
labor to shape the new political culture of post-war
America, I restore human agency to the process through which
"consensus" was forged, show that whatever else it may have
been, it was the product of concrete political struggles,
that it was, in essense, a political construction. I also
suggest the limits of consensus by exploring the "contested
terrain" of the workplace and local community.
In 1945, the business community worried about its
ability to shape post-war political and economic reconstruc-
tion. Industrialists had lost enormous prestige in the
depression, and during the New Deal faced sharp challenges
from liberalism and organized labor. World War II certainly
provided business leaders with an opportunity to restore
their reputation if not their dominance, but wartime econ-
omic success evoked multiple interpretations. To many
liberals and to much of the public, it served as proof that
government control, economic planning, and the welfare state
were key to continued prosperity. And in spite of feverish
publicity, popular approval of business remained below pre-
depression levels.
The war also began to shift the balance of power between
employers and workers in many factories. Many manufacturers
faced a growing challenge from unions. Wartime regula-
tions and labor-market shortages enabled labor to consoli-
date its position and achieve significant gains. Under the
exigencies of a production crisis, militant workers eroded
2
managerial authority and control on the shop floor. More-
over, some union leaders threatened to advance negotiations
beyond the standard personnel policy and wage issues into
such previously forbidden areas of corporate policy as
pricing and investment. Finally, many business leaders
feared that the formation of the CIO's Political Action
Committee heralded a more politically aggresssive labor
movement
.
The contentious atmosphere of industrial relations
culminated in 1946 in a strike wave unparalleled in
American history. Especially frightening to the business
community was Walter Reuther's demand that GM open its books
to union contract negotiators in order to link wages, prices
and profits. His demand exemplified the growing threat to
management rights both on and off the shop floor. Equally
troubling to companies like General Electric was the
widespread support community leaders showed for labor in GE
cities and towns. Company surveys found that the public
blamed the company for the strike and distrusted any cause
that industry supported.
To historians looking back from the vantage point of
the 1990s, it seems clear that by the fifties the threat
posed by the trade union movement and progressive liberalism
was more apparent than real. Scholars have begun to explore
corporate efforts in the immediate aftermath of the war to
regain lost authority and roll back union power. The first
3
part of this mul tipronged attack was a campaign by business
leaders to exploit public fears of radicalism in order to
weaken organized labor. The resulting Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 helped curb the power of industrial unionism. Secondly,
within the plant, corporations pursued aggressive collective
bargaining and applied sophisticated personnel administra-
tion and industrial relations techniques.-^
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have argued that
by the early fifties business had defused organized labor's
threat within the factory and beyond its gates. Each of
these fields have employed different terminology -- the
accord, the truce, or the social contract -- to describe a
cooperative relationship between industrial unions and
management. The basis of this arrangement was organized
labor's consent to join in a new political and economic
consensus built upon economic growth through greater produc-
tivity and anti-communism. Unions promised to respect
managerial prerogatives relating to production and to aid in
the drive for productivity in return for recognition of a
limited role on the shop floor and for periodic wage and
4benefit increases.
At the same time, outside the factory, some historians
contend that organized labor was leading American workers
away from meaningful political alternatives. They assert
that in the wake of Taft-Hartley the CIO cemented an
alliance with the Democratic Party that entailed driving out
4
the communists and undermining the militancy and radicalism
of the rank and file.
^
To American businessmen in 1945, however, very little
of this was self-evident. Unions were still growing
in size and the shop floor remained a "contested terrain."
In addition, businessmen were frightened by organized
labor's successful campaign to reelect Harry Truman in 1948.
They also continued to fear that the liberal agenda and New
Deal traditions espoused by the labor movement rang true for
much of the American public. Thus, in the late forties, the
business community redoubled its efforts to undermine the
power of organized labor and the discredit its philosophy.
Essentially, business leaders sought to formulate the ideas
and images that constituted America's political culture.
Even a brief survey of the business press of the period
suggests that corporate leaders understood the importance of
carrying the battle over political culture into the
workplace and local community.
The most visible aspects of the battle for power took
place over major policy issues at the national level,
pitting executives of large firms and major business organi-
zations, like the National Association of Manufacturers and
the United States Chamber of Commerce, against liberal
Democratic and union leaders. Less visible but equally
significant was the struggle led by these national business
leaders and smaller employers at the local level. In many
5
factories, employers resorted to personnel and industrial
relations policies designed to build allegiance among
employees to the company at the expense of the union. This
managerial approach, known as the "human relations" philo-
sophy, blended the techniques of welfare capitalism with the
insights of industrial psychology. Morale surveys, recrea-
tion, or profit sharing were not new to the post-war, but
employers expanded and made more sophisticated use of these
practices
.
Understanding the importance of the outside world in
shaping the limits of workplace legitimacy, business leaders
also challenged their opponents for power and influence
beyond the factory gates. Their goals were twofold: first,
to build good will in the community in order to create a
favorable climate for economic expansion; second, to shift
political dialogue to a more conservative position in order
to weaken organized labor and the liberal ideals upon which
unions stood. To achieve their first goal, business leaders
tried to demonstrate both their newly developed social
consciousness and the importance of the company to the
community. Efforts ranged from publicizing company contri-
butions to the local economy to beautifying their plants and
opening them to the public. The key to the employers'
second goal was restoration of business dominance over
institutional life that had characterized many cities prior
to the depression. The business community wanted to impose
6
its conservative stamp on schools, churches, and other
community institutions.
But employers were not a hegemonic group capable of
manipulating people and institutions at will. They
themselves were at times divided over how best to perserve
the capitalist system. Business organizations like the
National Association of Manufactuers and the Committee for
Economic Development worked hard to educate business leaders
as to their class interests. In addition, it is important
to understand the ways that business interacted with its
opposition, primarily organized labor. Unions had their own
political agenda, and like business, competed for influence
not only on the shop floor but in the community. Rather
than viewing business ideology and practices as simply being
imposed on workers, this study explores the ways workers and
their unions both resisted and reshaped employer actions.
Assessing the impact of the business community's
campaign to shape political culture is a difficult task.
Even most companies took it as a matter of faith that the
dollars they invested in national educational campaigns and
in workplace or community programs often paid off only in
intangible ways. But, by the end of the 1950s, the business
community could point to favorable results. The momentum of
New Deal liberalism and the welfare state had been
contained. Union representation of the labor force had
begun its decline and the popular image of organized labor
7
nad shifted from heroic defenders of the New Deal to just
another special interest group. Labor was less of a threat
to the American free enterprise system, but not because of a
corrupt pact or a self-serving accord. Instead, it took the
unflagging energy and abundant resources of business leaders
to create the political atmosphere historians have come to
identify as consensus.
8
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CHAPTER 2
NOTHING LESS THAN CATASTROPIC CIVIL WAR
During the winter of 1945-1946, a strike wave of
massive proportions swept the United States. To many
American businessmen these strikes signalled a grave social,
political, and economic crisis that threatened the free
enterprise system. By January 1946, business writer Whiting
Williams proclaimed that what originally seemed "an
inconvenient but more or less harmless series of industrial
disputes has now become so widespread and so threatening as
to look like nothing less than catastrophic civil war."-'-
Williams's analogy of the strike wave as civil war seemed
increasily relevant to many businessmen. During the war,
labor unions, with the assistance of the federal government,
had consolidated and expanded their position in American
industry. In some industries, moreover, militant workers
were challenging managerial authority for control of the
workplace. Many employers feared that the post-war strike
wave augured yet another chapter in labor's growing power.
An equally troubling component of the strike wave for
businessmen was the evidence of the growing influence of
Keynesian liberalism, with its emphasis on state involvement
in the economy and the redistribution of income. Striking
unionists, advancing a Keynesian analysis of the economy,
argued that wages must increase substantially to sustain
working-class purchasing power and thus avoid the the widely
10
anticipated and greatly feared postwar depression. This
argument meshed with the liberal vision of high consumption
levels, full employment, and social planning. The support
of the Truman administration for this Keynesian-based wage-
price theory caused alarm in the business community.
Concomitantly, the introduction of legislation designed
to ensure full employment, even before the war's end,
dramatized the increased political power of organized labor
and the ongoing alliance between unions and New Deal
liberals. This alliance gave vivid expression to the
increasing popular support for expanded government
participation in the economy through planning and through
encouraging the development of a social wage. Thus, in
1945, the business community faced the twin challenges of a
struggle for control within the workplace and the defense of
the free enterprise system from the growing intrusi venes s of
the state. Equally important, the business community itself
was struggling to find a unified voice, hindering effective
employer opposition to labor and liberalism.
I
By the end of World War II, nearly two decades of
political and economic change had produced an anxious
managerial class. The dramatic economic collapse after 1929
widened a chasm between factions of the American business
community. On one side was a bloc of ardent economic
11
nationalists made up principally of labor-intensive firms
relying on high tariffs and rabid anti-unionism. On the
other side were the largest, most capital-intensive, and
most mass-consumption-oriented firms, run by businessmen who
opted for international free trade because of their
competitive advantages and for more conciliatory labor
policies. Faced with a deepening depression, the large,
internationalist group of business leaders abandoned the
protectionist and anti-union Republican Party for the more
liberal Franklin Roosevelt, hoping to influence policies for
economic recovery.
At the same time, organized labor pressed its own
program of recovery. Unions experienced a resurgence in
1933-34 in part due to section 7a of the National Recovery
Act. But labor's disappointment with government enforcement
of the Act's provisions triggered a wave of bitter strikes
in 1934. At the polls, a new mass political mobilization
recruited the urban working class, particularly second-
generation immigrant wage earners, into the Democratic Party
where immigrant labor leaders like Sidney Hillman were
forming an alliance with the more progressive
internationalist business leaders. The Democratic victories
in 1934, together with the lingering threat of mass upheaval
looming in the background, set the stage for the "second New
Deal" which included the Wagner Act, the Social Security
Act, the public utility holding company act, and a wealth
tax act, among other laws; in short, the creation of a
12
welfare state. This legislation, resulting from a crisis
alliance of mass-consumption-oriented businessmen and new
CIO unionists, not only gave labor increased power but also
changed the government's role in the economy from protecting
business profits to intrusively stimulating mass
consumption.
The more "aggressively statist ideas" of the New Deal
coalition did not proceed unchallenged. The bloc of
protectionist, labor-intensive firms formed the Liberty
League to promote Republican Party opposition to Roosevelt
in 1936. Other companies initiated legal challenges to the
Wagner Act and extra-legal resistance to unionism from 1937
until the onset of World War II. iMoreover, craft unionists
in the AFL had their own reasons for despising the New Deal,
particularly the National Labor Relations Board's unit
determinations, whereby it gave preference to the CIO over
the AFL. The two national labor organizations waged a
damaging civil war for much of the next twenty years.
Consequently, when a new recession in 1937-38 halted
economic recovery, Roosevelt refused to side with organized
labor in the momentous struggles against the Little Steel
companies, the Mohawk Valley formula, or the solidly anti-
union South.
The startling changes initiated by New Deal order,
then, rested on shaky ground. Even the CIO found the
pluralistic industrial relations system established by the
13
Wagner Act to be far less empowering than it expected, while
more radical hopes for the New Deal foundered. Moreover,
during World War II the business community regained some of
its lost power and prestige. The wartime "miracle of
production" brought renewed authority as industry's leaders
demanded and received the largest voice in establishing
policy concerning economic mobilization. Businessmen drew
on their new influence with government to encourage the more
conservative wartime Congress to begin dismantling some of
the New Deal.^
For corporate leaders war production symbolized one of
the finest hours of the free enterprise system. General
Motors Vice Chairman Donaldson Brown attributed successful
economic mobilization to the "exercise of individual
initiative" and to the "efficiency inspired by long years of
competitive effort strenghtened by the stimulus and
incentive of the profit motive." This was the message that
conservative businessmen sought to spread during the war.-^
Wartime economic successes, however, meant different
things to different people. To many liberals and to much of
the public it showed that government control, economic
planning, and the welfare state were key to continued
prosperity. They contended the war proved that what
historian Robert Collins calls "left-wing" Keynesian
economics worked. That is, through deficit spending, the
government could support high consumption levels and create
jobs. Thus, liberals believed the only way to prevent the
14
widely expected postwar depression was not only continued
but expanded government participation in the economy. The
liberal economic vision had special resonance for workers.
Battered by the depression and fearing that wartime
affluence was temporary at best, workers sought above all
else security from the ravages of the business cycle.
Organized labor sought some remedies in such collective
bargaining provisions as seniority, but unions also looked
to government to even out the peaks and valleys of
production. Working with other liberal groups, labor's
quest for security found expression in the Roosevelt
administration's 1944 Economic Bill of Rights, which seemed
to endorse a fundamental reconstruction of American society
through the expansion of state power. That document
suggested that such personal needs as health, education and
c.
housing were tantamount to basic human rights."
Industry's war-time accomplishments, then, in some ways
undercut the business vision of free enterprise because
mobilization had taken place within the context of
government regulation and regimentation. Even during the
war, businessmen feared the consequences of military
necessity which would dictate government planning and
control of the economy. Writing only six months after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, General Motors' vice-chairman of
the board Donaldson Brown already worried that the "public
has not come to distinguish between the necessity of
15
centralized planning and regimention in time of war, and the
exercise of corresponding functions on the part of
government in the time of peace." Brown feared that those
with "ulterior motives" were going to "seize the occasion to
contend that the wartime system under which industrial
production has worked sucn wonders could be extended and
applied with equal benefit and effectiveness in the post-war
7economy .
"
While questions concerning the direction of America's
postwar economic policy troubled businessmen, many had even
more immediate concerns. Far more worrisome was the
unprecedented challenge posed by organized labor within
their firms. On the whole, the war provided a favorable
environment for the growth of the labor movement. Mobiliza-
tion had ended the Depression and brought a tight labor
market which enabled unions to make significant organiza-
tional and economic gains. During the conflict, the number
of union members increased from less than nine to almost
o
fifteen million.
After Pearl Harbor, the government's wartime labor
policy provided unions with organizational security through
maintenance of membership contract clauses. This enabled
organized labor to consolidate its position by breaking down
many of the bastions of anti-unionism including the "Little
Steel" companies. Governmental guarantees, however, were
not without cost to unions. The National War Labor Board
demanded not only adherence to a "no-strike" pledge but also
16
union responsibility. Under these pressures unions became
increasingly centralized and bureaucratic as they policed
discontent on the shop floor through the establishment of
formal grievance and arbitration procedures^.
Many managers, however, found little comfort in the
concept of responsible unionism. Wartime economic condi-
tions, including scarce labor, "cost plus" financing, and
the necessity for continuous production, contributed both to
the growth of unions and to the undermining of managerial
authority and control on the shop floor. War-time wildcat
strikes in defiance of the no-strike pledge were just the
most dramatic symbols of the decline of managerial power.
In many factories, discipline was lax and workers defiant.
Aggressive union representatives demanded and received a
voice in setting and enforcing production standards. As a
result, employers charged that worker power in unions and in
the labor market resulted in declining productivity.-'-^
The alienation of the first line of supervision exacer-
bated the shop floor crisis. The authority of foremen, for
instance, was weakened. During the war militant union shop
stewards successfully challenged foremen's authority over
the rank and file. Moreover foremen had grievances of their
own. Without overtime pay, salaried foremen's wages barely
exceded those they supervised. Without grievance procedures
or formal job security, foremen feared unemployment would
accompany the postwar cutbacks. Many former production
17
workers, pulled into management by the massive expansion of
the wartime labor pool, had experience with the benefits of
unionization and responded readily to the organization of
the Foreman's Association of America and other supervisory
unions. Their actual membership was small but employers
believed that even this limited unionization of the first
line of supervision represented a virus that was attacking
productivity and shop floor discipline.
^
As the war ended, managers fretted that virtually none
of their rights were secure. Participants at a 1944 Ameri-
can Management Association round table discussion observed
that "management has had an uneasy feeling that its preroga-
tives are slipping from it into the hands of unions. "'-^
Through the National War Labor Board's expansion of the
scope of collective bargaining, unions had made significant
inroads into the functions of management. To business
writers like Whiting Williams, the government appeared to be
in "active partnership" with the CIO, particularly when the
Board granted labor input over such issues as wages, senior-
1 3ity, and protection from arbitrary dismissal.
Even more ominously, unions were attempting to bargain
for such devices as mutual consent clauses, which limited
management's right to initiate change, or the establishment
of joint committees that would give labor equal voice in
planning and decision making. '^ Thomas Roy Jones,
president of American Type Founders, foresaw no limit to the
future demands of power hungry labor leaders. "Annual wages,
18
private social security systems, early retiremerxts
,
long
vacations, 25-hour weeks—are completely within the realm of
economic possiblity." So too, he continued was control of
management, "the distribution of profits; and advertising
policy; and marketing and production methods." Already, he
charged, "there have been bargained away, in favor of labor,
many of the rights of stockholders, the customer, the
government, and the public." If business did not halt this
trend, Roy predicted, "a condition of industrial chaos
eventually will ensue. "'"^
Businessmen doubtless exaggerated the seriousness of
labor's threat during the war. But their anxieties surfaced
early, and management did not allow the war to interfere
with its efforts to curb the power of labor. As early as
1943, with conversion problems solved, some companies
tightened up discipline and stopped making concessions to
ensure uninterrupted production. Workers, particularly in
the auto industry, responded with a wave of unauthorized
strikes
.
^ "
Wildcat strikes, labeled by the mass media as an
unpatriotic torpedoing of defense production, reinforced a
growing public sentiment hostile to unions. An increasingly
powerful Congressional coalition of Republicans and conser-
vative Democrats, encouraged by businessmen, capitalized on
labor's shrinking public approval by enacting anti-labor
legislation. The Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act, passed
19
in mid-1943, aimed to limit union political and economic
rights by banning contributions to political candidates,
mandating that unions give a 30-day notice prior to
striking, and allowing for federal seizure of a struck
plant. State campaigns accompanied this national effort to
control unions, and in 1943 twelve states wrote into their
laws restrictions on union activities. From the point of
view of business, these laws did little to moderate shop-
floor militancy or derail the union drive against managerial
prerogatives. Indeed, workers used the strike vote required
under the Smith-Connal ly Act to increase the bargaining
power of their unions. •'^
The success of this legislative anti-union drive
revitalized the oppositional politics of the labor movement.
In mid-1943, the CIO sought to counter this conservative
shift in domestic politics by forming a Political Action
Committee. The PAC was intended to provide the structure to
enable the labor movement to play a decisive role in the
nation's political life. During the 1944 presidential
campaign, the PAC supported a broad liberal program and
1 8helped mobilize the New Deal coalition.
After reelecting Roosevelt and defeating some Con-
gressional reactionaries, the CIO seemed to be laying the
groundwork for a progressive post-war reconstruction effort.
Above all, labor feared the return of mass unemployment.
Many unionists looked to the government to guarantee con-
tinued high level economic activity. In preparation for
20
reconversion, the CIO proposed a program of Keynesian social
planning which included the expansion of the welfare state.
Labor's economic vision, which meshed with that of many New
Deal liberals including Roosevelt, found legislative
expression in January 1945 with the introduction of the
full-employment bill. Written by liberal economists
working in wartime regulatory agencies, it promised to
institutionalize the wartime state management of the economy
and to make Keynesian spending public policy. The full
employment bill had the support of a broad liberal-labor
coalition that included the AFL, the CIO, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the
National Farmers Union. In early 1945, given the widespread
concern reflected in opinion polls about economic readjust-
ment during the postwar, the measure seemed destined to
become law.-*-^
The PAC gained an undeserved reputation for political
power. Its attempt to supplement collective bargaining with
political activity, however, succeeded in alarming elements
of the business community. "From the standpoint of the
ultimate welfare of the people of the United States," wrote
one Missouri business executive, "I think there is no
question but that if labor is permitted to consolidate its
power and to use that power to elect more Claude Peppers and
Henry Wallaces to positions of authority, we shall find
ourselves in a position in which labor is stronger than the
21
government of the United States and is able to dictate to
it. "20
The end of the war in August 1945, ignited the already
explosive atmosphere of labor-capital relations. Immediate
cancellation of wartime contracts led to massive layoffs and
the initiation of the eventual demobilization of twelve
million service men and women threatened to further swell
the ranks of the unemployed. One quarter of all war workers
had lost their jobs by the winter of 1945. Among the
employed, income dropped as the return to the normal work
week resulted in the loss of overtime earnings. Workers
also suffered from down-grading to lower-paying jobs. At the
same time, within the factories, employers took advantage of
the return of unemployment to intensify their efforts to
o
1
restore managerial control.
In response, unions ended their no-strike pledge and
frustrated workers walked out, initiating one of the largest
strike waves in American history. In the year after V-J
Day, there were 4,630 work stoppages, involving almost five
million workers, resulting in the loss of 119.8 million man-
days of production. Many were wildcat strikes, while others
in the auto, steel, electrical, and packinghouse industries
were officially sanctioned both to alleviate pent-up wartime
tensions and to place pressure on employers to meet union
demands. Labor struggles in communities like Stamford,
Connecticut, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and Rochester, New
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York, took on the characteristics of class warfare,
expanding into city-wide general strikes. ^2
Implicit in these industry-wide strikes was a broader
trade-union interpretation of the implications of Keynesian
economics. The AFL and CIO argued that a healthy economy
required the redistribution of income— even if necessary at
the expense of corporate prof its--through government
spending and taxes and through a pluralistic industrial
relations bargaining structure. Through meaningful collec-
tive bargaining, labor would guarantee the success of
Keynesianism by gaining higher wages for its members and
stable prices for all consumers. Increased wage levels,
without price increases, were necessary to offset the recon-
version drop in worker income and to sustain working-class
purchasing power. Labor economists, like Solomon Barkin,
argued that a high volume of demand fueling mass production
was the critical element of full employment and
prosperity
.
Organized labor's wage-price theory triggered a
vigorous debate. Trade unionists argued that productivity
gains and the massive increase in corporate profits during
the war meant that industry could absorb the requested pay
increases without resorting to price increases. In October
1945, government economists supported this interpretation,
arguing that industry could increase wages by 24 percent and
keep production going while still earning profits at prewar
levels. Shortly afterwards, President Truman also endorsed
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wage increases "to sustain adequate purchasing power and to
raise the national income. "^"^
The business community cried foul, asserting that
government and labor economists had distorted projected
profit margins. Businessmen argued that forced redistribu-
tion of income would serve only to undermine the free enter-
prise system. Profits should not be related to wages as
they were critical to fueling further economic growth. The
only legitimate source of higher wages, asserted the
business journal Factory Managem ent and M aintenance
, was
"increased out-put per man-hour of work;" that is,
intensified production.
Most alarming for the business community were the
issues raised in the General Motors strike which began in
late November 1945. One student of the strike concluded
that Walter Reuther "consciously politicized the GM strike
by challenging managerial control of product pricing and by
emphasizing the stake the consuming public had in the
victory of the auto workers." " His demand that the auto
company open its books to union contract negotiators in
order to specifically link wages and prices to profits
seemed to businessmen to strike at the very essence of
capitalism. Moreover, by treading on the most sacred of
managerial prerogatives, Reuther epitomized the mounting
threat unions posed to employer control over their own
firms. In opposing Reuther, Leonard Westrate declared in
2 4
Automotive Industries, General iMotors was "fighting the
battle for all American industry and the free enterprise
system. "^"^
The results of the National Labor-Management Con-
ference, which took place during the GM strike, demonstrated
to many businessmen that Reuther's challenge to the
employers' right to manage represented just the spearhead of
an ever larger attack. Neither side could reach an agree-
ment on "either the prerogatives of management or the scope
of legitimate union demands. "28 Management conference
delegate Lee H. Hill reported that "high-handed" union
leaders with unlimited ambitions demanded either exclusive
union or joint control of many mangement functions. The
conference, asserted this former Al lis-Chalmers executive,
should have made clear even to sympathetic liberals in the
Administration that union leaders were "unswervingly
committed to programs . . . which in many parts are hope-
lessy unfair, preposterous, and unworkable. "^
^
All of this led many businessmen to believe that
America was in the midst of a serious social, political, and
economic crisis. Some placed the blame entirely on "the
entrenched monopolistic power of enormous international
unions," exercised by a handful of irresponsible labor
leaders. National Association of Manufacturers Chairman
Ira Mosher asserted that "we are now in the midst of one of
the greatest emergencies the country ever experienced."
Production was in a shambles because of the Truman
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administration's wage-price "squeeze" and because of the
mass strikes that constituted an "insurrection." Indeed
businessmen's very economic existence was held in the palm
of labor leaders' hands. Mosher bluntly charged that:
"Reuther decides whether or not we can have automobiles.
Murray decides when we can have steel to build automobiles
or refigerators or homes. Lewis determines whether we shall
have coal to turn the wheel of our industry, to heat and
light our homes." And finally "as if this were not enough,
Petrillo decides when and how we can have music. "^'-
II
There was a wide spectum of views among businessmen
over how best to preserve the capitalistic system in the
face of the crisis created by advocates of New Deal liberal-
ism and the labor movement. The answers posed by corporate
leaders roughly reflected the division of the business
community into two ideological camps that in many respects
reflected distinct segments of American industry. Tradi-
tional or practical conservatives often associated with the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce tended to come from smaller companies or from a
bloc of inf rastructural and primary goods industries like
steel. They generally distrusted the state and called for
the dismantling of much of the New Deal and all of the war-
time regulations. They especially denounced the meddling of
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the government in a peacetime economy through wage and price
controls or through Keynesian fiscal policies. ^2 Business-
men like Donaldson Brown of General Motors, J. Howard Pew of
Sun Oil, and Ernest T. Weir of National steel Corporation
spoke of the centrality of freedom and the value of indi-
vidual initiative and competition. Abridgement of economic
freedom would inevitably lead to such disasters as compul-
sory state control, collectivism, and possibly even facism.
Thus, the vice-chairman of the United Aircraft Corporation,
Eugene E. Wilson, warned that unless America returned to its
fundamental principles "Christian freedom will give way to
atheistic slavery, cooperation to compulsion, hope to fear,
equality of opportunity to privilege, and the dead hand of
bureaucracy will close the throttle on progress."
^
Traditional conservatives particularly chafed at the
abridgement of their economic freedom in the realm of indus-
trial relations. The growth of unionism in the 1930s and
especially under the auspices of the National War Labor
Board seemingly imposed strict limits on employer freedom of
action. Conservative businessmen viewed unions as illegiti-
mate, outside forces that fomented trouble and undermined
the naturally close relations between worker and employer.
Some staunch anti-union firms, like Weirton Steel and
Dupont, successfully opposed organizing drives. Companies
like General Motors, forced by the state to recognize
unions, still refused to accept their permanence. Even after
participating in collective bargaining, GM worked hard to
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contain or weaken the power of organized labor. At the same
time, within the political realm, the owners of these firms
backed the National Association of Manufacturers in its
campaign for the repeal or amendment of the Wagner Act to
protect employers against the "monopolistic power" of
34unions
.
At the other end of the spectum were the more sophisti-
cated conservatives or moderates who joined together in
organizations like the Business Advisory Council and the
Committee for Economic Development. Tending to come from
newer mass consumption-oriented industries or firms with
strong international connections, these corporate leaders
were less concerned with protecting competition. They
sought to moderate the New Deal, not destroy it. In
contrast with Donaldson Brown, CED founders like Marion
Folson of Eastman Kodak, Ralph Flanders, and Paul G. Hoffman
of Studebaker Auto Company looked to central economic
planning, albeit primarily influenced by business, to ensure
postwar prosperity. Hoffman borrowed a line from the NAM
conservatives when he dramatically warned in 1943 that
collectivism could come to postwar America, but only if
business did not protect against mass unemployment through
planning. It would come by default rather than "design on
3 Sthe part of revolutionaries."
The CED asserted that America could no longer afford
wild economic fluctuations. Instead of "ignorant opposition
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to change/' businessmen should help define a new role for
the state to promote economic growth and stability. in
1946, Hoffman challenged corporate leaders to "look one
important fact squarely in the face--that the Federal
Government has a vital role to play in our capitalistic
system." NAM conservatives "who claim that all that is
necessary is to 'unshackle free enterprise' are guilty of an
irresponsible statement," he went on. "Those who say that
the Federal Government's role is only that of an umpire have
their heads in the sand." The CED's message was that en-
lightened businessmen should not reject the state but should
provide positive policy programs to guide the government in
the correct direct ion.
^
Moderates tended to take an accomodationist attitude
towards organized labor. Rather than fearing unions, some
welcomed them with open arms. Progressive industrialists,
like Henry Kaiser or Eric Johnston, believed that if
properly directed, unions could "contribute to increased
1
7
industrial efficiency and social responsibility."
They acknowledged unions as legitimate representatives of
their employees and welcomed the cooperative arrangements
that government agencies promoted during the war. Through
these means and without giving up real power, these execu-
tives hoped to gain organized labor's cooperation in
increasing productivity and industrial stability. To these
businessmen, the NLRB was not an enemy but an ally in the
O O
development of responsible unions.
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Any attempt to categorize businessmen into two camps
obviously slights many shadings and variations. The busi-
ness community had many divisions within it and individual
businessmen often demonstrated little ideological consis-
tency. Many members of the CED like Henning W. Prentis of
Armstrong Cork or Clarence Francis of General Foods were
also prominent NAM activists. These men might accept an
enlightened attitudes towards an activist state but scowl at
progressive labor policy within their own plants. The CED,
in fact, worked hard not to alienate more conservative
businessmen, and individuals like Walter D. Fuller, presi-
dent of Curtis Publishing Company, could direct information
committees for both organizations. Fuller seemingly had
little difficulty with spreading the contradictory messages
of the NAM and CED to the business community and to the
public.
III
Mobilization of the business community actually began
during the war. The CED had as its principal founding goals
in 1942 the formulation of constructive postwar economic
policy. It sponsored research into reconversion problems
and through its Field Development Division and Information
Department sought to educate businessmen and popularize its
economic vision. By the end of the war over 2,800 autono-
mous CED committees of businessmen were working to achieve
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the CED objectives of postwar business expansion and level
employment. These committees, however, were to be
shortlived. in order to assuage the suspicions of the
older business organizations, like the NAM and the Chamber
of Commerce, the CED promised to disband its local groups at
the end of the conflict. Although its emphasis was
primarily on educating the business community, the CED
reached out to the public through a weekly national radio
program to allay the "fear of fear itself" and ensure that
the people were "informed on what the problems of reconver-
sion are, and how they are being met."^^
The older business organizations were not far behind
the CED. In 1942, the Chamber of Commerce initiated
structural changes to reinvigorate the organization. In
order to enhance its political influence the Chamber of
Commmerce established a Department of Governmental Affairs
to lobby Congress. It also formed 800 local level national
affairs committees to mobilize public opinion and apply
political pressure. The leadership of the organization
shifted hands from an old guard of traditional conservatives
to a new group of cautious moderates led by Eric A.
Johnston. Under Johnston's leadership, the Chamber offi-
cially moved closer to the sort of economic policies
endorsed by the CED. That is, it accepted the inevitablity
of government intervention in the economy but was prepared
to act decisively in defining the state's role.'*-'-
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In contrast, the National Association of Manufacturers
continued its steadfast support for individualism and
freedom from government interference. The need for wartime
unity, however, stopped outright attacks against New Deal
Liberalism. The organization moved towards refurbishing its
negative image and rebuilding business leadership. it con-
tinued a public relations program that began in the 1930s
but in more muted, subtle terms. Through newspaper adver-
tisements, radio programs, and other forms of mass
communications, the NAM stressed protection of free enter-
prise and the harmony of all classes. individual
corporations followed in the NAM 's steps with advertisements
in popular weekly magazines like The Saturday Evening Post
or Collier ^s
,
emphasizing freedom of enterprise and rugged
individualism. A Nash-Kelvinator Corporation piece, for
example, quotes an American soldier: "I'm not playing for
marbles. I'm fighting for freedom. I'm fighting for the
things that made America the greatest place in the world to
live in. . . So don't anybody tell me I'll find America
changed. . . Don't anybody tell me there's a ceiling on my
opportunity to make a million or be President. "^^
Fearing for the survival of private enterprise during
the war, the NAM tried to activate the business community in
its defense. Thus, the organization supplemented its
earlier public relations efforts with a program of public
relations forums. These meetings were designed to educate
businessmen as to the importance of spreading the kind of
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message found in the Nash-Kel vinator advertisement and to
provide practical lessons. Two held during the war and one
shortly after spoke to the need for a broaa, active conser-
vative business response to the problem of excessive
government intervention in the economy. ^'^
Although the NAM 's economic message certainly conflic-
ted with that of the CED, both organizations agreed on the
necessity of mobilizing the business community. The
principal point of agreement appeared to be the effort to
offset the growing influence of organized labor. Indeed,
battles fought in the immediate post-war years over full
employment, price controls, and labor legislation drew the
groups closer together and encouraged businessmen to seek
greater cooperation on at least the basic issues of the
post-war economy.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFENDING THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, 1945-1955
In early 1946 sociologist Robert Lynd observed that
"the old liberal enterprise system is on the way out and
business must organize and fight for its life." While
acknowledging ideological differences within the business
community, Lynd asserted that there was broad agreement
among employers that their two most critical problems were
defining the role of the state and of organized labor within
the economy. Business, he claimed, was prepared to "spend
unlimited money" in search of a solution. Two years later
Lynd perceptively outlined the strategic program embarked
upon by corporate leaders to regain political and economic
influence in the immediate post-war period. The business
community was determined "to organize its power more
systematically and continuously ... to control the federal
government" and "to curb the growing power of labor."
According to Lynd, the business' most insidious tactic was
the "selling of the 'private enterprise system' on the
theory that if you control public opinion you have the
2government in your hand and labor behind the eight ball."
In the post-war decade, there were a number of major
national issues still open to debate. American society had
yet to reach consensus on the relationship of government to
the economy, on the proper size of the welfare state, and on
the scope of union power in the factory. The two most
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central actors in this debate, the business community and
organized labor, had both awakened to the importance of
public opinion. Between 1945 and 1955, each launched
strenuous campaigns to shape national politics and create a
favorable climate of opinion for their opposing views. In
many respects, these national campaigns framed a debate that
would reach into factories, schools, churches, and communi-
ties over the next decade. At stake was the future of the
American economy.
Labor, particularly the CIO, had an aggressive politi-
cal program for post-war reconstruction. With liberal
Democrats and the support of the Truman administration,
labor's legislative agenda included tax reform, expanded
unemployment insurance, price controls, and a higher minimum
wage. The legislative centerpiece of a 1 iberal -labor vision
of the post-war order, however, was the Full Employment
Bi 1 1 . Labor demanded that government assure sufficient
employment opportunities for all Americans through support
of private investments and, if necessary , by government
spending. Full employment was to be the opening wedge for
post-war economic expansion and the Keynesian program of
using government spending to guarantee prosperity and
security
.
Factions of the business community mobilized to either
oppose or mediate the content of government-guaranteed full
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employment. To members of the NAM and local chambers of
commerce, the bill epitomized the long slide towards state
socialism. These business leaders denounced the Full
Employment Bill and initiated a lobbying campaign against
its passage and against the institutionalization of govern-
ment involvement in the economy.^ Instead of outright
opposition, moderate businessmen responded in a more sophis-
ticated manner. Adhering to a policy of providing positive
guidance the Business Advisory Council and the Council of
Economic Development diseminated reports on the employment
issue that accepted the idea of a limited federal involve-
ment in the economy but rejected compensatory government
spending as the solution to unemployment. Corporate
liberals like George M. Humphrey of the M.A. Hanna Company,
Ralph Flanders, Paul Hoffman, and Chamber of Commerce presi-
dent Eric Johnston worked quietly behind the scene to
provide support for conservative Congressmen who sought to
water down but not destroy the bill.*^
Moderate businessmen enjoyed the most success. When
the Employment Act passed in 1946, gone from the final
version was the government commitment to full employment and
the provisions for mandatory spending. What was left met
the specifications of the CED perfectly. The Act provided
that government should affirm an interest in maintaining
maximum employment through the establishment of research
machinery to evaluate the state of the economy. The
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responsiblity for providing employment, however, would
continue to reside in the private sector, it was, according
to one Business Council activist a "pretty innocuous" bill.
5
Moderates had taken important first steps in shaping the
limits of the debate over the role of the state.
If the employment act was a victory for the moderate
arm of the business community, conservatives could rejoice
in their role in eliminating governmental control over
prices. The Office of Price Control had been effective in
stablizing prices during the war. But important elements of
the business community chafed under its regulation and
complained about its inflexibility and restrictions on
profits.^ Moreover, business analyst Harold Fleming charged
that the OPA was stacked with people "with no business
experience and hostile to business wellbeing and indifferent
to business failure.""^
At the end of the war, many liberals joined with
organized labor in strongly advocating continuance of the
OPA to check inflation. The response of corporate leaders
reflected the divisions in the business community. The
Committee for Economic Development and moderate businessmen
like Eric Johnston acknowledged their dislike for economic
controls in peacetime but stood in fear of the dangers of
inflationary pressures generated by the war. Within the
context of a commitment of a free price system, the CED
quietly advocated renewal of the OPA on a temporary basis
o
and gradual relaxation of controls.
°
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Destruction of the OPA became the rallying cry of
laissez faire businessmen as its continuance during peace-
time epitomized to them America's drift towards collectiv-
ism. In late 1945, with the aid of industrial and
commerical trade associations, the NAM spearheaded "one of
the most carefully planned lobbying campaigns in legislative
history."^ The campaign was aimed both at the Congress,
which was considering renewal of the agency, and at the
public. In a lobbying effort similar to the one conducted
against the Full Employment Bill, yet more intense, the NAM
and other business groups testified before Congressional
commitees and pressured individual legislators. The NAM
alone spent over three million dollars in 1946 to destroy
the OPA. Half of that went to newspaper advertising. Full
page advertisements directed towards consumers began:
"VJould you like some BUTTER or a ROAST of BEEF" and alleged
that OPA controls had discouraged the production of butter
and driven meat into the black market. ''^
The NAM held a series of meetings with industrialists
to whip up local enthusiasm for the drive against price
controls. It also sent speakers to make hundreds of talks
before civic organizations, women's clubs and college
students. NAM publications barraged over one hundred
thousand school teachers, clergy, farm leaders, women's
clubs directors and over ten thousand weekly newspapers and
columists with anti-OPA statements.^ ^ "Take the wraps--
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wartime price controls-off peace production and there will
be such an abundance of things to buy as America has never
known" the NAM proclaimed. It promised that "if price
controls are removed goods will then pour into the market,
and then, within a reasonable time, prices will adjust
themselves--naturally--as they always have--in line with the
real worth of things. "^2 yes, said the NAM, it supported
price control but "price control by the American housewife,
not by bureaucrats in Washington."^
^
Fearful of a repeat of the disasterous inflation that
followed World War I, organized labor fought vigorously to
protect the wartime controls that were due to expire in June
1946. It joined in a liberal alliance of teachers, consumer
groups, veterans and civic organizations to stave off a "joy
ride to disaster." A "March of Housewives" paraded into
Washington in April 1946 and two thousand women representing
consumer groups demonstrated outside the Capitol. ''^ UAW
President R.J. Thomas warned autoworkers that the removal of
price controls threatened recently achieved wage increases.
The nam's full page ads proved that "dominant manufacturing
companies are 'hell bent' for inflation." Thomas accused
manufacturers of "conducting a strike which makes the labor
strikes look puny by comparison. This strike is against the
general public, and its objective is higher prices." The
UAW president urged the union members to organize their
local communities and vowed that "we most definitely have
the political power to help stop this drive to inflation. "^5
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R.J. Thomas was wrong. A congressional coalition of
Republicans and Southern Democrats gutted the OPA and the
NAM cheerfully took credit. Prices immediately jumped, some
as much as twenty-five percent in two weeks. Labor news-
papers admitted to the effectiveness of the employer
campaign, conceding that some of the public and even some
trade unionists had fallen for the NAM 's "big lie
technique." A UAW local paper quoted the editor of a small
Pennsylvania weekly: "When we saw that OPA was on the way
out, we joined in the snake dance that was led by the
National Association of Manufactures and unwittingly
swallowed the platitudes put out by that organization that
the end of price control would increase production and lower
costs." But, he continued, "After several months of eye-
rubbing, during which prices continued their steady climb .
. . we began to awaken to the fact that the NAM eyewash was
irritating rather than soothing." Having learned their
lesson "we had the courage to ask for the return of the OPA
if prices could not be controlled."^
The struggles against the Full Employment Act and price
controls were the beginning of a larger effort on the part
of the business community to undermine liberal and left-wing
influence on American society and to shift the political
climate in a more conservative direction. The tenacity of
liberal support for measures like price controls seemed to
demonstrate that the conservative business community's worst
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fears about the lessons the public would take from the
depression and wartime experiences were not unfounded.
Despite these early legislative successes, an expanded role
for the state and government guarantees of security for
workers through mechanisms like deficit spending appeared to
be highly popular. In October 1946, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation Vice President F.D. Newbury found "no clear
demand by the American people, or program from the Washing-
ton Administration, for returning to the tested principles
and practices of free private enterprise. Instead there
were "strong pressures within the Administration to
perpetuate as much planning and control as the people would
accept. "^^
Conservative businessmen trying to mobilize the
business community issued repeated and at times almost
hysterical warnings that the American way of life was under
attack. One business journal in 1947 found that the world
was in "the throes of a cataclysmic conflict. . . The lines
of the conflict are clearly drawn. The collectivist system
on the one side, the capitalistic system on the other. A
test for survival is in progress. "'•^ Leading the assault
on business and the American way of life were trade unions
assisted by the "pseudo-liberals, academic busy-bodies,
columnists, 'enlightened' newspaper men, radio commentators
and a galaxy of associated malcontents." Their "tirades"
against free enterprise were not new but the threat of
2 0
Communism overseas intensified the domestic danger.
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From every direction, businessmen found evidence of the
effectiveness of the liberal
-trade union indoctrination of
the public. Despite industry's war production record, the
business journal Factory warned that business was again on
the defensive and almost back into its prewar doghouse. ^1
The public tended to be suspicious of industry and had
little understanding of the American economic system. As a
result, workers bought trade union "propaganda" about
bloated corporate profits. Public Relations News found
"incontrovertible" evidence that almost the entire public
believed that corporate profits were from double to ten
times their actual rate.^^ In contrast, the labor movement
"retains the public's good will— or at least its patient
indulgence--in spite of stopping the public's trains,
planes, boats, trolleys, elevators, and even turning off its
lights." According to California businessman James L.
Beebe, "the people of the United States have been fed and I
think most of them have believed, that the state can provide
jobs; that capitalism is on its way out;. . . and that it is
the duty of the state to provide security (so-called) for
all of its people. "^^
Opinion surveys seemed to substantiate Beebe's fears.
Factory 's 1946 survey found that forty-seven percent of
factory workers thought that the government would do most in
providing new peacetime jobs.^^ Similarily, the Opinion
Research Corporation discovered that over seventy percent of
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workers believed that the government should guarantee
jobs. 26 For some corporate leaders the most startling
revelation in terms of the outlook for business growth and
survival was a Fortune poll that showed less than half of
those interviewed believed hard work would pay off. All
these findings seemed to demonstrate a lack of confidence
among the public in the free enterprise system.
There were differences within the business community as
to the seriousness of the threat to capitalism. Most
alarmist were the traditional conservatives associated with
the NAiM who had been finding evidence of a coming cataclysm
since the days of the New Deal. Fred G. Clark of The
American Economic Foundation, a conservative think tank
founded in the thirties, asserted that businessmen from
across the country agreed "that America is sitting on a
volcano," and that an overall plan should be adopted "at the
earliest possible moment" to "save America." Public rela-
tions experts, eager to promote their function in the
corporate hierarchy, provided a steady stream of dire pre-
dictions to add to the anxieties of these business leaders.
One public relations firm, for example, warned in 1947 that
"our present economic system, and the men who run it, have
three years— maybe five at the outside--to resell our so-far
preferred way of life as against competing systems." Ours,
the firm claimed, was "the 'last exhibit' of free enterprise
in the world. If we yield it by default, that's all there
..2 8is
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Sophisticated moderates, who accepted a growing role
for the government, were less likely to shout about
America's drift towards statism. They turned for evidence
to the findings of opinion polster Elmo Roper who emphasized
the fundamental belief of Americans in the values upon which
the free enterprise system was based. But even the
leaders of the CED agreed that the business community needed
to protect its reputation and ability to decisively influ-
ence America's political culture. Paul G. Hoffman argued
that it was "high time that we devote time and thought in
bringing about public understanding of the role of profits
in a free economy. "-^^
II
In the battle to save the "American way of life,"
businessmen utilized a combination of attack and persuasion.
After World War I, conservative business organizations had
exploited public fears over radicalism as a means of attack-
ing organized labor. Growing concerns about domestic
subversion and the Soviet Union again provided business with
the opportunity to utilize anti-communism as a weapon
against liberals and labor. In late 1945, business organi-
zations, like the Chamber of Commerce, allied with patriotic
groups, such as the American Legion, initiated a propaganda
campaign against communism in government and in the labor
movement. Warnings of Communist infiltration of American
49
institutions helped foster an atmosphere of intolerance. ^ 1
Symptomatic of their success in changing the political
climate was the firing during 1946 of dozens of liberal
radio broadcasters. Business sponsors also pressured other
reporters to "tone down" news sympathetic to organized
labor, Russia or liberal causes. -^^
The flipside of the battle against radicalism was the
promotion of a ultra patriotism. If international Communism
and domestic subversion threatened American values, what was
needed, according to Advertising Council director Thomas
D'Arcy Brophy, was a patriotic campaign which "would help by
attacking the root of the evil, which is the loss of faith
in our traditions. And it would help by selling the rewards
still open to us individually and collectively, if we are
willing to put American grit and sweat into our jobs."
From this concern over the subversion of American values
came educational-patriotic programs like the Freedom Train,
a red, white, and blue train that carried a cargo of his-
toric documents to communities throughout the country.
Initiated and strongly supported by the business community,
this patriotic campaign, which began in 1947, was designed
to re-sell Americanism to Americans. Although labeled non-
partisan, the emphasis on individual rights and freedom from
coersion constituted a subtle attack on the values promoted
by liberals and trade unioni st s.
In Detroit, the campaign to associate patriotism with
anti-unionism was less subtle. Support of American values
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could easily be extended to include support of business as
one of the America's central institutions. "An American's
Pledge of Loyalty." regularly broadcast in 1947 and 1948
over a Detroit radio station, implied that patriotic workers
owed their allegiance to more than their flag and country.
It read "I pledge devotion to God and the brotherhood His
word proclaims: I offer loyalty to the United Nations and
the world order it is maintaining: I vow to defend America
and the opportunities it contains; I promise to give my best
to America and American Industry and the homes it sustains."
UAW Local 600 caustically noted that such sentiments implied
that my country right or wrong had become my employer right
or wrong. Local 600 sarcastically asked workers: "Did you
give your best to American industry today. "-^'^
The business campaign to sell patriotism merged into an
equally fervent if even more intense campaign of persuasion
to sell Americans on the benefits of capitalism. Business-
men believed in the importance of public opinion. If the
public held industry in low esteem, it was because of a
general misunderstanding fostered by organized labor through
its denunciation of exhorbiant corporate profits.
Employers found justification for their faith in public
relations in the words of Abraham Lincoln, quoting his 1860
statement that "with public sentiment nothing can fail.
Without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds
public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or
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pronounces decisions--he makes statutes or decisions
possible or impossible to execute. it seemed increas-
ingly clear that the business community needed to mold
public opinion in a more systematic way. As a result,
business leaders from across the ideological spectrum vowed
to reeducate their employees and the public in the prin-
ciples and benefits of the American economic system.
Between 1945 and 1947, new organizations emerged with
the purpose of aiding the business community in restoring
"American" values. Among them were the Foundation for
Economic Education, formed in 1946, the Industrial Informa-
tion Institute, established in 1947, the American Heritage
Foundation, organized in 1947 to sponsor the Freedom Train,
and the Advertising Council, reorganized in 1945 from a
wartime agency. Ostensibly non-partisan, these groups
cooperated with such older opponents of New Deal liberalism
as the Tax Foundation and the American Economic Foundation.
Financial support came from the largest manufacturing
corporations and combined firms with ultra-conservative
outlooks (the DuPont Company, Sun Oil, and Republic Steel)
with others at the more liberal end of the business
3 7political spectrum, such as Ford and U.S. Steel.
There was a certain variety in the messages emanating
from these organizations as well as from individual
companies. The most conservative, like the Foundation for
Economic Education, emphasized absolute protection of its
version of America's freedom, particularly economic freedom
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Those representing the more liberal wing of the business
community, like the Advertising Council, recognized labor's
right to free collective bargaining and acknowledged the
necessity of government involvement in economic affairs
where private interests proved inadequate. But, there were
certain themes common to almost all the business efforts at
mass persuasion. Among them were importance of individual
initiative and opportunity, the role of competition, and the
legitimacy and economic necessity of profits. An N.W. Ayer
& Son advertisment, for example, explained that profits were
used "for practically the same purposes as the wages a
husband brings home Fridays." Much effort went into correc-
ting the public's "f antastic"ideas about the rate of
business profits and in easily understood language showing
the relationship of profits to investment and the growth of
the American economy.
Finally, business groups hammered home the necessity of
expanding productivity through the application of increased
mechanization, power, and efficiency. Workers, in particu-
lar, needed to understand that, despite union calls for
higher wages at the expense of profits, increased real wages
and an improved standard of living actually depended upon
greater productivity. The business journal Factory warned
in 1947 that workers "led by mistaken, overzealous, or
ignorant prophets, can price themselves out of jobs, and
industry along with them out of markets," unless they gave
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the "cooperation necessary for the production job that must
be done." in 1948, a Warner & Swasey advertisement asserted
that "It's just that simple: if you want lower prices, a
steady job, and more pay, you start with more efficient
production. And there's no other way."^^
At the forefront of the effort to correct the public's
thinking was the National Association of Manufacturers. At
the end of the war, the NAM gave top priority to expanding
and intensifying its already long-established public
relations campaign against what it called collectivism. It
asserted that the "battle between the advocates of collec-
tivism and those who believe in freedom and opportunity" had
been rejoined after the armistice imposed by all-out war.
The NAM believed it had to work quickly, contending that New
Deal liberals had joined forces with the CIO in an attempt
to "sell their respective 'bil 1-of-goods ' to the American
people" in order to prepare them for a "revolutionary change
in the nation's economy." The strike wave, price controls,
the "fallacious" principle of ability to pay as a factor in
fixing wage scales, and continued deficit spending and heavy
taxation constituted a "master plan to remake America." The
NAM was determined to help lead the counter-attack. '^^ In
1946-47, it raised a multi-million dollar war chest to sell
the free enterprise story, with additional funds allocated
for its more specific campaigns, such as those against the
full employment bill and price controls. Financial support
from the membership increased eacn year after the war.
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While 6,000 of the 16,000 members of the NAM contributed to
its public relations fund in 1946, over 11,000 contributed
the following year.^-'-
The organization revamped its public relations program
in 1946. Members and advertising experts had criticized the
nam's earlier efforts, asserting that it was suspect "by the
people whom management must reach." Too often, according to
advertising consultants, NAM publicity in defense of the
free enterprise sytem could be subverted and used by labor
to label industry as selfish and greedy. The NAM leadership
answered these concerns by trying to improve its advertising
techniques. It hired the Opinion Research Corporation to
field-test potential advertisements in order to establish in
advance their ability to "convey an idea and enlist sympa-
4 9thetic consideration."
The NAM began a more aggressive public relations
campaign. "The story of business economics and philosophy
needs to be told" declared Holcombe Parkes, NAM vice
president for public relations, "simply, understandably,
repetitious ly and without dilution or distortion --to broad
masses of the people." Accordingly, it issued a constant
stream of paid advertisements, news releases, speeches,
posters, leaflets, and magazines. The Industrial Press
Service, for example, sent free material to 7,500 country
papers and 2,500 company journals, while the organization's
literature department distributed in 1947 over two million
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pamphlets. The NAM newspaper and magazine advertising
campaigns, focusing on the three roadblocks to prosperity-
price controls, labor relations, government spending, and
taxes were brought to the public in early 19 4 6 through paid
ads in 265 daily papers and 1,876 small town papers.
Similarily, it ran ads explaining profits in popular
magazines like Harper ^s and Saturday Evening Post . Half of
the nam's two-and-a-half million dollar public relations
budget in 1947 went to national advertising and publicity.
Furthermore, newspapers often picked up NAM material and ran
it free of charge, while the complementary efforts of other
trade organizations to explain the workings of the American
economic system gave NAM 's program even broader exposure.
The NAM supplemented its written appeals with copy on
other media. It regularly distributed "Briefs for Broad-
casters" to 1,000 radio commentators and program directors.
In addition, NAM representatives made personal contacts with
network officers, local station managers, program directors
and com.m>entators. In 1946 it sought to recruit and train a
staff of full-time radio debaters for participation in the
popular forum-style programs like Town Hall. Busy and
oftimes unprepared industrialists, complained the NAM, had
not been particularly effective against the opposition that
assigned "someone trained in public brawling, armed to the
hilt with facts and figures, and bug-eyed with zeal for the
Leftist side of any debate. ""^^ Also, beginning in 1947,
instead of just relying on free radio time from the
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networks, the NAM bought its own airtime and began "visiting
some 3,000,000 American homes" with a radio series, "Your
Business Reporter." The program emphasized the need for
"keeping firm faith in the benefits and opportunities
provided by the American system of free enterprise in the
face of constant attacks from the left."'^^
Moreover, the organization expanded its motion picture
service to develop a wider audience before groups of
employees, club members, educators and students. Films,
like "American Anniversary" and "Your Town--A Story of
America" demonstrated the relationship of American freedoms
and opportunites to all other freedoms and showed the value
of individual initiative and the dependence of the community
on the industrial payroll. By 1948, yearly attendance at
NAM films had reached over two-and-a-half million people a
47year
.
The barrage of business messages appeared to deliver
immediate political gains. In the 1946 congressional
elections. Republicans rolled to a stunning victory, gaining
a majority in both houses for the first time since 1928.
Businessmen read the results of the 1946 congressional elec-
tion as evidence of the initial success of their prostely-
tizing campaign. Much of the public, wearied by constant
industrial strife and frustrated by the galloping infla-
tion, ever higher prices, and scarcity of consumer goods
seemed to accept the business explanation that organized
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labor was to blame for the country's economic woes.
Exploiting their impatience, Republicans campaigned on the
issues of curbing union power and the excesses of federal
authority, repeatedly asking "Had Enough?" Conservative
businessmen supported red-baiting Republican tactics and
linked labor disturbances to the "international Communist
conspiracy." The Chamber of Commerce, for instance, released
a report, entitled "Communist Infiltration in the United
States," at the height of the campaign. Meanwhile, in
cities like Milwaukee, division within the labor movement
over Communism helped undercut labor's political power.
The NAM interpreted the results of the election as a
public mandate. The message was "We are tired of government
regimentation and boot-strap economics." It seemed clear
that the public was turning back to the business community
for leadership: "let's see what business can do to lead us
to better days. Let's give business a fair chance to prove
that our way of life is better than any other system in the
world. ""^^ Similarily, the election said to Charles E.
Wilson of General Motors that "America has chosen the fork
in the road that leads to freedom and personal liberty. The
majority of our citizens have had enough, enough of bureau-
cratic government planning . . . enough of unbalanced budget
and governmental extravagances; enough of organized
unemployment.
"
The conservative political resurgence combined with the
apparent decline in labor's public esteem gave the business
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community more power and unity in its growing battle against
unions. Heeding Thomas Roy Jones's call that "Management
must wake up" to the dangers of the labor movement's "mad
lust for power" business leaders had reached consensus over
the future direction of labor relations policy.
This convergence of opinion added strength to the
emerging corporate strategy designed to restore management's
lost authority and roll back union power. The NAM figured
prominently in this first step towards a successful
"recovery of the initiative" in labor relations. At the end
of the war, attempting to change its negative image, the NAM
muted its attack on labor by abandoning the demand for
industrial self-rule, laissez faire, and the repeal of the
Wagner Act. NAM leaders publicly acknowledged workers'
rights to engage in collective bargaining but called for
changes in public policy that would enable the state to
intervene on behalf of employers. While some corporate
liberal businessmen might publicly applaud the efforts of
progressives like Eric Johnston, Paul Hoffman of Studebaker
Motors and Henry Kaiser to promote union-management accomo-
dation, most, even in the CED, joined the NAM conservatives
in promoting a strategy that historian Howell John Harris
has labeled "realism." It entailed reluctant acceptance of
the principle of unionism while actively attempting to
restrict the scope of collective bargaining and to contain
labor power. By early 1946, it was clear to sociologist
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Robert Lynd that in labor relations, liberal and conserva-
tive businessmen had become "brothers under the skin."^^
The first part of this multi-pronged attack on labor
involved "the confinement and gradual reduction" of the
scope of collective bargaining and union influence within
the factory. This effort had begun towards the end of the
war and intensified during reconversion, with the auto
companies setting the trend during the 1945-1946 bargaining
round. Determined to save "our American system and keep it
from evolving into an alien form imported from east of the
Rhine," General Motors refused to negotiate with Reuther
over corporate investment and pricing policy. Moreover,
it provoked a work stoppage rather than capitulate to
labor's attempt to expand the scope of collective bargaining
into the realm of management decision making. Henceforth,
bargaining would be limited to such issues as wages, hours
and working conditions. Similarily, seeking improved
control, stability and predictability. Ford Motor Company
demanded and received security from the UAW against un-
S 6
authorized strikes and freedomi to maximize product ion. ^ In
late 1946, management consultant Ralph A. Lind observed that
never before had management been so conscious of the need to
make collective bargaining "a two-sided proposition."
Employers were "becoming increasingly insistent that the
unions . . . recognize the rights of management and the
5 7
obligations of employees and union officials."
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The second part of the struggle to curb the power of
industrial unionism involved weakening government support of
organized labor through revision of the Wagner Act. The
NAM, together with such organizations as the Business
Advisory Council, developed a relatively moderate set of
legislative proposals that reflected the emerging business
consensus on labor. The NAM argued that the business program
was not punitive but was designed to make collective bar-
gaining work in the public interest. Under the Wagner
Act, former NAM president H.W. Prentis argued, unions had
gained unlimited monopoly power without any legal responsi-
bility. They intimidated their members and the public
through mass picketing, boycotting, and violence and had
crippled the country's economic progress through restrictive
practices that undermined productivity. Even more fundamen-
tally troubling to Prentis was the "ominous rise of class
consciousness, engendered by legalized labor union
C Q
activity." The "House of Labor," intoned Detroit manu-
facturer Frank Rising, had become "a nuisance in the
ft f)
neighborhood. ""
What business spokesmen demanded was legislation that
would bring balance between labor and management. The
absence of true equality and the failure to protect
employees and the public from unions had resulted in the
growth of the monopoly power of labor which was the cause of
the ever increasing levels of industrial strife. This was
the message that the NAM broadcast in a series of newspaper
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ads in February 1946. It proposed to protect employees
through guaranteeing employer free speech, prohibition of
union security clause to ensure the right to work, and
regulation of union's internal affairs. The public rights
would be guarded by regulating strikes that threatened the
nation's safety and by outlawing sympathetic and jurisdic-
tional strikes as well as secondary boycotts. In addition,
requirement of proof that union officers were not communists
would help rid the labor movement of subversive influence,
while prohibitions against union contributions to federal
political campaigns would limit organized labor's political
power. Finally, the exclusion of foremen from collective
bargaining would provide safeguards for the rights of
management and help offset the union challenge to managerial
6 1prerogatives
.
In the spring of 1947, aided by the Chamber of
Commerce, employer associations, and individual corpora-
tions, the NAM threw its full strength behind the Taft-
Hartley bill, the labor reform legislation that came out of
the Republican dominated eightieth Congress. The Associa-
tion conducted an intense lobbying campaign in Washington.
It attached equal im.portance to obtaining public support and
utilized the public relations mechanisms at both the com-
munity and national levels that had helped destroy price
controls and promote a conservative political atmosphere.
The NAM alone spent over three million dollars in the public
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relations drive that featured full page ads in 287 daily
papers in 193 key industrial centers. Always, employers
couched their arguments for labor reform constructively, "in
the puplic interest. "^-^
A compliant press aided business in mobilizing public
opinion. The weekly Quincy Record of Illinois, for example,
engaged in a blitz of pro-Taf t-Hart ley coverage. it re-
printed the bi-weekly talks of Henry J. Taylor, the General
Motors sponsored radio commentator. Playing on public fears
of radicalism, Taylor charged that those who oppose labor
reform were Communist fellow-travellers who sought to weaken
America by "hamstringing our individual effort through
lopsided labor law . . . through sponsoring false economic
doctrines that can bust us, along with political action
dedicated to tying up management so that it cannot possibly
manage." The paper endorsed Taylor's ideas and contended
that Taft-Hartley was not anti-labor; it really protected
workingmen "from coercions from any source." It asked
workers to look beyond their narrow class interests, arguing
that the legislation would be used as a tool in the public
interest to fight inflation through lifting arbitrary union
rules "which exploit the worker in his other role as a
customer of goods and services." Arguments such as these
flooded the newspapers and airways. In June 1947 conserva-
tives and the business community celebrated victory when
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over a presidential
64veto
.
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The labor movement did not just surrender before this
managerial onslaught. Its defense centered on two strate-
gies. First, trade unionists, the labor press, and their
allies tried to counter employer propaganda efforts. In
late 1947, for example. Senator Harley Kilgore blasted the
NAM before the Senate, exposing the various techniques used
by the organization to "soften up the country" and denounced
its role in killing price controls, wrecking the Wagner Act,
and attempting to "emasculate" the wage and hour law.^^ For
their part, trade union leaders were alarmed over employer
public relations programs. They paid close attention to the
activities of the NAM and individual employers like General
Motors. Labor papers warned workers that business was
funding "a vast outpouring of propaganda —millions of
printed words and thousand of hours of radio time" designed
"to convince the American people that labor is a 'monopoly'
and that its organizations should be weakened to "give
business an even break. "^^ Indiana State CIO president Neal
Edwards sent letters to the membership pointing out the NAM
tricks
:
"Read carefully between the line and do your own
thinking. Take such NAM propaganda with a grain of
salt. Your own power of reasoning, based on true facts,
will aid tremendously in our efforts to expose the NAM
for what it is, . . . industrialists organized for the
soul purpose of protecting their profit-bursting
pocketbooks . " 67
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Organized labor also warned workers to be wary of the
seemingly non-partisan campaigns to sell free enterprise
orginating from liberal business organizations like the
Advertising Council. While the Council's campaign was in
its planning stages in early 1948, the labor press pointed
out that the project, which would overshadow the NAM 's
national advertising, was an "audacious billion-dollar plan"
designed to "sell the American people on the virtues of big
business." Trade unionists chortled with glee when Marshall
Adams, a director of the Association of National Adver-
tisers, denounced the campaign, which boiled "down to an
effort to cover up the evils of the private enterprise
system and to propagandize against changes to improve that
system." The average "Joe Doakes," Adams declared, "doesn't
need to be sold on 'the American way of life."^^ Similarily
the Railway workers journal. Labor, ridiculed these efforts
calling them the "biggest 'ballyhoo campaign in history."
What is wrong with free enterprise, the paper asked if
"after having its own way all these years, it must now be
'sold' in this lavish way?"^^
Trade unionists asserted that the class nature of mass
communications prevented fair coverage. The CIO News
charged that most daily newspapers and radio stations had
close ties to an interlocking web of such large corporations
as Eastman Kodak, General Mills, U.S. Steel, International
Paper Company, and AT&T. It was only natural that the press
would follow a policy of "damming labor at every opportunity
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while carefully glossing over the sins of the banking and
industrial magnates who really control the nation. "^0 In
1946, the Greater Buffalo Industrial Union, infuriated at
the "anti-labor" and "anti-CIO" coverage of the Buffalo
Evening News, resolved to expose the paper's intent to
destroy the public's civil liberties and legal rights. ^^
Similarly, Pennsylvania unionists warned members against
newscasters like Fulton Lewis Jr., a propagandist in the
employ of the NAM and the Republican Party, while labor
leaders at the Ford Motor's Company's River Rouge plant
cautioned fellow workers that the Detroit daily press was
spreading lies day and night to "demoralize the rank and
file of our great union." UAW foundry worker Leroy Krawford
simply urged: "Believe only our union press and radio
hookup which is paid for by you and staged by you to tell
you the score. ""^^
"Watch out," organized labor also told its members, for
those "phony" opinion polls that always seemed to provide
ammunition to employers. A 1947 Opinion Research Corpora-
tion poll, for instance, apparently showed that while most
workers opposed the Taft-Hartely Act, they supported ten of
the most important provisions of the Act when presented
separately. These findings were publicized in a Look
Magazine article and in full page advertisements sponsored
by companies, like General Electric, General Motors, Union
Carbide and J.I. Case as well as widely distributed among
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factory employees and editorial writers. Labor and Nation
charged that this poll was simply "planned conf us ion."'^
^
In an effort to undercut the political uses of these
polls in 1948, the Building Services Employees Union engaged
pollster Robert C. Myers who reported that "much of the
polling reported in today's newspapers and magazines is
unscientific, biased, and slipshod." Similarily the AFL
accused pollsters of the "worst kind of fraud. They are big
business organizations which are used to influence rather
than measure public opinion. ""^^ Trade unionists also
pointed to sociologist Arthur Kornhauser's 1946 study of
major public-opinion polling agenices, which found that the
questions on labor were biased towards a management point of
view. Not surprisingly, since polling was a profit making
enterprise, according to the Pennsylvania Labor News
,
pro-
corporation pollsters were featured speakers at a NAM public
relations conference.
The second part of the labor union defense against
business aggressiveness involved publicizing the union point
of view, both to activate the rank and file and to gain a
more sympathetic hearing from the public. In general,
however, unions reacted to an agenda set by the business
community. A great deal of effort, for example, went into
refuting employer calls for higher productivity. Walter
Reuther declared that the employer propaganda campaign on
productivity was an "effort by management to swell already
scandalously high profits by sweating still more profits out
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of workers. Similarily, much union ink was spilled in an
effort to disprove employer charges that wage increases led
to inflation. Following Keysenian reasoning, the CIO argued
that, rather than harming the economy, wage increases were
necessary to sustain mass purchasing power and prevent a
depression. in 1946, it widely publicized the Nathan
Report, which demonstated that wages could be increased
thirty-eight percent without price increaes and without
affecting profit levels. The post-war strike wave,
declared a resolution sent by New York workers to their
Congressional representatives, arose from workers' attempt
to sustain their standard of living and should not be blamed
on unions but "on the bosses who are constantly refusing to
meet the workers' needs. "^^
The CIO asserted that inflation actually came from
shortages manufactured by employers to drive up prices and
profits. To prove this, labor papers constantly charted
increases in corporate profits in articles like one pub-
lished in the United Automobile Worker entitled "Golden
Goose Hangs High, Profit Orgy Paves Way to Depression." Big
business, asserted the CIO, was "having about as much luck
as the mahout who tried to hide his elephant in a pup tent"
in selling the public on the idea that corporate profits
were not too high.°
Unions rarely had the means to compete with biased
newspapers in terms of news coverage, nor could they compete
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with business groups in purchasing extensive newspaper
advertising. Consequently, the labor movement looked
increasily towards radio as a means of gaining support for
union programs. in 1939, the National Association of Broad-
casters had adopted a code that prohibited the discussion of
controversial issues except for political broadcasts on the
radio. Many radio stations used the code to effectively bar
unions from the airways while providing time to business
groups like the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce. Beginning
in 1944, the AFL and the CIO began pressuring radio stations
and the Federal Communications Commission for access and in
1945, ABC provided airtime to the CIO which produced a
weekly program "Labor-U.S.A."^^ The program used music,
stories and interviews to explain labor's views on current
issues. The CIO promoted other labor radio programs as "a
good antidote to the anti-strike poison you get from news-
papers and from many radio commentators." The CIO gleefully
reported that a Variety review of the competing business and
labor radio programs found that "'Labor' is warm,
ingratiating, human," while the "exact antonyms characterize
the 'business' pitch'" It wasn't possible, according to
Variety to balance the voice of ex-NAM president Ira Mosher
against Tom Glaser singing a ballad like 'Money in the
Pocket" and "expect anyone to cheer for the NAM. It just
o n
isn't in the cards."
To gain greater exposure, the CIO asked affiliates to
urge their local radio stations to broadcast the program as
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well as a second network program spnsored by CBS, "Cross-
Section— CIO. " Local unions and central bodies also began
sponsoring programs. in 1946, Lansing, Michigan, UAW locals
began a radio program, "Labor Speaks," to support their
strike against General Motors. Finally, in January 1948,
the CIO tried to broaden its appeal, producing the first
weekly labor quiz show. "It's in the Family" featured two
rank-and-file families competing for a savings bond by an-
swering questions about labor, the CIO, and current
event s . ^
As the anti-labor assault intensified, unions began to
aggressively challenge the coverage of labor on commercially
owned stations. In January 1948, the UAW petitioned the FCC
for a hearing on censorship, charging that a Cincinnati
station had refused to broadcast a program by the Catholic
Church regarding its position on organized labor. ^'^ About
the same time, the Geneva Federation of Labor, incensed at
Fulton Lewis Jr.'s attacks on social security and the labor
movement, tried to drive him off the air by boycotting his
o c
local sponsor, the Geneva Federal Loan.°
The trade union public relations efforts, however,
lacked the resources and the sophistication of the business
community's free enterprise campaign. Of the national
unions, the UAW and the United Electrical Workers were
perhaps the most active. The class oriented nature of the
left-wing UE program partially backfired, however, for it
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provided fuel to business claims of Communist indoctrination
of the working class. Finding that their own members as well
as the public were "subjected hour after hour and day after
day to employer propaganda," the UE launched its program in
1946 to counteract these "forces of confusion and reaction
at work throughout our nation." its activities included
the establishment of the first union weekly news broadcast,
entitled "An Informed America is a Free America," the
distribution of a modest amount of literature, including a
guide to community action and pamphlets directed at the
public schools, and the production and distribution of
motion pictures. The business journal, Public Relations
News, characterized "Deadline for Action," the UE's first
picture, as an "exceptionally well made and compelling movie
which castigates business and industry as a gang of
profiteers
,
war mongers and slave drivers. " The film became
almost as popular among businessmen as among workers as
business groups bought copies to demonstrate the dangers
o c
facing America.
The struggle against the passage of Taft-Hartley
revealed union limitations in the realm of moral suasion.
In early 1947, the specter of anti-labor legislation
energized the labor movement. Unions lobbied furiously in
Washington, organized a massive letter writing campaign and,
in the weeks prior to passage held huge public protest
rallies to arouse their membership and the public. The CIO
promoted a publicity campaign entitled "Defend Labor Month"
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in an effort to mobilize local communities against the
legislation. CIO Publicity Director, Len DeCaux, urging
affilitates to gain radio time to present labor's position,
distributed radio spot announcements and scripts for
speeches and interviews. ^"^ Emulating the NAM, the AFL ran
five advertisements in one hundred leading newspapers
warning "Don't be a NAM fool". It declared that Taft-
Hartley sought to "destroy free enterprise by destroying
labor." In an appeal to anti-radical sentiments. The AFL
contended that "by prohibiting free bargaining among
freemen," Taft-Hartley "would wreck our nation's position as
the defender of democracy and the champion of freedom in the
fight to halt further expansion of Communism." In the last
weeks of the campaign, the AFL topped off its written
appeals with a daily soap opera that began "Lady, down in
Washington they're trying to push through a slave-labor bill
that will slice your husband's envelope right down the
middle," and with weekly variety shows featuring such
o o
popular stars as Milton Berle and Jimmy Durante.
Despite labor's efforts, the Taft-Hartley bill became
law. The business community seemingly had helped shape
public opinion more effectively than the unions. According
to one commentator, "the words 'radical labor leaders' have
been linked together in people's minds as ineradicably as
the phrase, 'damyankees , ' is in Georgia. "^^ Similarily,
local UAW leaders found that thousands of their fellow
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workers had "been stampeded into making grave mistakes due
to the vast propaganda arms of the corporations." ^ 0 Critics
charged that labor's effort to derail labor reform had been
too little, too late, uncoordinated, and ill conceived. The
liberal journal Labor and Nation found that despite a few
publicity campaigns the crucial period of political man-
euvering prior to the introduction of Taft-Hartley was
distinguised "by a general passivity on the part of labor
in the face of increasingly vocal attacks. "^^
The apathy of labor during the 1946 campaign helped
anti-labor forces plant the idea that the public had given a
mandate to curb unions. It was only at the very last minute
that unions actively resisted the Congressional drive and
then their campaign was not effectivly organized or gener-
alized. Moreover, contended economist C.W. Anrod in a post
mortem, the split in the house of labor between the AFL and
CIO handicapped unions while industry proceeded along an
united well coordinated front. Labor, agreed Labor and
Nation
, offered only opposition and never "united in a
positive statement of aims" designed to guide workers and
9 2progressives and win public support.
The passage of Taft-Hartley and the success of conser-
vative initiatives during the Eightieth Congress seemed to
indicate that the Republicans were gaining political momen-
tum. Thus, the Republican Party and their business
supporters approached the 1948 election with great confi-
dence prepared to cement their accession to political power
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by capturing the presidency. The splintering of the
Democratic party with the emergence of two third party
candidates combined with the nomination of the unpopular
Harry Truman also added strength to the predicted guarantee
of a Republican victory.
Taft-Hartley, however, had galvanized the labor
movement. Hoping for the law's repeal and the defeat of the
"reactionary" eightieth Congress, unions recognized the need
for the full mobilization of labor's political power. in
January 1948, CIO Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey declared
that purely economic action would not solve labor's
problems. It had become clear that gains achieved on the
picket line could be easily erased by political action.
"Organized labor must not and will not," he continued "take
these political and legislative defeats standing still.
Organized labor must develop new and more effective politi-
cal weapons, not only to repeal vicious anti-labor legisla-
tion, but to remove from office those lackeys of big
business responsible for its passage. "^^
New more effective political action entailed the AFL's
formation of Labor's League for Political Education and its
formal participation for the first time in a presidential
campaign. Wedded to the emerging anti -communist liberal
consensus, the CIO rejected Henry's Wallace's Progressive
third-party candidancy and joined in an alliance with
Truman, who had mended his fences with labor by vetoing
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Taft-Hartley. The alliance with the Democrats was so
intense that in some states, like Michigan, the CIO's
Political Action Committee actually took over the party.^^
The PAC designed a new strategy for the 1948 campaign,
carefully divorcing unions from Communism and reaching
beyond labor circles for support by emphasizing that unions
supported objectives that were "shared by the overwhelming
majority of Americans." These included the maintenance of a
domestic economy that guaranteed full employment, adequate
housing, health care, education and social security, and the
assurance of full political and civil equality and equal
economic opportunities for all "men and women in our country
of every race, creed or color. "^^ Above all, both the AFL
and CIO emphasized overcoming rank-and-file apathy by
getting out the labor vote, arguing, that low turnout by
workers frustrated with Truman had been a decisive factor in
the 1946 defeat. Labor made a heroic effort to help elect
Democratic candidates, distributing literature, sponsoring
radio programs, and fielding an army of precinct workers to
q -jget voters to the polls. Finally, labor participation m
the 1948 election involved setting aside in some locales of
the bitter struggle between the AFL and CIO. In Massachu-
setts, for instance, faced with three "vicious anti-labor
referenda," the AFL, the CIO and the liberal organization,
the Americans for Democratic Action, formed a "historic
pact" to overcome the disunity in the ranks of organized
Q Q
labor that had contributed to the 1946 "debacle."^"
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Truir.an in turn appealed for working class support by
conducting a slashing anti-business campaign. He charged
that the Republican party was in the hands of big business.
Before farmers, he accused Wall Street "gluttons of
privilege" of attacking the structure of agricultural price
supports. Truman challenged conservative fears of
collectivism. In late October in Chicago, for instance, he
drew an apocalypic image of the American way of life under
attack. The danger came not from the obvious threat of
Communism but from "powerful reactionary forces which are
silenty undermining our democratic institutions." Those
behind these forces were men "who are striving to concen-
trate great economic power in their own hands." Truman
warned that great corporations had been steadily expanding
their power. They controlled the Republican Party which
recently had delivered gains to the private power, big oil,
railroad and real estate lobbies. Big business, not labor,
was responsible for the high cost of living. Wrapping
himself around the image of the New Deal, Truman reminded
his Chicago audience that in 1933, the Democratic party
"drove the money-changers out of the temple and brought new
life to our democracy. "^^
In one of the sharpest class votes in American history,
Truman won an unexpected victory over Thomas Dewey, his
Republican opponent, and the Democrats regained control of
Congress. Labor played a special part in that victory. -'^^
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J. William Belanger, president of the Massachusetts State
CIO, which had been part of the coalition that helped defeat
that state's anti-labor referendum, concluded that organized
labor's venture into politics had succeeded. Labor, united
with liberal forces, had overcome power of "selfish wealth."
In the period after the war these men had "combined as never
before to destroy us," Belanger continued. "The great
powers of their minion press, the persuasive voices of their
radio hirelings, the inaccurate minds of the political
pollsters, merged their power.
. . but reckoned without
.
.
the sound and patriotic common sense of the little men and
women. "^^^ Trade unionists celebrated the victory as an
endorsement of liberalism and a call for the extension of
the New Deal. According to a Pennsylvania AFL paper, tne
election marked an "awakening of a new political conscious-
ness." The people had "delivered a mandate for free labor
unions, for extended social security, for increased educa-
tion opportunity for all Americans, for civil right for all,
for the end to dangerous profits and for control of
inflation. "^02
IV
The result of the 1948 election stunned the business
community. It indicated that the hold of conservatives over
the public seemed tenuous. Business ideologues apparently
had not succeeded in convincing voters that freedom from
"government paternalism" was more important than the
77
economic security promoted by both labor and the Democratic
party. Indeed, Truman had effectively campaigned on a
program calling for the repeal of Taft-Hartely
, the restora-
tion of price controls to protect earnings, and the
expansion of government spending. To a shaken business
community, it was not inconceivable that many of their
achievements would be rolled back. General Foods Vice
President Thomas G. Spates observed that "when the smoke of
last November's election had cleared away there was revealed
a
. . .
rededication to the policy of achieving the more
abundant life through more taxes, more spending, more
controls and less liberty, and a clear declaration that the
government should stand for the welfare of the people."
These goals, according to Spates, were actually inconsistent
with the American idea of government as the servant of the
people and "a guarantor of equality of opportunity."-^ '^^
Moreover, the critical role of labor in the campaign
convinced Spates and other businessmen that unions were even
more politically powerful than they had feared. Business
Week editor Merlyn Pitzler warned a United States Chamber of
Commerce gathering that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
had "committed the unions to political activity on a scale
and at a pace never before approached." Taft-Hartley,
designed in part to weaken labor politically, had seemingly
backf ired. ^^"^
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What then, asked businessmen, was the lesson to be
learned from the 1948 election? Was it impossible for the
business community to sell its values and its world view to
the American public? No, thundered speaker vmiiam
McMillen to the December 1 948 convention of the Nation
Association of Manufacturers. The election showed that:
"You just haven't done enough of what you have been doing."
Businessmen, McMillen demanded, must intensify their efforts
"to convince those American who are confused that the road
to statism, tyranny, and slavery is paved with good inten-
tions and lighted with great 'welfare' schemes." Freedom
indivisible and unimpaired, he continued, was "the only
fertilizer of well-being," and "teamwork based on mutual
understanding is the only guarantee of either individual or
collective happiness." Business leader Thomas G. Spates
added urgency to McMillen's call for a renewed commitment
from the business community, warning in early 1949 that time
was short but there still was "a fighting change" to save
"this nation as a democracy.
Both moderate and conservative business organizations
vowed to redouble their efforts. The first major campaign,
emanating from the more moderate wing of the business
community, began the week after the election. Fearful that
ignorance of the benefits of the American economic system
increased the public's susceptiblity to Communist subver-
sion, in 1947 the Advertising Council had started planning
its economic education campaign. The Council's Industries
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Advisory Committee, led by General Foods and General
Electric donations of $100,000, spearheaded fundraising.
Other substantial donors included General Motors, Johnson
and Johnson, Procter and Gamble, Goodrich, Republic Steel,
Remington Rand, while four advertising agencies volunteered
their services to create the campaign. By late 1949,
advertisers, media, and agencies had supplied $3,000,000 in
time and space.
The Council's message stressed the need for free enter-
prise to expand productivity through mechanization and
increased efficiency. During the first six months, radio
spots barraged the public, and the four major networks each
pledged half-hour special programs on economic education.
Within two years newspapers ordered over 13 million lines of
advertising, national advertisers and publishers sponsored
over 600 pages of magazine ads, 300,000 car cards, and 8,000
billboards extolling the virtues of capitalism. During the
same period, the Council distributed 1.5 million copies of a
free pamphlet on the advertisements. In "The Miracle of
America," Uncle Sam explained "Why Americans live better,"
"How machines make jobs," and "Why freedom and security go
together." Look, the Scholastic magazines. Opportunity and
41 company publications also reprinted or digested the
pamphlet. The publisher of Junior Scholastic magazine
guaranteed that the March 1950 issue, incorporating the
complete "Miracle of America," would be the "main subject of
80
discussion" in 15,000 junior and senior high schools
throughout the country, '-^^
The NAM intensified its education activities while
other trade associations, including the American Petroleum
Institute, the National Association of Electric Power
Companies and the American Medical Association, began major
public relations campaigns to derail Fair Deal programs on
such issues as natural resources, public power, and health
care. J. Warren Kinsman, chairman of the NAM's Public
Relations Advisory Committee and vice president of Dupont,
reminded businessmen that "in the everlasting battle for the
minds of men" the tools of public relations were the only
weapons "powerful enough to arouse public opinion suffi-
ciently to check the steady, insidious and current drift
toward Socialism." The NAM contributed to this ideological
battle by stepping up distribution of its pamphlets. It
increased its production from 2.5 million in 1948 to 6.5
million in 1949, to nearly 8 million in 1950.-^^^
The media also became a more important vehicle for
carrying the business story to the public. As part of its
commitment to reach more people, in early 1949 the NAM began
a new $1.5 million weekly program featuring singers and
interviews with businessmen. Early on, the association
recognized television's potential. In 1950, it launched a
weekly program, "Industry on Parade." Unlike NAM radio
programs which emphasized the association's position on
business, economic, and social problems, the television
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program took a more subtle approach. it showcased
companies, explained how products were made, and demon-
strated what industry gave to individuals, communities and
the nation. The goal was to make industry, as opposed to
organized labor, "the symbol of progress and hope for the
majority of people." The program had an immediate impact.
In early 1952 Oklahoma City reported that the series ranked
among the first five programs in popularity, and Milwaukee
gave "Industry on Parade" a higher audience rating than
"Meet the Press," telecast in the same time segment.
Corporations as well as the NAM also showed greater
interest in movies and television. Since the thirties,
companies like Ford, Dupont, U.S. Steel, and Firestone had
sponsored highly prestigous classical music and serious
drama programs designed to improve the corporate image.
They sold ideas as well as products. Ford executive William
J. Cameron incensed labor with his intermission talks on the
"Ford Sunday Evening Hour" which attacked New Deal programs
and government interference in business. In the late
forties and fifties, corporations shifted some of this kind
of programming into television. They also dramatically
expanded their production of movies for rent-free distribu-
tion to clubs, schools, churches, and theaters as well as to
television. By late 1951, business-sponsored movies reached
an audience of 20 million people every week, more than a
third of the nation's weekly attendance at commercial
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movies. That represented a 30 percent larger audience than
in 1950 and a 500 percent increase since 1946.
Some films simply promoted products or, like "The
DuPont Story/' showcased a firm's history. others had much
more explicit economic messages, like the films distributed
by the National Education Program, an ultra conservative
organization founded in 1948 on the campus of Harding
College in Arkansas. Between 1949 and 1951, Alfred P. Sloan
of General Motors gave the NEP $600,000 to establish a
motion picture service to produce and distribute films
attacking communism, teaching the facts of the American
private enterprise system and warning that government
interference in the economy led to social ism. ^
Corporations also stepped up their efforts to create a
nationwide legion of articulate business spokespersons. In
1 949, a joint committee of the Association of National
Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising
Agencies instituted "Freedom Forums" which were held on a
regular basis at Harding College. At the first meeting,
over 100 industrialists from companies like Armco, J.I.
Case, Genral Electric, General Mills, Kohler, Quaker Oats,
and Chrysler sat through "long sessions of indoctrination in
the fundamentals of our economic system." They discussed
"the most effective channels of communication needed to give
an understanding of America to those who are confused or
apathetic," and left "determined to interpret the system in
understandable terms to both management and labor.""'"-'"''"
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unions attempted to counter the business message. Both
the AFL and CIO defended Truman's Fair Deal, arguing that
employers opposed expanding social security, unemployment
compensation and health insurance but favored "welfare
state" projects which helped business, like government
subsidized airports, factories and roads. As the New York
State CIO put it, labor stood for the "welfare state" as
opposed to the "special interest state." Labor endorsed
"government for the people" not "government for special
privilege. "112 To reach the general public with this under-
standing of politics and the economy, in 1949 the AFL
initiated a news and commentary program featuring Frank
Edwards. Broadcast to 7 million listeners a week over 176
stations at the cost of $350,000 per year, its goal was "to
establish a standard of full and accurate coverage of the
news, fair presentation of the news and intelligent inter-
pretation of the news from the liberal point of view."-*-!^
Edwards's broadcasts rankled the business community.
Business Week, for instance, charged him with "merchandising
verbal poison." To refute Edwards, the Industrial Relations
Council of Utah, a group of employers, hired ex-CBS news-
caster Paul Sullivan to give industry's side of the news
immediately after labor's broadcast. ^ ^
^
Domestic and foreign policy events, however, combined
to help create a more receptive audience for business,
inexorably shifting the political center of gravity from
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liberalism. Anti-communism, not UberaUsm, became the
primary political motif. Between 1948 and 1950, Communist
revolution in China, the Soviet acquisition of the atomxc
bomb, espionage cases, and McCarthy's accusations of commu-
nist infiltration of the government created an atmosphere of
crisis and tension. with the the outbreak of the Korean
war, Truman, who had met stiff resistance to the expansion
Of the welfare state from a coalition of southern Democrats
and Republicans, sacrificed what was left of the Pair Deal
on the altar of anti-communism. All this and the renewed
inflation touched off by the war lent credibility to the
business warning that something was fundamentally wrong with
America .^^^
Contributing to the nation's drift to the right was
labor's own internal anticommunism. in 1949 after years of
struggle between left and right, the CIO expelled eleven
allegedly Communist-controlled unions. An internecine
battle ensued that crippled the unions of the electrical and
farm equipment workers among others. The feuds and anti-
communist purges also played a role in the collapse of
"Operation Dixie," the CIO's Southern organizing drive.
Within the broader context of Southern racism and anti-
unionism, the CIO internal struggle over communism and the
continuing rivalry between the AFL and CIO to ensured the
failure of any significant organizing in the South. -^'-^
In this political atmosphere, labor had to narrow its
political goals. Labor's hopes for a sweeping expansion of
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the welfare state and for the repeal of Taft-Hartley
disappeared. Unable to achxeve seour.ty for all workers
through poltics, CIO unions pushed for worker security
through the collective bargaining syste.. m 1949 and 1950,
unions like the UAW and the Steelworkers achieved signifi-
cant victories on the issues of wages and fringe benefits.
But they also conceded much to the employer drive to
increase productivity at the expense of union rights on the
shop floor. ^^"^
The 1950 election revealed the increasingly conserva-
tive tenor of American politics and the political limita-
tions of labor. In Maryland, California, North Carolina,
and elsewhere. Republicans rode the issue of anti-communism
to victory. m Ohio, the struggle was even more clearly one
of business against labor. in late 1949, the business
journal Factory had warned that unions planned to flex their
political muscle by punishing those politicians who had
opposed Fair Deal legislation. it foresaw that 1950
"promises to be a year of decision of American industry— in
fact, for the economy as a whole." It called upon business
to attack labor's growing power "by collective action, by
molding the opinions of large groups." Top on labor's list
of enemies was Robert Taft, leader of the conservative
branch of the Republican party and coauthor of the Taft-
Hartley bill. Business leaders rallied around Taft, who ran
a successful campaign appealing to rank and file workers.
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wage earners, according to poUtrcal analyst Sa.uel Lubell,
"seized upon Taft's candrdacy to voxce a protest against
their own union chiefs." Ohio workers, he contended,
disliked being told how to vote by national union leaders
and they bought the Republican argument that a PAC victory
implied that labor was "running the country."118
Determined that the conservative cause should not lose
momentum as it had after the 1946 election, business leaders
moved to select a Republican candidate who could win in
1952. Dwight Eisenhower seemed the perfect choice. A World
war II hero, he had broad popular appeal. His political and
economic ideas meshed closely with the moderate wing of the
business community associated with the Committee for
Economic Development and the Advertising Council. But his
concern over "the insidious inclination toward statism" made
him acceptable to corporate conservatives. Moderate
businessmen led by Paul Hoffman of Studebaker, Thomas J.
Watson of IBM, and Harry A. Bullis of General Mills helped
mobilize the initial grass-roots support for Eisenhower's
candidacy. Adlai Stevenson won the support of liberals and
organized labor.
The most heralded issues of the election were
communism, corruption, and Korea. The business community,
however, continued to stress the threat "Big Labor" and "Big
Government" posed to American liberty and freedom. In late
September 1952, NAM President William J. Grede charged that
"dictatorial union bosses" sought to "establish in
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Washington a government whxch win be a Labor Government in
name
-
as well as in fact." Busrness-sponsored advertise-
nients in popular magazines like Newsweek, The Saturday
ivenina Post, and CoUierls inveighed against the dangers of
government dictation asserting that the welfare state
crushes freedom. One ad began, "THEY DorT KEEP FEEDING YOU
CHEESE AFTER THE TRAP IS SPRUNG," and cautioned that "to
vote into office a welfare state is to 'find you have voted
away your f reedom.
Eisenhower struck a responsive chord with the American
public, winning in a landslide and carrying the Republicans
to control of the House and Senate. For the first time in
twenty years, friends of business dominated government in
Washington. The business community joined in the victory
celebration and looked forward to a more favorable political
and economic climate. "Business" observed the journal.
Steel, was "no longer on the outside looking in." Contem-
plating the implications of the election, Henry Ford II
wrote in the Saturday Review: "This is an opportunity that
we in business must not fail to meet. For years we have
talked glibly of the superiority of the American way and of
our ability, if given the chance, to correct many of the
evils which beset us and the other peoples of the world."
Finally, he continued "we have that chance."-'-
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Vone victory, however, did not mean tnat employers could
safely abandon their public relations efforts. while some
business leaders argued that the change in political
administration meant that the business had "done its job/'
most contended that the struggle to shape the economic and
political atmosphere was a continuing process. m December
1952, the Joint Committee of the Association of National
Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising
Agencies pointed out that forty percent of American workers
and forty-nine percent of farmers still felt that business
profits were too high.122 election victory could easily
prove to be hollow. A Warner and Swasey advertisement
warned that "One day of feeling better doesn't mean you're
cured. For years the world has been sick." As every doctor
knew, the ad continued, the first surge of "feeling better"
was dangerous: "A relapse could kill us." Similarily, NAM,
which commited itself to a "continued program of economic
education," observed that Eisenhower's election should be
viewed more as a "reprieve than an acquittal from the Fair
Deal." Louis B. Seltzer, editor of The Cleveland Press
cheered the NAM 's decision, contending that the results of
the election magnified rather than lessened the public rela-
tions responsibilities of American business. He called upon
the business community to "intensify in all directions the
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30. Of getting across to the American people rts own story-
the real story of modern America. "123
Business leaders continued to worry in part because the
CIO decided to intensify rts public relations work in the
wake of the 1952 defeat. m early 1953, shocked that
perhaps 40 percent of blue collar workers had voted for
Eisenhower, the CIO appropriated one milUon dollars for a
public relations program to contest business domination of
political dialogue. The main component of the program was a
fifteen minute radio program broadcast on 150 stations,
featuring the news commentary of John w. Vandercook and
commercials promoting the CIO views on political and
economic issues. The purpose of the radio program was to
provide an "additional liberal voice on the nation's
airwaves," and to offset "the one-party press which
dominates so much of the country." According to Reuther,
the CIO was reaching out to "the cross section of the public
of America which was either neutral in its attitude toward
CIO or in large measure antagonistic." The CIO, he
continued, was trying to convince the public that labor was
"not another public economic pressure group trying to make
progress for itself at the expense of free society" but
instead sought "solutions of the problems of all of the
people." Within six months, the CIO reported that
Vandercook attracted equal or larger audiences than conser-
vative Fulton Lewis Jr.'s in 13 of 36 surveyed cities. ^^4
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Desp.te CIO co.pet.txon, by 1955 the business co..unity
could discern concrete results fro. the co..xtn.ent
.ade ten
years earlier to reshape America's cUmate of opinion,
conservative businessmen were disappointed that Eisenhower
did not dismantle the New Deal, but were elated that much of
the momentum toward an invigorated welfare state was
stopped. Tax cuts in 1 954, the abolishing of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, the decline of anti-trust
activity, and the passage of legislation giving business
access to oil-rich coastal lands all testified to the
emergence of a more pro-business political climate.
Although the Democratic Party regained majorities m the
House and Senate with labor assistance in 1954, the party's
return to control did little to alter the political atmos-
phere in Congress since much of its strength came from the
conservative South. Indeed Americans for Democratic Action
chairman Joseph Rauh charged that "the Congressional
Democrats have become practically indistinguishable from the
party they allegedly oppose. "-'^^
Organized labor, though certainly still strong, took a
beating under the Republican administration. Business
succeeded in defeating efforts to revise Taft-Hartley, and
the rulings of the Eisenhower-appointed National Labor
Relations Board made the law more and more restrictive of
unions. Violence associated with bitter strikes at Kohler
in Wisconsin and Perfect Circle in Indiana demonstrated a
growing recalcitrance among some employers and blackened the
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reputatxon of labor. So too dxd the f.ndxngs of Congres-
sional probes during 1953, 1954 and 1955 on labor
"racketeering, extortion and gangsterism." Weakened by
internecine struggles over Communisra and competition with
the AFL, the CIO was faltering. Bitter divisions between
Reuther and David McDonald of the Steelworkers led conserva-
tive labor columnist Victor Riesel to predict in early 1954
that the "odds are that CIO may not survive the year."
Enough of the fire had been extinguished from the ciO's
social unionism that in 1954 it began negotiating a merger
with the AFL.-'-^^
Employers could also find good news in the opinion
polls of the mid-fifties. in early 1955, Opinion Research
Corporation conducted a poll for the NAM and found that the
climate of opinion in which industry was operating had
improved. Noting that opinion changed "relatively slowly,"
it contended that the public was rejecting the "Marxian idea
of an inevitable class struggle between Labor and Manage-
ment." Sixty-one percent of those polled believed that the
interests of employers and workers were the same, an eleven
point gain over five years. A similar survey conducted by
ORC for Look magazine found that the American people
approved of large corporations by a ten to one margin.
Three times as many were concerned about the power of big
labor as opposed to the power of big business. Nearly two-
thirds felt that the present laws regulating business were
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broad and strong enough whrle nearly that
.any beUeved big
labor groups was "getting out of hand." From all this ORC
concluded that the country was definitely "in7 «-icj.xiiii:eiy m a swing to the
right . " 127
At the national level, business had scored major
victories. still, xt worried about how much labor had
already won. Moreover, through 1955, the labor movement
continued to grow. who knew what impact the proposed merger
of the AFL and CIO might have on union power? Certainly the
business community took nothing for granted. Beneath the
apparent consensus of the 1950s, much contention remained.
TO gain a better understanding of that contention, as well
as the effort of both business and labor to shift political
discourse, we need to move from the national level to the
struggle that took place within communities and at worksites
to define the meaning of Americanism.
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CHAPTER 4
BUILDING COMPANY CONSCIOUSNESS
The economic and political struggles between capital
and labor in the 1930s and 1940s raised, as we have seen,
fundamental questions of power. who would make the critical
decisions affecting hours, wages, and the conditions of
work? Who would control the shop floor? Some labor
leaders, such as Walter Reuther, raised the specter of co-
determination of investment and pricing. Beyond the terrain
of production, moreover, labor and capital also struggled to
shape the larger social and political economy of the postwar
era. At the heart of this conflict was a fundamental
struggle over tne consciousness and loyalties of American
workers. The rise of labor unions had moblilized workers
around new and powerful loyalties. These unions, business
leaders complained, had drenched the minds of workers "in a
reckless propaganda of distortion, deceit and phoney econo-
mics."^ Fearing the new loyalties of their workers and
sensing that in these ties lay not only a threat to their
control of the workplace but beyond that a threat to the
future shape of America itself, businessmen thus sought
victory not only at the bargaining table and in the halls of
Congress but sought to win as well the hearts and minds of
American workers.
Moderate and conservative businessmen, particularly
those in organizations like the National Association of
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Manufacturers and the Chamber of Cc.erce, vowed to regain
fro. unions both undisputed control over therr factories and
the allegiance of their workers. Collective bargaxn.ng
advances had achieved some of these goals by lin^itrng the
structural power of unrons. Equally important were employer
efforts to undermine organized labor's ideological hold over
the working class. To win their employees' loyalty,
managers reshaped their personnel policies by drawing on
insights from psychology and sociology. Througn mechanisms
such as human relations and welfarism, the business com-
munity hoped to recapture a social order they nostalgically
remembered as one dominated by corporate leaders, but where
business created a contented and productive "body of under-
standing employees. "2 This chapter will focus on human
relations while the next will examine the revita 1 ization of
welfare capitalism.
Employers in the immediate post-war years wanted to
regain control over the shop floor in order to cut costs and
restore the productivity necessary to meet rising consumer
demand. There were several responses to the labor problem.
A significant sector of American industry, located in the
South and Southwest but also including small nationwide
firms and companies involved in extremely capital-intensive,
continuous flow production, like chemicals and oil
refining, continued to resist unions. Alternatively, a
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small group of progressive employers, primarily in the
garment and electrical industries, along with some smaller
steel making and fabricating firms, looked to union-
management cooperation or accomodation as a means of gaming
control over the labor force. This distinctly minority
approach entailed respecting the union's "dignity as an
institution" and abandoning any efforts to compete for
worker allegiance.-^
The majority of large corporations, however, tended to
take a more moderate "realistic" approach to industrial
relations. They reluctantly accepted organized labor but
hoped that an aggressive collective bargaining strategy
would enable them to contain union power and achieve produc-
tivity goals. The initial post-war contract negotiations in
the auto industry that confined the scope of collective
bargaining to wages, hours, and working conditions were the
first steps in this direction. in 1948 General Motors
proposed linking wage rates to increased productivity. At
least at the national level, unions were to trade job
control for periodic wage increases and benefits. The
inclusion of no-strike clauses in postwar contracts and an
increasingly elaborate grievance system were designed to
ensure that union leaders shared responsiblity with manage-
ment to tighten up worker discipline and prevent interrup-
tions to production. By 1950, historian Howell Harris
concludes, large corporations like GM, Ford, U.S. Steel and
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Westinghouse Electric had made sxgn.fxcant progress towards
achieving stable and efficient labor relations.
^
It is tempting to draw broader generalizations from the
willingness of some corporations to concede higher wages and
benefits. However it neither signaled the formation of a
"social contract" between capital and labor nor ended
genuine conflict, as many historians have argued. Employer
intransigence in the area of managerial prerogative had
forced unions to give up some structural power. But the
fight for economic security, a goal genuinely and strongly
desired by their members, was a real struggle. Firms only
offered wage increases and benefits because organized labor
posed a threat to capital. Indeed, it took a series of
major confrontations to achieve the beginnings of economic
security for union members. The business community learned
that it could not manipulate the industrial relations sytem
at will and would come to see higher wages and benefits as a
necessary cost for keeping factories in operation.^
Gains for wage earners came from struggle, not
accomodation. The Steelworkers , for example, demonstrated
their power and solidarity during the 1946 strike, wresting
a wage hike from a reluctant industry. Benefits also failed
to come easily. Employers had no desire to allow unions to
take credit for or share in the control of employee benefit
plans with unions. Over half of the strikes in 1949 and
seventy percent during the first half of 1950 were over
health and welfare issues in labor contracts. Indeed,
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General Motors' concession of pensions in I950 ca.e only
after a longstanding uaw campaign for old age security.
Just a year earlier, the steel industry refused a sx.ilar
demand from the United steel Workers, labeling the proposed
pension system "socialistic" and claiming that pension costs
would destroy the steel industry's profitability. it took
the 1949 strike by steel workers, combined with government
intervention to make pensions a reality.
^
National collective bargaining agreements also fail to
give an accurate portrayal of the ongoing struggle during
the forties and fifties to control the shop floor. Here the
business community discovered the limitations of reliance on
collective bargaining alone. in late 1949, labor analysist
Edward T. Cheyfitz observed that "Labor-management relations
in America are continuing in the pattern of a power
struggle. That is the outstanding fact characterizing
industrial relations today." Local unions and management
fought endlessly over the pace and organization of work.
Moreover, seniority and grievance systems, which at times
certainly stifled worker militancy, also placed substantial
•a.
constraints on managerial discipline and personnel
deployment. Even in plants where the collective bargaining
system was weak and the union non-confrontational
, informal
work groups served to challenge managerial authority. These
cohesive units of workers, protected by the grievance
system, used a variety of tactics including informal
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bargaining with foremen, slowdowns, wor.-to-rule ca.paxgns,
and wildcat strikes to push for greater control over the
production process. Thus, despite agreements on the
national level to promote productivity and smother conflict,
contention continued to characterize the shop floor.^
Continuing conflict evoked two sharply different inter-
pretations within the business community. The small core of
moderates accepted as inevitable that significant differ-
ences of interest and social philosophy separated employees
and management. Business leaders like Paul Hoffman of
Studebaker, Robert Wood Johnson of Johnson & Johnson
pharmaceuticals, and Meyer Kestnbaum of the garment firm
Hart, Schaffner & Marx recognized organized labor as the
legitimate representatives of workers' interests. They
believed that unions served as the channel and instrument
but not source of worker protest and discontent.^ Dependent
upon each other for survival, unions and management needed
to find a way to overcome their differences. "We must
develop a relationship between management and union which is
neither based on the assumption of permanent industrial
warfare, nor on the equally false hope that we can eliminate
all the conflicts within enterprise," asserted railway
executive Charles R. Hook. Instead, we must, "find a way to
make the conflict itself constructive and fruitful."-'-^
Collective bargaining was a workable, practical, and demo-
cratic vehicle for resolving conflicting interests. Through
the collective bargaining process, progressives hoped to
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make the union an "intearal r^^^y-t ^-fx r g part of a program of teamwork,
communication and participation.
^
For progressive employers like Robert Wood Johnson, no
contradiction existed between workers' loyalty to both
company and union. He observed that life "is full of
multiple loyalties which can be adjusted by common sense."12
Similarly a Raytheon Company executive contended that
employees could have "dual loyalties, just as a foreman must
have loyalty to his employees as well as to the management.
This duality need not present serious conflict or create
adversaries." Workers could be pro-management and pro-union
at the same time. Continuing conflict, then, simply symbol-
ized the expression of divergent opinions and perspectives.
When capital and labor achieved mutual accommodation of
their legitimate differences then industrial peace would
become a reality. Industrial relations professionals
applauded and encouraged this vision of labor relations.
Most conservative businessmen, in contrast to the small
core of liberals, held a harmonious, consensual vision of
society. To them, no inevitable conflict existed between
labor and management. Workers and employers were partners
in a community of interest dominated by employers.-'-'^ Thus,
in 1946 industrial relations expert E. Wright Bakke found
that managers viewed employees as "'our men', not workers in
general, not members of the union," and certainly not
organized labor. -"-^ "We are all workers," declared NAM
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president Wallace F. Bennett in I949 "w^ .ly^y, e are all capital-
ists." Employers, not unions, were the natural allies of
workers, and yet, Bennett continued, "we have allowed our
detractors to put over on us their symbols, with certain
words spelled with capitals to spell out classes which
compartimentalize us."^^
Still, it was impossible to deny the existence of
conflict in postwar industrial relations. Employers pointed
to two interrelated causes for the disruption of harmony
within the plant. Assuming that at some point in a mythic
past managers and workers had shared a similar vision of the
world, some employers blamed the nature of the organization
of work in the modern factory. Huge plants and mass produc-
tion methods had driven a wedge between management and
labor. Division of labor and specialization had robbed
workers of an understanding of the functioning of the free
market and the benefits of competition. Without a sense of
economic significance, frustrated workers were more apt to
"listen to the glittering promises of a demagogue. " ^
^
That demagogue, of course, was organized labor. Unions
exploited managerial difficulties created by the modern
factory. They divided workers from the employer, whom
businessmen felt was the "logical leader of labor," and were
responsible for an "artifically created" ideological
1
8
chasm. Indeed, some businessmen blamed organized labor and
what they saw as its the collectivist philosophy more than
any problems inherent in the labor process for the
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continuing turmoU on the shop floor. Labor relations
consultant Mart.n Dodge accused unxons of poisoning the
minds of workers with a "barrage of irresponsible invective,
false economics, distorted statist.es, and general accusa-
tions that front offices are largely filled with a
conspiring coterie of lying leeches." Many employers
believed that workers, whose intelligence they tended to
hold m low esteem, were the most suceptible of all elements
of society to these kinds of "falsifications" and attacks on
the virture of a free economy.^
^
In a series of public forums, NAM leaders angrily
repudiated a 1950 Harvard Business Review article by Solomon
Barkin, director of Research of the Textile Workers Union,
which asserted that a fundamental conflict existed between
workers and management. The source of this conflict was the
helplessness of the individual worker in the face of the
economic and social power of the employer. Unions, repre-
senting workers as a group, empowered employees, fulfilling
their aspirations and reflecting their needs. Accordingly,
Barkin contended the worker's primary loyalty was to the
union, not the firm.^^ NAM Managing Director Earl Bunting
challenged Barkin's assumptions, asserting that approaching
industrial relations "on the basis of mass and class is
repugnant to our ideals" for the United States has "attained
a classless society which other countries dream of." He
declared that trade unionists had finally shown their true
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colors and condemned Barkin's "frank ^r.^xAx s t ana open acceptance of
the class conflict approach. "21
Yet there appeared to be ample evidence that large
numbers of workers accepted Barkin's interpretation of class
relations. Opinion polls concluded that many workers
distrusted their employers and doubted the virture of the
free enterprise system itself. Surprisingly large numbers
of workers favored government ownership or control of the
economy and even greater numbers wanted governmental guaran-
tees of economic security. m 1946, the Psychological
Corporation found that 43 percent of surveyed workers
believed they would do as well or better if American
manufacturing firms were run entirely by the government. A
1950 Opinion Research Corporation sample of industrial
workers found that over 30 percent believed that the govern-
ment should control prices and limit profits, 26 percent
wanted to see the government limit salaries of top execu-
tives and 21 percent would vote for government ownership of
four key industries.
The same workers who trusted the government had little
faith in management's concern for their welfare. Attitude
surveys reflected a rejection the traditional managerial
philosophy that individual effort as opposed to collective
action led to success and advancement. As a result,
skeptical, group-minded employees were suspicious of
employer appeals for greater productivity. Fifty-eight
percent of manual workers surveyed by ORC responded to a
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call for increased effort w.th the answer
"That's the SPEED
UP. Means they want more work for the same pay." A similar
number rejected the idea that workers benefxtted from
increased productivity, and over a third of these workers
believed that labor saving machinery destroyed jobs.23
Polls demonstrating that over half of American workers
believed that corporations earned profits topping 25 percent
each year also alerted industrialists that significant
economic misunderstandings clouded the relationship between
worker and employer. "No partnership can be expected to
work very well," Henry Ford II told United States Chamber of
commerce in 1947, "when 75 percent of industry's employees
think stockholders and top mangement of corporations take
more out of business than employees." m reality, according
to the automaker, industry profits averaged less than five
percent and employees received almost six times as much as
the amount paid to stockholders. ^4
Employers believed that these negative attitudes
towards the American economic system manifested themselves
on the shop floor. Workers who felt that they only received
the "crumbs" had little incentive to work hard. Within this
context traditional managerial complaints about low produc-
tivity assumed a new, more ominous significance. In 1946,
73 percent of executives surveyed by M ill and Factory blamed
"a general indifference on the part of the workers" as the
prime cause of declining labor productivity. Similarily,
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American Thread Company executive Guy b. Arthur, Jr. noted
that employees, who "years ago were as regular as the
sunrxse/- routinely skipped work or produced as Ixttle as
necesary, feeling no obligation to "trade a fair day's work
for a farr day's pay." Part of the problem, continued
Arthur, was that the worker no longer accepted responsi-
bility for his security, expecting "the government to take
care of his future." Most disquieting, however, was the
"subordination of the individual to the group" as workers
relied on seniority rather than ability or merit for
advancement . ^ ^
Public relations experts, concerned individual
employers, and an array of business organizations, ranging
from the conservative National Association of iManuf acturers
and the Chamber of Commerce to the more liberal Advertising
Council, attempted to alert the business community to the
dangers a misled working class posed to each firm as well as
the future welfare of America. ^"^
They warned that by exploiting employer silence,
organized labor was winning the battle for the loyalty of
workers, which enabled increasingly powerful unions to
undercut business control and influence both in the economic
and political realms. Management, declared General Foods
President Austin S. Ingleheart "has left open a wide hole
through which its adversaries are driving half-truths and
false-hoods."^^ In a 1949 article, associate editor of
Factory
, M.J. Murphy, described the results of employer
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reticence to challenge un.ons at every level. Continuing
union power over the shop floor, he charged, was gamed
primarily through ideological manipulation of employees,
organized labor's ability to limit output through its
influence over the work force threatened the economic
viability of every firm. 29 the contest for worker
loyalty during the post-war years, labor had the early
advantage. Labor columnist Victor Riesel admonished
businessmen at the 1950 NAM convention "You are not
competing [effectively] for the credi tabi 1 ity of your
company with your working people, and I say that with the
rush to the left, you will get washed aside in the years to
come . " ^ 0
In response to these warnings particularly after the
1948 election came the call for business to protect its
class interests by selling itself and the free enterprise
system to American workers. It was imperative for the
business community to "make an organized effort to recapture
the American mind, to
. . . re-establish its conviction
that individual freedom is the key to happiness." More
than creative or tough collective bargaining was needed to
gain worker acceptance of the business agenda and thereby
thwart the power and influence of unions on and off the shop
f loor .^^
A large segment of the business community responded to
the ideological and economic challenge posed by unions with
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an aggressive strategy to w.n over workers. Large unionized
firms like General Motors as well as small unorganized fxrms
like Stanley Home Products sought to undercut or prevent
unionism by creating a separate company identity or company
consciousness among therr employees. This involved convin-
cing workers to identify their socral, economic, and politi-
cal well being with that of therr specific employer and more
broadly with the free enterprise system.32 ^ ^^^^^^^
conscious worker, rather like the idealized boy scout, was
not only productive but took pride in his job and demon-
strated loyalty and allegiance to the firm. One component
of company consciousness drew from the insights of human
relations. Through human relations, managers planned to
gain the willing cooperation of workers in expanding produc-
tivity and to restore "the natural and sincere friendship
that should exist" between worker and employer.
II
The origins of the human relations theory of management
can be traced to the Hawthorne experiments conducted by
sociologist Elton Mayo and his Harvard Business School
associates beginning in the mid 1920s and to the theories
published by psychologist Abraham H. Maslow during and after
World War II. The Hawthorne researchers discovered that
informal work groups exerted tremendous influence over
worker behavior and productivity. Informal organization
grew out of the employee's social needs, the desire for
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recognition and dignity, as well as the natural co.raderie
Of the Shop floor. Sociologists used these insights to
challenge the dominant managerial ideology that treated
workers simply as a source of labor services driven by
economic incentives. instead, these social scientists
contended that employees were motivated by social as well as
economic rewards. They needed to be treated as a "social
being related to others m a complex social organization."
increased productivity depended on securing the cooperation
of the small work group and providing employees with greater
social and psychological satisfaction on the job. Mayo
sought to enlist group cooperation through various
mechanisms designed to satisfy the individual's desire for
meaningful work and recognition among their fellow workers.
Participation in decision making, better communication,
improved supervisory training, and other measures including
counseling would improve interpersonal relations and thus
raise morale and productivity.^"^
In an influential article published in 1943, psycholo-
gist Abraham H. Mas low provided the basis for a more sophis-
ticated understanding of motivation by a hierarchy of man's
basic needs. He identified five sets of needs, including
physiological, safety, affection, esteem and self -actualiza-
tion or accomplishment. when the most basic drives were
satisfied, they no longer motivated behavior. Drawing on
Maslow's findings, human relations oriented social
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scientists contended that employers could not depend on
higher wages alone as a substitute for fulfxll.ng the entire
range of workers' needs. They linked employee discontent
and falling productivity to the failure to meet workers-
higher needs on the job and asserted that these problems
could be alieviated only through the enhancement of the
social aspects of the workplace. Maslow's ideas reinforced
the insights gained from the Hawthorne experiments. ^5
Mayo's and Maslow's work had great appeal in the
business community. Like many employers. Mayo assumed that
company and employee formed a community that reflected homo-
geneous interests. Conflict was not natural but simply the
result of misunderstanding. if management could gain the
cooperation or control of the informal groups of workers
then the need for trade unions would disappear. ^6 Building
on Mayo's work psychologist Robert N. McMurry argued that
workers joined unions to express frustration at the
company's failure to satisfy their emotional and social
needs. Here was "scientific" verification that collective
action was not a natural phenonomen. Reflecting this inter-
pretation. General Foods Vice-President Thomas G. Spates
argued that the "militancy and the crusading spirit of the
labor movement" was nurtured by the failure of management to
satisfy the non -economic needs" of workers. In turn, Maslow
provided proof that workers didn't really want more money.
Demands for higher wage rates were simply an expression of
worker discontent at their firm's failure to meet their
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higher needs. PuUfUUng such non-econo..c wants was the
key to industrial peace.37 Human relations theory of worker
behavior along with Maslow's f.ndxngs became a blueprint to
guide managers in their effort to regaxn the loyalty of
their employees. m combination they would become the
building blocks upon which employers would reshape
traditional managerial ideology.
Practical application of human relations theory within
the firm grew slowly. Even prior to the Hawthorne experi-
ments there had been some discussion but generally little
sustained effort to improve morale and supervision. But the
rise of industrial unionism during the thirties and the
demands of wartime production triggered experimentation
with employee morale and job satisfaction. What employees
thought about their company assumed a growing importance.
Charles Crawford of Thompson Products, for instance, became
an advocate of human relations, asserting that contented
employees were not only more productive but were indifferent
or hostile to union organizers. Other companies conducted
attitude surveys, initiated consueling programs, and began
instructing foremen on the application of human relations
supervision
.
-^^
The post war labor crisis widened the audience for
human relations. One scholar notes that after 1946 "the
managerial conviction that problems of human relations were
important knew virtually no bounds. "^^ That same year,
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Henry Ford II asserted that one of the greatest problems
confronting American industry concerned
"human
relationshrps-relationships which can either aid or xmpede
our efforts to achieve greater industrial ef f iciency."40
Fowler McCormick, Chairman of the Board of International
Harvester Company, predicted more devasting results if
managers continued to overlook the human element, contending
that "the very existence of American industry depends on the
success of its human relations." Unless the people of this
country believe in industry, he continued, "American
industry will not last."^^
Employers looked to personnel programs based on human
relations approach not only to restore workers' belief in
American industry but also to combat the growing power of
organized labor. Business journals like Factory and
American Business constantly reiterated that only by
adopting human relations techniques could employers gain the
willing cooperation of their workers. In 1949, Factory
advised that an equally important payoff for good human
relations was a disarmed or weakened union movement.
Editor L.C. Morrow predicted that even in union shops labor
leaders would have difficulty stirring up workers who had
received "long and consistent proper treatment from manage-
ment" and "all of us know of instances where workers are so
well satisfied
. . . that union leaders have not been able
even to organize them.""^^
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Factory's arguments touched a responsive chord in the
business community, especially among non-union employers and
those committed to containing the scope of industrial
relations. The number of articles on the topic increased
dramatically.49 ^he early 50s, there were courses,
bulletins, and even national meetings devoted to human
relations. To its boosters, human relations promised to
revitalize managerial initiative. Raymond Livingstone, Vice
President for Personnel for Thompson Products, observed that
"management interest in building good employee relations has
surged higher and in a shorter period of time than interest
in any other business subject I have ever known." Virtually
every employer, he continued "will tell you that good human
relations pay-off not only as a matter of morality, but of
good business." By 1952, the news magazine Time pronounced
that a second Industrial Revolution, "quieter but more
profound, is sweeping through U.S. industry. its name:
Human Relations in Industry. ""^^
Employers with widely differing ideological perspec-
tives adopted the language of human relations. Liberal
businessmen liKe Robert Woods Johnson as well as the
National Association of Manufacturers, the voice of unrecon-
structed conservatism, agreed that companies needed to treat
workers with dignity and fulfill their desires for self-
esteem. Liberal businessmen, however, tended to see human
relations more as a means of enhancing productivity than a
way of weakening unions. A recitation of Maslow's hierarchy
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of needs became commonplace in the business literature.
Hotpoint President James Nance, for example, reminded fellow
executives that we "must not forget that the man on the line
wants the same feeling of accomplishing something
worthwhile, or recognition, and of being an integral part of
a human organization that management wants. "^'^
Few employers, however, accepted all the implications
of sociological human relations theory, particularly the
concept of the primacy of the work group. These informal
organizations of workers, which in the minds of many
employers had become linked to organized labor, could not be
allowed to usurp or challenge older patterns of managerial
authority. Instead, managers grafted the terminology and
some of the insights of human relations research onto the
traditional authority relationship within the factory. The
lesson postwar employers took from Mayo and Maslow was the
need to reforge a personal relationship with each worker by
appealing to his or her non-financial, social needs.
The individual remained of central importance in post-
war personnel policy. Fowler McCormick of International
Harvester stated unequivocally that "without denying the
importance of group relations . . . nothing is more impor-
tant than individual personal relations. "'^^ Workers needed
recognition as individuals and individualism was the
"keystone" of the American enterprise system. It was wrong,
asserted Ford's John Bugas, to assume that unions and
127
employees were identical or that their interests were
necessarily the same. m 1951, NAM President Willia. Ruffm
claimed that management had "rejected the idea that any
human being is an inarticulate member of a common herd," for
treating workers as a mass in an impersonal atmosphere
encouraged group behavior. As William B. Given of
American Brake Shoe declared: "We must stop thinking of them
as union members, or as a group, and think of them as
individuals
.
"^^
There was more to the human relations movement than
simply a change in corporate language. A number of firms,
both large and small, formally launched systematic human
relations programs on the heels the postwar strike wave, in
1946 and 1947, George D. Roper Company, the Aluminum Company
of America (ALCOA), the Steel Improvement and Forge Company,
the Borg-Warner Company, the Monsanto Chemical Company, and
the giant International Harvester Company, among others,
turned to human relations as a means of mending fences with
employees, following repressive attacks on their unions.
In developing a new relationship with its employees, the
Columbia Steel and Shafting Company was determined to "place
entirely from our minds the fact that we have a Union."
Instead, the firm sought to emphasize "what can be done to
contribute to the personal dignity of the employment of the
individual," and "what can be done to make the individual
honor the privilege of being part of the enterprise." This
meshed with business' postwar political attack on the
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unAmerxcan character of class and collectives.. The new
corporate
.ottos were to be "understanding" and "together-
ness." in 1948 Cloud Wa.pler, head of Carreer Corporation,
determined that "happy relationships shall prevaxl" between
the corporation and xts employees. He instructed management
to "treat our fellow employees as associates in the Carrier
enterprise." Labor was not to be regarded as a commodity
and supervisors were not to "forget that 'feelings' as well
as reason enter into human reactions. "^0
Ford Motor Company and General Electric represented two
of the most prominent firms to adopt the new human relations
approach. Turbulence had characterized labor relations at
Ford before and during the war. Seeking to reduce the
gulf that had arisen between management and worker, Henry
Ford II inaguarated a human relations program which commit-
ted the company to treating each worker as "an individual
human being" and to providing opportunities for employees to
"reasonably satisfy many of those normal desires which
motivate all of us."^^ Similarily, an extensive reorienta-
tion of management's thinking followed the 1946 strike at
GE. Human relations, which promoted "a greater sense of
identification on the part of individual employees with the
interest of the company," was to be the core of a broader
strategy to reduce the influence of unionism at GE.^^
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Ill
Human relations, in large part, relied on a sophisti-
cated, xf poUtically loaded, understanding of communica-
tions, a key to building "company consciousness." Effective
communications would help fulfill workers' higher needs by
giving men and women a "sense of 'belonging' in the plants
where they work," so its advocates claimed, it would create
a new kind of interaction between employer and employee,
designed to bring cooperation and integration to the enter-
prise. It would build confidence in management and clear up
misunderstandings that separated worker and manager."
Companies earlier had used various communication
techniques to forestall unionization after World War I and
in the thirties. 54 The passage of the Wagner Act, however,
made this an unfair labor practice. For a decade employers
found their communications restricted. In 1 947 the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act brought employers greater freedom of
expression within their firms. J. p. Woodard, Director of
Industrial Relations for the Johns-Manvi 1 le Corporation,
observed that "perhaps the principal advantage granted to
the employer by the new Act lies in the opportunity for top
management--directly, through management authority channels
to convey its opinions and advice to all employees." Within
months of the law's passage. Modern Industry observed that
companies liKe International Harvester were exercising to
the fullest their newly defined right of freedom of speech
130
an. we.e
.....n, t.e of.ens.ve against t.e attacks
.a.e upon
tne American economic syste. by the Co„„uni3ts and by their
propagandists within the unions. "55
The National Association of Manufacturers, established
communication conferences and cUnxcs around the country.
Other groups, including the Chamber of Commerce and such
local employer associations as the Merchants and Manufac-
turers Association of Los Angeles, the Mountain states
Employers Council and the Associated Industries of
Cleveland, quickly followed suit. Between 1948 and 1950,
the NAM conducted 1,000 clinics and distributed thousands of
communication manuals. m 1953, the Association established
a special task force devoted to increasing the quantity and
quality of information available to employees. its efforts
in this area continued through the 1950s. 56 The Chamber's
work meshed with that of the the NAM, sponsoring 227
meetings during the first eight months of 1950 alone. Each
organization also issued monthly newletters devoted to
communications transmission, complete with ideas, sugges-
tions, and case histories. In 1956 Champion Paper and Fibre
Company produced a film focusing attention on the importance
of communication to happiness and well being. More than six
hundred prints of Production 5118 circulated among firms
like Dupont, Ford, IBM and International Paper Company. 5^
Reflecting the growth of the movement, private manage-
ment communications consultants emerged, offering to design
tailor-made programs for firms. The formation in 1953 of
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the Employers Labor Relations Information Committee (ERLIC,
testified to the significance of communications, its
Officers and advrsory commrttee represented some of the
most important firms in the country including, b.F.
Goodrich, GE, Ford, Westinghouse, standard Oil, sears,
Monsanto, Kennecott Copper, United states steel, and
'
Goodyear. ERLIC helped managers develop more purposeful
communications designed to draw "the corporate family
together." It promised to aid companies in overcoming the
"songs of class struggle and fear" em^npii- n r.^ ^c iiu l anating from unions and
in winning the "emotional allegiance" of their workers.
ERLIC asserted that the failure of employers to correct
misunderstandings propagated by unions and other leftist
organizations was the cause of most labor-management
conflict and the reason for America's drift towards "alien
ideologies ."58
The andidote was "information." Companies would
rebuild their relationship with employees by communicating
directly with the individual. in 1950, Ivan Willis,
International Harvester's vice-president for industrial
relations vowed:
we are finished with the idea of letting unions tell
our story to our people. We are going to do that for
ourselves and we are going to do it in competition
with a union or any other agency which attempts to
do it. We recognize the rights of a union as the
employes' spokesman, their lawyer if you like, on a
specific topic. But we do not consider employes the
union's employes. They are our employes. We are
attempting to establish a relationship directly with
our people so that regardless of what union they
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Herman Steinkraus, president of Bridgeport Brass bluntly
declared that while an employee may belong to the union, he
"belongs to the company first. "^^
communication, however, did not necessarily imply an
open attack on organized labor. indeed, the small group of
firms committed to accomodation used the union as a channel
for the increased level of communication with employees. it
was ridiculus advised Pittsburgh Plate Glass Labor Relations
Director, Herbert Eby, to try to "out-race and out-maneuver
the union in getting a message across to employees."
Others, following a more moderate program, agreed that any
attempt to discredit unions might backfire and alienate
workers. Instead, these firms, except during strikes,
implicitly discounted the significance or legitimacy of
organized labor, bypassing or totally ignoring the union.
Firms bombarded their workers with pamphlets, comic
books, posters, bulletin boards, letters home, company
annual reports, magazines, newspapers, films, and even
matchbooks. In 1949, for instance. General Motors became
the first company to install information racks in its
plants. It distributed seven million pamphlets in a single
year. By 1958, three thousand companies utilized reading
racks, and firms, like Employee Relations Inc., emerged to
provide a steady stream of booklets.
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Often, the mainstay of employee communxcatxon was the
employee magazine or newspaper. some of these publ.catxons
dated to the Progressive Era but many were drscont.nued
dur.ng the thxrt.es. World War li and the post-war campaign
to build company consciousness sparked the revival of this
medium of communication. The number of titles jumped from
1,000 in 1940 to 6,500 ten years later, with a circulation
of 80 million and at the cost of over 100 million dollars a
year. Universities began offering training for company
editors and newsletters and journals like Quotes Ending and
Stet shared ideas and encouraged professional ism. ^
3
The story management communications sought to convey
had two interrelated parts. The first part was a timeless
industrial message concerning managerial authority and
worker morale. Moderate as well as conservative employers
were attracted to a variety of communication mechanisms
portraying the individual firm's financial position,
operations, products and problems to give employees a
feeling of closeness to the firm. Explanations of the
significance of each operation to the finished product were
designed to help create a sense of purpose, pride, and
dignity even among those frustrated by subdivided and
alienating labor. Moreover, information about the company
was to clarify for workers the mutual aims and shared
interests of the "employee-company family. "^^
The second part spoke more specifically to current
political and economic issues. Particularly in the years
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fro. the end of World War li to the election of Eisenhower
co.panxes engaged in an al.ost hysterical propaganda to
teach general lessons on the workings of the American
economic system to enhance workers' apprecxatxon of free
enterprise. Conservative employers, tended to emphasize the
importance of freedom from government regulation to prevent
the supposed arift toward statist collectivism. Business-
sponsored associations like the NAM, the Advertising
Council, and the American Economic Foundation provided
editorials and ads to company journals and urged ever
greater efforts in publicizing the "economic facts. "^S
Story after story in company publications focused on
tne theme that the high American standard of living was the
direct result of business enterprise and profits. Meddling
with profits, warned a 1950 editorial the Packard Cablegram
"carries every last one of us dangerously closer to the
tyranny of systems in which we want no part."^^ The Allis
Chalmers Company paper published an employee poem entitled
"My Name is Profit" that began "I have been maligned and I
have been praised. My name is hallowed where Industry and
Commerce prosper. Where I am unknown Enterprises cease and
Bankruptcy takes over."^^ Booklets carried similar politi-
cal and economic messages. American Steel and Wire
Company's rack service included The Chips are Down -- The
Story of Communism 's 'War to Death' With Capitalis m and The
Three Headed Monster by Sherman Rogers, an attack on
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government spending and high taxes, sixty-two percent of
the workers at the Philadelphia plant of Yale and Towne read
Free Men vs the union Closed Shog. Much to the ohagr.n of
the union, twenty-six percent rated it the best booklet on
the rack.^^
Often, employers tried to overcome worker resistance by
masking their message. Company journals buxlt readership by
integrating news about the firm and economics with recrea-
tional and educational activities, department gossip, and
announcements of special events in the lives of employees.
Reading rack services mixed innocuous literature on hobbies
and home improvement projects with those carrying an
explicit economic message to encourage employees to form the
habit of picking up every booklet from the racks and taking
them home.^^
Employers also used more direct means, such as letters,
to personalize communications with individual employees. The
Public Opinion Index for Industry found that the proportion
of surveyed firms writing to employees increased from 28
percent in 1947 to 82 percent in 1955.^0 Another researcher
reported that 99 percent of East St. Louis Swift Company
workers liked company letters; women enjoyed them even more
than men. Letters from the plant manager or company presi-
dent provided the personal touch. "It's warm," asserted
James Black, the Director of Public Relations for the
Associated Industries of Cleveland, "It goes right into the
home of the worker and his family, and it takes the company
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With .t." Beg.nn.ng in 1 946, Henry Pord ix annually sent
Chr.st.as letters to every employee and his fa.ily. To
build a spirit Of co.pet.t.on xn the workforce and a greater
interest in the ,ob, co.pan.es wrote to employees about
competing firms, customers, future business prospects, and
new methods and machinery. Letters, U,e many other forms
of corporate communication, bypassed organized labor. Black
advised employers to disregard union objections for "You re
not sending letters to the union's members, but to your
employees." During times of conflict, employers felt these
letters served as an important bridge to employees,
international Harvester and Chrysler, among others, wrote
almost daily to employees during strikes. "^^
Some firms went to great lengths to ensure that workers
listened to their message. in 1956, Kaiser steel Company,
put its annual report in a motion picture film and then
showed it along with a Hollywood premiere at company-
sponsored theatre parties to 30,000 people. other companies
recorded their presidents' reports and sent the phonograph
records to the employees homes. General Aniline & Film
Corporation conducted a game called Qunch (quiz-at-lunch)
,
testing workers on their knowledge, gained from annual
reports, booklets, magazines and plant papers, of company
economics, products, people and history. "^^
Managers argued that effective communication involved
listening as much as telling. Two-way communication was
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essential for verifying if workers were absorbrng the
employer's message. Attitude surveys were one means for
determining what was on employees" minds and Uke other
communication techniques their utilization increased after
the war. By the mid-fifties, one in five f,-,-m=f v^iic ll l tirms were survey-
ing their employees. The Ford Motor Company began its
communication program after an opinion survey revealed a
rather unfavorable level of employee morale, a thirty
minute quiz developed in 1952 by Employee Attitude Research
Group at the University of Chicago promised to determine
"what keeps the worker happy, enthusiastic, loyal to his
employer." The inventory was adopted by a number of firms
including Sears, Roebuck & Company, Campbell Soup Company,
New York Central System, Johnson & Johnson, and The Visking
Corporation
.
^
Meetings, particularly in small and medium sized firms,
complemented surveys by providing a forum for face-to-face
contact with management. Corporate officers from firms like
Pitney-Bowes, Elgin National Watch Company, Esso Standard
Oil Company and Sharp & Dohme met annually with groups of
employees to explain their firm's business condition and
outlook and to field questions. In 1949, 15,000 Johnson and
Johnson employees periodically stopped work to hear company
chairman's Robert Wood Johnson's 44 tape recorded talks and
then participate in discussions that made "the employees
feel they had a personal part in the success of the
business." Weekly "Understanding Luncheons" provided an
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"open forum" at Stanley Home Products ^ .1 uiut^ t-roau , a small Massachusetts
firm. During 1953, Trmken Roller Bearing Company encouraged
two-way communxcat.on by .nvit.ng all li,000 rank-and-file
employees, agaxn xn small groups, to lunch with management.
Thompson Products, an auto parts manufacturer, relied on
frequent meetings over dinner or lunch in xts successful
effort to keep its firm non-union.^5
some firms, like Crouse-Hinds
, a Syracuse electrical
products manufacturer, combined meetings with plant tours,
enabling employees to integrate their jobs into the firm's
overall operation. Luncheon meetings with a ranking company
officer after the tour dealt with such "touchy subjects" as
job ratings and specific grievances. Similarily, Chicago
bolt and screw producer, Pheoll Manfacturing Company,
employing 1500 workers, ended its tour with a conference
with General Manager A.E. Johnson. The employee-tourists,
timid at first, soon were "talking openly and with feeling
about matters that are of deep concern to them." One ten-
year company veteran gained a new understanding of the
company and a sense of pride in his work. He observed:
a man^can work all day long at a packing table but he
doesn't have any particular feeling about what he is
doing. Here today I have watched this whole process, frombeginning to end. For the first time I see my own job in
its real light. I see that it is important to other
jobs. And I see where other people in this plant can't
get along without me. You hear a lot of talk about team-
work in the plant. Now I see clearly what it means.^'
This kind of response kept managers enthusiastic about
communications. In 1950, Lockheed's tour dramatized the
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value Of good workmanship when xt chartered a flock of
company buUt Constellations and flew 11,000 employees on
company time over Southern California to enable them to see
how the planes they built performed in the air. 78
companies devised some of the most innovative communi-
cation techniques m an effort to impress upon employees the
danger of big government and high taxes. Here the overtly
political nature of the communications movement became even
clearer. Concerned that few employees understood their tax
burden, Dupont dramatized the impact of "hidden taxes," by
having an employee and his family to pick out all" the
merchanidise they might have purchased with the money they
had paid in taxes between 1947 and 1954 and photographing
the collection for its journal. m 1952, FE Myers &
Brothers Company held meetings with employees that began
with Controller iM.C. Moses stacking $5,000 on a table. An
employee volunteer counted out the money he had spent during
the year for real estate, gasoline, cigarette, excise, and
sales taxes, with Moses making running comments about what
the worker could have done with "all that money." The
controller then computed what the whole plant including
employees and company paid in taxes. After the meeting, the
firm distributed special kits with instructions and $5,000
in stage money called "Big Tax Money" to enable each worker
to determine their personal tax bite.^^
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other companies specifically mobilized workers to
demand lower taxes and the creation of a "better business
environment." On March 5, 1953, Quaker Oats Company
initiated the "non-partisan" Ighat (l m Gonna Holler About
Taxes) campaign in seventeen major plants. Employees
circulated Ighat petitions which they sent along with
letters and postcards to their Congressmen urging support of
legislation to reduce the tax burden. William Kohs, a
Quaker Oats maintenance man, who won a contest by collecting
anti-tax petition signatures, shouted "IGHAT" at Senator
Everett Dirksen over the telephone. m the spring of 1957,
companies worked hard to rouse worker opposition to a
proposed graduated corporate income tax. Dupont, for
instance, warned its employees that this legislation would
lead to higher consumer prices and discourage corporate
expansion which provided new jobs. GE responded with a
special three week campaign called "Freedom in Action."
Conducted in plants across the nation, it encouraged
employees to write to their congressional representatives on
government spending, taxes, and "the Freedom of Initiative
Climate for Economic Growth. "^^
IV
In the post-war decade, industrialists added a greater
sophistication to selling their version of the American
economic system. A dozen educational and business organiza-
tions and over thirty large firms, ranging from progres-
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sives like Johnson
. Johnson to such staunch ant.-union
conservatives of IBM and Dupont, developed economic educa-
tion programs, n^any of which were distributed nationwide to
other firms. These entailed taking workers or supervisors
off the Shop floor for one or more days for a period of
three to fifteen hours to participate in discussion classes.
105,000 Westinghouse, 180,000 U.S. Steel and 20,000 Swift
Company employees were among the first to be exposed to this
new technique. GE demonstrated its commitment to promoting
"a better understanding of our American way of life" by
assigning an executive fulltime as "Manager of Economic
Training." in early 1951, a leading management consultant
observed in the Harvard Business Review that "practically
every prominent leader of business in the United States
today is talking about teaching economics to employees.
Many of the largest corporations have launched economic-
education programs."^ '•
Two of the most popular courses, "How Our Business
System Operates" (HOBSO) and "In Our Hands" were initially
created by the Dupont Company and the Borg Warner Company
and Inland Steel for their employees, but then given to the
National Association of Manufacturers and the American
Economic Foundation for national distribution. The NAM
conducted eight day institutes for the training of HOBSO
discussion leaders at sites throughout the country. By the
mid-fifties over 500 firms had participated in training
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sessions and were equipped to present the program and rts
sequel, HOBSO II, to t.e.r wor.ers.B2 3eginnrng
.n 1950 the
American Economic Foundation began distributing "m Our
Hands," the Inland Steel and Borg Warner course. within
three years one and a half million workers had participated
in this program. Nineteen firms in Latrobe, Pennsylvania,
for example, co-sponsored the AEF program enabling half the
workers of that town to "study economics" The Latrobe
Bulletin observed that "we still cannot get used to hearing
economics being casually discussed on buses, on street
corners and in the lunchrooms and taverns." Both these
programs emphasized the importance of worker participation,
because "conclusions reached through participation are
understood, accepted, believed, and remembered." To
facilitate participation, "In Our Hands" limited group size
to fifteen and relied on "unsupervised" discussion led by
rank and file workers. But the movies and flipcharts
utilized by both programs tended to steer discussion to the
conclusions desired by management. ^
^
In terms of content, these courses fell into three
groups, evangelistic, academic, and company oriented.
V
Although there were significant differences in approach, all
ultimately led to the goal of generating support for free
enterprise. Evangelistic programs like, HOBSO and "In Our
Hands," taught "Free Enterprise economics" by focusing on the
accomplishments of the American business system and exploit-
ing the fear of losing its benefits to encroaching
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soc.ausm. HOBSO also e^phasi.ed the importance of profits,
competition and individual freedom, and defended the
"capitalistxc standard of living against central government
control." After the HOBSO sessions one Dupont worker
commented "I realize what could happen under a socialistic
government and now I am going to do all i can to prevent our
Government from going social istic."^^
Academic programs, like the one developed by the
university of Chicago for 3,000 Republic Steel supervisors
shunned emotional appeals about the dangers of socialism for
a more subtle approach. Such programs proported to teach
the basic principles of economics, including issues like
costs, stock investment and the banking system, in order to
provide a framework for analyzing economic and social
problems. After participating in fifteen educational
sessions. Republic Steel foremen were to have developed "an
appreciation of the values, benefits and rewards to the
individual as part of the Corporation and the Economic
system" and an ability to correct workers misconceptions.
Foreman Chris Cutropia reported that the course enabled him
to effectively respond to a disgruntled worker who snapped
"Why should I knock myself out for Republic? They make $75
out of every billet of steel and I get nothing." Cutropia,
who took the "griper" aside and convinced him that the
company would be lucky to make seventy-five cents a billet,
recalled that "three months ago I wouldn't have been able to
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say anything."85 3^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
typified company oriented economic education. They presen-
ted to all their employees information specifically about
the company to enhance organizational rapport in the belief
that the best way to generate approval of the economic
system was to create feelings of identity with the fxrm.86
Economic education advocates pointed to the opinion
polls conducted before and after the presentations to demon-
strate how they reshaped worker attitudes. m 1951, before
participating in the "in Our Hands" discussions half the
rank and file workers of Sharon steel Corporation believed
there was no real danger to personal freedom if the govern-
ment took over industry, that the way to increase prosperity
was to circulate more money, and that a strong union was the
best protection for job security. The post-course survey
showed only one quarter of the workers agreed with these
propositions. "in Our Hands" also seemingly changed
workers' ideas about the best way to improve their standard
of living. Fifty-three percent as against thirty-three
percent of a pre-course audience agreed that the solution
was greater production. ^ Similarily an informal survey
showed that at least some Latrobe workers had absorbed the
program's message. Paul Palmer of the Toyad Company
reported he had learned that "People benefit when the tools
of production are in the hands of private individuals rather
than under the control and supervision of the government."
Without the profit motive, he continued, "inefficiency is
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bound to creep into our industrial pattern and the 1
would be passed on to the taxpayers. "88
Often, economic education nmnr-^rr^c: k-,^^ciuxo programs had more immediate
political goals. m the early fxfties moboli.ing support
for the Republican Party drove many programs. Although the
political message of "m Our Hands" was very subtle, another
program, "This Is Our Problem", developed by the arch
conservative Harding College and presented to workers at
General Motors and Swift Company and throughout the midwest,
openly attacked the Democractic Party. The growth pattern
of economic education programs reflected their use as a
political weapon. while economic training increased
steadily after 1948, the biggest jump occurred during the
year prior to the 1952 presidential election, when the
percentage of participating firms increased to forty-four
percent from twenty percent. After the Republican victory
the number of firms utilizing formal economic training
receded back to one in five. NAM President Charles Sligh
pleaded against backsliding, warning "the spirit of peace
and sweet reasonableness is not going to descend automati-
cally." A political change in Washington would not guaran-
tee better relations with employees. In 1955, an Opinion
Research Corporation Vice President admitted that "the
Republican victory in the national elections has removed the
need for explaining so thoroughly the basis of the enter-
prise system and the threats to its continuation. "8
9
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VGaining worker consent to the messages of economic
education was intimately connected to the operation of the
shop floor. Many companies recognized that all the energy
and money expended on communication would be worthless if
"Ivan the Terrible is walking up and down the aisles, or
Mortimer the Dumb is posing in the garb of foreman."90
Thus, human relations oriented personnel administration
often integrated communication programs with the development
of more effective supervision. Most managers agreed that
foremen were the key figure in labor relations. They
believed that the degree of worker identification with the
firm and possibly with the free enterprise system itself was
intimately linked to the employee's relationship with their
supervisor.
Following the war, many firms increased the size of
their supervisory force. Dupont maintained a ratio of
fifteen workers to one foreman. At the same time, to
stregthen foremen vis a vis union shop floor leadership,
corporations negotiated for the reductions in the number of
stewards. Supervisory training programs proliferated as
firms, like GE, Armstrong Cork, Alcoa, and Ford, sought to
increase the prestige, effectiveness, and loyalty of their
foreman. A few firms had initially offered these courses
after World War I and during the late thirties to combat
rising unionism.. In addition, the government had sponsored
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foreman training during World War Ii92 ^^^^ extensive
post-war programs had two goals. First, they attempted to
rehabrl.tate foremen as an integral part of management. The
Taft-Hartley Act had destroyed supervisory unionization but
failed to solve the problem of the alienation of front line
supervisors. To bolster supervisors' prestige and improve
their loyalty to the firm, employers provided foreman with
greater job security and established a sharp differentiation
between supervisors and the rank and file. Companies
increasingly placed foremen on salary, invited them to
special meetings and dinners, tailored special economic
education programs to them, and gave them offices or desks,
telephones and special parking privileges. in 1948,
American Type Founders invited all its management staff to a
three day conference at a hotel that included a program of
banquets, entertainment and sports, with the entire bill
picked up by the firm.^^
Secondly, supervisory development promised to boost
foremen's ability to serve more effectively as the first
line of defense against unionism. Companies would win
worker back their their side with proper, fair, and sympa-
thetic treatment from their immediate supervisors. This
strategy was employed not only by large non-union firms like
Thompson Products, American Rolling Mill and Kodak, but also
by companies committed to a realistic approach to industrial
relations, such as International Harvester, General Motors,
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and Ford. Courses taught foreman how to use their own
personaUty to develop d.scrpUne and
.nstUl loyalty a.ong
workers. Authoritarianism was no longer acceptable;
instead, huznan relations theory called for persuasxon and
friendly, caring leadership. "when there is a human
personal relationship, a feeling of belonging to the team,
when there is mutual under standing confidence and respect-
advised Joseph G. Gilland of the Packard Motor Car Company,
"there is a well rounded, harmonious, and efficient
organization. "^^
Employers understood, of course, that a close foreman-
worker relationship was also a means of circumventing the
union. in 1950, the Lukens Steel Company reaffirmed to the
"'Nth degree'" its commitment to developing better under-
standing and closer ties between supervision and employees
for it was "the one and only avenue through which certain
activities of the Union can be offset in a proper and
constructive manner." Firms like Lukens instructed foreman
to compete with the union steward for worker allegiance by
personally greeting each employee every day and by providing
a sympathetic ear for on-and-off the job problems. Some
companies even provided instructions in counseling techni-
ques. Coring White of the non-union Dan River Mills advised
foreman to learn the names of workers' wives and children
and to engage each employee in a "three minute, friendly
chat" on a regular basis. In 1947, GE began encouraging
the "establishment and maintenance of a separate man-to-man
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relat.onsh.p between each supervisor and each
.nd.v.dual
employee," by establishing 15,000 cells of f.ve to twenty-
five people grouped around a single supervisor. ge xssued a
124-page manual to supervisors, which contained elaborate
answers to every objection that might be raised by employees
about their jobs or the company. Moreover, the corporation
urged foreman to find out what each employee "liKes and
dislikes about his job, what he thinks we can do to help him
have a job and a personal association with us that is more
rewarding materially and spiritual ly. "96
Participation was another fundamental concept
associated with the human relations movement. The Hawthorne
studies had demonstrated that allowing workers to partici-
pate in decisions concerning their welfare raised morale and
reduced resistance to company directives thereby ensuring
greater cooperation and higher productivity. Although,
other social scientists questioned the link between higher
morale and productivity, some managers embraced the concept.
Like communications, participation promised to address
employees higher needs by making work more meaningful, by
creating a sense of importance and belonging, and by
restoring workers' creative relationship to the job. James
C. Worthy of Sears warned that workers who were not fully
involved became "restless and discontented" and were "easily
subject to strong leadership which may arise in opposition
to management." Thus, like other human relations policies.
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participation was a means of drawina th^ i^-Ldwi g ne loyalty of workers
away from the union and closer to management. 9
^
The corporate commitment to participation, however, dxd
not signify a wrllingness to restructure work or the lines
of authority within the shop. Most managers recoxled at the
Idea of instituting labor-management committees. Few had
any sympathy for the widely discussed Scanlon Plan, a union-
management cooperative scheme that permitted the union to
negotiate on equal terms with the employer on critical
production issues. Instead, as Fortune observed in 1951,
employers wanted to give workers the illusion of partici-
pating in the company.98 similarily, sociologist William
Foote Whyte recalled that companies saw no need to change
their styles of management but simply sought guidance on how
to "make workers feel they are participating. "^^
In reality, participation gave little real power or
control over jobs to workers. In some firms, it involved
increased use of conferences during which supervisors
"consulted" with employees on decisions that affected them.
Cessna Aircraft assigned the group leader the job of molding
the "human weakneses of his men and women in the proper
direction." Glenn L. Martin Company succeeded in using these
meetings to obtain "full agreement" to a methods improvement
program. The company reported that workers responded: "We
like this way of conducting changes because we feel we are
being considered." Lewis Corey, a professor of political
economy at Antioch College, who observed the Harwood
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Manufacturing Company's syste. of part.c.pat.on, found tnat
the Objective of the conferences was "to get the workers to
accept what management wants them to accept but to make them
feel the^ made or helped to make the decision."100
More commonly, employers relied on suggestion programs
to secure greater employee involvement. Suggestion systems
enabled employers to gain greater access to workers' know-
ledge of the work process by giving employees a direct
monetary reward for ideas on how to cut waste, eliminate
unnecessary motions or prevent safety hazards. Although
they dated back to the 1 880s, it was not until the postwar
era of human relations that suggestion systems began to
flourish. Ford Motor Company, for example, established an
employee suggestion plan in 1947 as part of its new human
relations effort. By 1953, four thousand firms received
more than two million ideas from workers and paid out over
fifteen million dollars in return. The National Association
of Suggestion Systems, organized in 1942 by four companies,
compiled statistics on the operation of plans and helped
members promote and administer their programs. By 1949 the
organization had grown to three hundred and fifty members
and to a over a thousand seven years later . '^ '-
Companies claimed that the value of these plans lay in
more than monetary savings. Allen Ruffin of the W.F Hall
Printing Company asserted that they provided "a direct line
of communication from the men at the machine to the man a
152
the top... Moreover, they gave employees a sense of part.cx-
pation, making them feel the company was interested
.n the.r
ideas. in 1952, Riegel Paper Corporation executive G.R.
Schenck asserted that upon adoption of a suggestion the
employee gained satisfaction
.'from personal recognition for
his constructive thinking., and attained "a sense of pride
when he sees one of his ideas in actual operation. -. 1 0 2 The
GE Utica plant assured recognition by televising suggestion
awards ceremonies on local stations. Parker Pen Company
used a suggestion system called the
-.Jdea Exchange Plan", in
which workers shared jointly with the company in the first
year's net savings as the core of a program to break
workers' traditional attitudes. The company also eliminated
time clocks to demonstate that it viewed workers as respon-
sible partners of management. The firm asserted that the
program had succeeded in stimulating among workers
"proprietor-mindedness,.. which meant the identification of
employees with company interests. '^^
Companies frequently had to counter worker complaints
that rewards were too meager or that labor-saving sugges-
tions might lead to job loss. Ceremonies and rituals
offered one way of overcoming such resistance. Elaborate
campaigns or contests were designed to raise the level of
worker involvement and promote feelings of company identity
or esprit de corp
. In 1949, Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company conducted a five-week campaign devoted to waste
reduction suggestions. It doubled awards and held weekly
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drawings for merchandise prizes. a
.Villainous looking
hunchback named Weasel Waste" roamed through the plants
criticizing good work and praising any waste he observed
During 1956, "Mr. check" strolled daxly through the
westinghouse Columbus plant tapping employees on the
shoulder and giving them five silver dollars if they
successfully answered three questions on xmproving qualxty.
According to a report published in Factory Manaaement and
Maintenance
,
a distrustful, active union member admitted
changing "his tune" after receiving his award, confessing he
had believed the cash only went to carefully selected non-
unionists . ^ 0^
Sylvania's 1952 "Operation sharp" contest stressed
group spirit to improve worker performance in the areas of
safety, housekeeping, reduction of scrap, and product
improvement. The company publicized the campaign with
streamers, posters, floats, a circus parade and the crowning
of "Miss Sharp" before an audience of 12,000. To ensure
fullest participation, the contest divided workers into
groups named after college football teams, which were judged
m the various categories, with a grand prize of a three day
luxury weekend in New York City. Teams created their own
special costumes and decorations, held parades and pep
rallies, "come complete with cheers," to build enthusiasm.
The "Stanford Indians" dressed as Indians and built a
teepee. Although the contest cut into working time.
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Sylvania asserted that production increased, quality
improved, and employee morale and the level of company
identification jumped. '-
AS all of these activities attest, human relations
systems trumpeted the company's sincere and personal concern
for the individual employee. Name plates, awards for long
service, birthday greetings and merit awards provided
individual recognition and acknowleged that the most menial
job, however, minor, was important to the company. one
manager whose company began sending birthday cards in 1946
attested that:
One of my men is going around walking on air, sayingthat for the first time in thirty-five years with the
company he been recognized as an individual ratherthan a cog in the machine. He says that birthday card is
worth more to him than a ten dollar bill.^O^
Firms, like the Frigidaire division of General Motors, Union
Carbide and Carbon, and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing,
provided dinner at a hotel, flowers, music, and entertain-
ment to honor employees "who have proved their worth and
loyalty over a long period of years." To enhance the
worker s prestige in the community, many companies broadcast
service award cermonies over local radio stations or
released pictures to local newspapers. Acknowledging that
some workers might ridicule such efforts, personnel
specialist Joseph H. Frost insisted that they were "quite
important to [them] no matter how much [they] may publicly
scoff at the idea."^^^
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Firms that employed large numbers of women believed
that these
..nds of activities were especially important.
Their approach, however, reflected the gender relations of
the dominant culture and served to reinforce its assump-
tions. Personnel specialists contended that the particular-
ities of the female temperament meant that women required
even greater levels of respect, appreciation, and friend-
liness than men. Hughes Aircraft stressed making women feel
at home at work, encouraging supervisors to act as a
"handholder" when necessary. m 1957, applying typical
human relations thinking, an employee counselor concluded
that Hughes women workers were well satisfied as they liked
getting "a big 'hello'in the morning. They like the boss to
call them by their first names. And they like the feeling
of belonging." Indeed, many employers believed that it took
little more that a "big mirror, perfumed soap, hot water"
and an occasional kind word to "keep the girls happy." The
GE Schenectady Works' paper featured women's contribution to
the plant by focusing on the "Woman of the Month." In other
firms, however, recognition was based more on women's
physical attributes. Standard Oil held beauty contests
while McDonnell Aircraft Corporation plants annually elected
a "Sky Queen" to "reign over company activities. "-'-
VI
Employers asserted that human relations worked.
Communications and participation were contributing to a
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growing company consciousness. m 1958, ERLIC contended
that "a segment of American management has suceeded xn
building a relationship wxth its employees that sharply
reduces the influence exercised by unxon leaders." Many
managers admitted, however, that the results were often
intangible. They reUed on studxes Uke one conducted by
the National Industrial Conference Board in 1952, which
concluded that "communication is a powerful factor affectxng
the ideas and attitudes of employee." others pointed to
concrete benefits. Standard Oil reported greater worker
participation resulted in a twenty percent increase in
productivity. c.H. Smith, president of The steel improve-
ment and Forge Company, attributed fewer labor dxsturbances
and a more cooperative workforce to a human relations
program that included economic education and foreman
training. The Ideal Electric and iManufacturing Company, a
small Ohio firm, reported that grievances dropped dramatic-
ally and the union showed a new respect for management at
the bargaining table.
^
Finally, General Electric felt its communications
campaign, which exploited the internal factionalism of the
electrical workers union over the issue of communism, had
suceeded in driving a wedge between organized labor and
workers. Even as early as 1947, United Electrical Workers'
St. Louis district president William Sentner recognized the
union's growing demoralization and admitted "that poison and
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misinformation and bosses' propaganda stuck a little bit.
There is an old saying out in Missouri,
'if you hit that
stuff hard enough, a little bit of it sticks." Some of you
who are farmers know what you take out of a barn every day,
and know what I am talking about.-m ge believed that the
failure of several locals to join the International Electri-
cal workers Union's 1952 strike against the corporation, and
the refusal of union members to endorse strike calls in 1953
and 1954 provided proof of the effectiveness of human ^
relations
.
'-
'^
Despite this litany of endorsements, critics challenged
almost every aspect of human relations. As early as 1947,
sociologists and economists began attacking human relations
in industry, charging that its goal was to manipulate
workers for management's purposes. According to sociologist
Daniel Bell the "social science of the factory researchers
is not a science of man, but a cow-sociology," which
suggested that the happy worker like the contented cow is
more productive. Industrial relations scholar John Dunlop
found that the communications framework, positing a "single
unity and corporateness in the work community" was
"basically incompatible with collective bargaining and
democratic traditions."
In 1950, Fortune editor William Whyte also questioned
all of the effort spent in economic education. In a series
of articles entitled "Is Anybody Listening?," his conclusion
was an emphatic no. The millions spent were "not worth a
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da.n." The campaign to sell free enterpr.se was psycho-
logically unsound/, abstract, defensive, and negative
Moreover,
.'in a great .any of rts aspects rt represents a
shoeing lac. of fa.th .n the A.er.can people, and .n so.e
cases downright contempt." Americans weren't col lect ivists
and didn't need indoctrination rn the American way. whyte
Charged that the real objective was a Republican victory at
the polls. so long as communications was so blatantly
partisan, employees would not accept management's facts or
have confidence in its motives or sincerity. Moreover,
participation, as practiced in most firms, also failed
because the actual goal was manipulation and avoidance of
real participation. ^ ^
Management consultant Peter Drucker concurred. Any
money spent on changing the thinking of employees on "such
queer targets" as a lower tax load on business was "totally
wasted." Participation hinged on actually making work
important and possibly restructuring the whole corporate
organization rather than giving workers a "feeling of
importance. "115 Like the social science critics and some
more liberal businessmen, Drucker saw the unwillingness of
human relation advocates to accept the fact that the
workplace involved real and healthy problems of power and
conflicts "which are not conflicts of personalities but
objective conflicts of vision and interests" as evidence of
their 'almost panicky fear" of unions. Finally, he
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condemned the wxdespread use of hu.an relations as a „ea„s
of busting organized labor. The belief that unions would
"wither on the vine" in the facp nf rrr.r.At e o good employee relations
was the "opium of the managerial proletariat."! 1
6
criticism touched off a period of debate within the
business community. Claude Rob.nson of the Opxnxon Research
corporation provided evidence that workers were listening.
His polls demonstrated that twice as many worKers believed
what they read in company as opposed to union publications
and that seventy percent of polled workers said they read
and believed the contents of company letters. some
employers, however, admitted that their economic education
programs met worker resistance. Dupont surveys, for
instance, found workers emerging from HOBSO training with
the comments "just a lot of propaganda for Big Business" and
"I went up there a Democrat and 'by ' i 'm still a
Democrat. They can't change me." others conceded that the
payoff on foreman training was "not automatic or inevitable.
Foremen often failed to implement lessons taught in super-
visory training or workers were suspicious of newly-trained
foremen who were suddenly solitious about employee
feelings.
But, an endless series of conferences, meetings, and
seminars on the problem produced the resolve that "if
initial experiments
. . . have only moderate success, the
mature reaction is not to scrap the effort, but to develop
still better techniques for achieving the objective."
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more
Employers determined that their programs would beoome
sophisticated and worked to rmprove their methods. They
would avoid preaching or patron.zxng their workers and would
cast their message in ways that appealed to the worker's own
self interest. As a result, human relations continued
strongly throughout most of the fifties.
In the end, it is impossible to estimate the success of
any particular program in reshaping the ideas of workers.
The cumulative weight of the wide variety of human relations
mechanisms, however, remained relevant in the continuing
battle to fashion a postwar pro-ccrporat e ideology.
Employers were still committed to the "selling of sound
economic ideas," which John R. Thompson of the Missouri
State Chamber of Commerce, admitted, was "a political
12 0:ob." They continued to use communications as a vehicle
to compete with unions for worker support. Indeed, an even
more aggressive communications campaign highlighted a mana-
gerial offensive against organized labor that began during
the waning years of the Eisenhower administration. in 1961,
United States Steel Vice President R. Heath Larry reiterated
his firm's commitment to this policy, asserting that evi-
dence existed "that over the years a [positive] change in
the climate of employee opinion has been taking place. "-^^^
Employers girded themselves for an enduring war of attri-
tion. It was not enough, however, to preach the virtues of
the free enterprise system; workers expected to see
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significant improvements in their quality of life. To
delxver these expectations, many employers complemented
human relations with an astounding revitalizatron of cor
porate welfare activities. For workers, then, company
consciousness depended upon tangible rewards as well as
illusion of belonging.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NEW WELFARE CAPITALISM
Managers intent on increasing employee attachment to
the firm and to the American economic system reached back to
a personnel strategy that had even deeper historical roots
tnan human relations. in the years following World War II,
companies in both the union and non-union sectors revital-
ized mechanisms often associated with antiunion welfare
capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. Industrial recreation boomed, profit sharing
increased, and employers demonstrated renewed interest in
integrating workers' families into the firm. More impor-
tantly, an intricate web of benefits including pensions,
vacations, educational assistance, and insurance provided a
substantial segment of American workers with a greater
degree of security. Indeed, even in the unionized sector,
employers fought hard to claim credit for the benefits won by
organized labor in collective bargaining.
Welfarism meshed closely with human relations.
Together, advocates claimed, they promised to build company
consciousness; they would restore the afffinities between
capital and labor while alleviating the stresses created by
the work process. But while human relations relied on
social and psychological devices to enhance employee
identification with the firm, welfarism provided tangible
evidence of employer concern for the worker. Moreover, if
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numan relations created personal ties and loyalties between
worKer and management on the shop floor, welfarism sought to
expand that community of interest beyond the immediate
confines of the factory to encompass the worker's leisure
and home life. Combined, human relations and welfare capi-
talism reinforced the notion of the interdependence of
workers and their families with their employer. Employers
tried to convince workers that their security depended not
on union organization or the state, but on acceptance of a
managerially-dominated social and political order.
Welfarism had deep roots in the American economic
system. From the decline of the artisan shop through the
rise of the corporate giants, employer benevolence was a
constant device, drawing on the moral imperatives of the
American social order. Its earliest form was a paternalism
based on the personalized relationship between employer and
employee that helped smooth the initial transition to indus-
trial capitalism. More systematized welfare programs fol-
lowed in the early twentieth century to combat proDlems
caused by the advent of mass production, Taylorism, and
unionism. Particularly after the labor turmoil at the end
of World War I, progressive employers began to address these
problems by developing bureaucratic personnel and labor-
management programs in which welfarism played an important
part. Through non-wage incentives, employers hoped to
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restore the sense of loyalty and identification between
worker and employer that had been weakened by changes m the
labor process and by the growth in the size of the
workplace
.
Underpinning welfare capitalism was the concept of
management's obligation to secure the well-being of its
employees. Employers demonstrated their concern for workers
by improving conditions in their factories through safety
campaigns, lunchrooms, and even beautified plants. They
wished to alleviate many of the hazards of industrial life
by providing doctors and insurance plans. Through stock
purchasing, pensions, and home-ownership plans, managers
sought to bind workers closer to the company and decrease
the costly turnover rates, while work councils and shop
committees encouraged workers to believe that they had a
voice in determining wages and working conditions or in
settling grievances. ^ Finally, in recreational activities
like sports teams and hobby clubs, employers linked company
imperatives to the worker's leisure time and offset the
monotony of factory work.-^
The welfare capitalism of the 1920s achieved mixed
results. Welfarism played at least some part in the preci-
pitious decline in labor activity and the greater stability
of the workforce during that decade. But, employees never
passively accepted management's policies; instead, cor-
porate loyalty implied a negotiated compact between
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manayeir.ent ana worker, based on the employer's willingness
to compromise on significant issues. while companies
achieved a degree of consent, they paid for it through wages
and at times shop floor concessions.^
The Depression, however, shook the notion of mutual
responsibility between worker and company, m the early
thirties, the prolonged economic slump forced most firms to
drop expensive programs. Other companies faced competition
for control of welfare programs from newly unionized
workers. 5 Although in disarray, welfarism was not com-
pletely destroyed. Some companies, like Endicott Johnson,
NCR, Sears, Roebuck and Company, and Goodyear Tire and
Rubber, combined well established programs of welfare capi-
talism with a degree of intimidation to combat labor organ-
izing drives. A few others implemented new benefit schemes
to contain the industrial union upsurge.^
The outbreak of the Secona World War brought changes in
state policy that breathed new life into welfare capitalism.
The drive to promote wartime productivity and industrial
harmony led state agencies to support traditional welfare
programs like corporate-sponsored industrial recreation.
The government also altered corporate tax laws and insti-
tuted wage control policies that encouraged the development
of employee benefit plans in the private sector. Finally,
some firms struggling with labor militancy, turnover, and
absenteeism looked to welfarism with renewed favor. By tne
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war's end, health insurance coverage tripled and pension
coverage increased by a third.
Management's desire to build company consciousness in
an effort to counter the growing power of the state and
organized labor further invigorated welfarism. Postwar
prosperity and accompanying high corporate profits under-
wrote this new venture in employer benevolence. Obviously,
government-regulated services introduced during the New
Deal and the existence of unions altered postwar welfare
capitalism. With the development of state-sponsored public
housing, for instance, employers showed little interest in
directly providing housing, which had been a common com-
ponent of earlier welfare capitalist initiatives. Moreover,
benefits like pensions, vacations, and heath insurance came
under the regulation of federal and state law or became
meshed in the collective bargaining system. There were,
however, significant continuities. Post-war employers, like
their predecessors, emphasized the common interest between
capital and labor. They, too, were responding to continuing
notions of social responsiblity . More concretely, these
employers shared the hopes of earlier welfare capitalists
that provision of an array of benefits and services would
translate into greater productivity, higher morale, and
increased employee loyalty. They also hoped to prevent or
weaken unionism within their plants.
Non-wage financial incentives, a traditional part of
welfare capitalism, expanded rapidly following the war.
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Employers revived profit sharing, for example, as a program
which earlier had operated successfully. m the late
nineteenth century, companies distributed profits, usually
in the form of cash, shares, or deferred payments, to
encourage worker loyalty and productivity. By 1917, 250
companies practiced profit sharing. interest continued
through the twenties, but the depression ended most plans
and embittered those workers who had lost money in corporate
stock purchasing schemes. Concern about heightened tensions
between capital and labor and about union criticism of high
corporate profits in the post-war years renewed employer
interest in the plans. in 1947 the executives of sixteen
companies, mostly smaller firms, founded the Council of
Profit Sharing Industries, which by 1955 boasted over 900
members. The number of profit snaring plans formally
approved by the U.S. Treasury Department grew from 37 in
1940 to over 8,000 in 1955 and 20,000 in 1960.^
Profit sharing promisea to instill within the plant a
sense of partnership between management and workforce that
would result in improved efficiency and work performance as
well as more harmonious labor relations. In 1 950, Cass S.
Hough, vice president of a Michigan firm that manufactured
air guns testified that profit sharing so motivated his
employees that they literally fought each other to boost
productivity. He recalled:
I didn't know whether to fire them or give them a
raise. We have a rule: fighting on the job means
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ma?p??^ T ^^^^^ share ofterial. Imagine: workers actually fightinq overwno s to get the most to do. Before; thosewould have sat down and waited for the material tobe brought to their machines, not anymore.^
A 1957 Opinion Research survey corroborated the motivating
impact of profit sharing, finding that profit sharing
employees were less inclined to oppose efforts to raise
production performance.^*^
Firms resisting unionization were particularly
attracted by a policy that promised harmony in the factory.
Like human relations, profit sharing offered to eliminate
the "dividing line" and make workers "feel they belong, that
they're not just another cog in an impersonal machine." Not
surprisingly, then, in 1950, only thirty percent of the
members of the Council of Profit Sharing Industries had
contracts with organized labor. Some large non-union firms
like Sears, Proctor and Gamble, and Dow Chemical offered
profit sharing or stock ownership. Most often, however,
smaller companies were behind the programs. Indeed, for
many small and medium sized firms, profit sharing anchored a
paternalistic personnel program designed to raise producti-
vity while resisting unions. Such was the case at the 250
member Swartwout Company of Ohio, which began profit sharing
in 1946, and at Motorolla, which set up its plan in 1947 in
a bid to keep its 7,000 workers "satisfied and happy. "'-
Beyond its immediate practical benefits, profit sharing
generated great excitement among employers because it
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appealed to their broader class interests. Business
leaders, who feared for the future of capitalism, believed
that profit sharing 's significance lay in strengthening the
American social and political system. Strange J. Porter,
personnel director of a Syracuse machine company, contended
that plans, when combined with other evidence of "sincere
appreciation and respect" for the worker, "will go farther
in estaolisning his inherent identity with free enterpise
.
.
than anything we merely preach about." Advocates often
evinced an evangelical fervor. The W all street Journal
found that the Council for Profit Snaring Industries annual
meetings were conducted in a "missionary mood" as "an
unusually fervent group of businessmen" propounded an
economic gospel that they believed would end labor-capital
conflict and bring the "spirit of capitalism" to the masses.
Defense of the free enterprise system remained a constant
theme. In 1960, for instance, the chairman of S.C. Johnson
and Son was convinced that profit sharing was "a major
barrier to the Communistic inroads which even at this moment
literally threatens our shores. "-'^
While profit-sharing plans attracted new interest,
private benefit programs were far more significant and far-
reaching. In part, offering benefits was an ingredient of a
broader corporate strategy within primary sector firms to
stabilize tight labor markets through changes in personnel
policy. "'^ But, they also served as weapons in the battle to
undermine worker allegiance to unions and reliance on the
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state. Benefits provided tangible evidence of employer
concern for the worKer and served to reinforce the notion
that the road to security lay in private as opposed to
public sector welfare initiatives.
After World War II, organized labor seized the initial
credit for the massive growth in private sector benefits.
Unions had been pushing for the expansion of the welfare
state but had met stiff resistance, particularly from
employers. Without political clout at the state level to
achieve reforms, such as national health insurance, CIO
unions began demanding the expansion of private sector
programs. Most employers resisted union demands, fearful of
the labor' movement's intrusion upon managerial preroga-
tives; some wanted to avoid the expense, pleading inability
to cover the cost. Others were not opposed, finding
advantages in the tax breaks and the ability to pension off
older employees. This latter group also envisioned improve-
ments in morale and loyalty from the voluntary provision of
fringe benefits. The key here was the maintenance of
benefits as a voluntary form of compensation under the
complete control of the employer
^
Business leaders condemned union-negotiated plans,
charging that they tended to "glorify the union as the
expense of the employer," throwing the "obligation entirely
on tne one, the credit on the other. ""'^ Instead, employers
wanted the credit and good will generated from voluntarily
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provided benefits and the freedom to administer such
programs independently of unions. Aware of labor's power,
business leaders began in early 1946 urged companies to take
the initiative and preempt union demands by immediately
instituting employee benefit plans. Moreover, as Fortune
noted, employers feared if business did not recognize its
responsibility for providing for workers' security, the
"government will take over." Accordingly, in 1947, Ford
offered its workers a pension plan and General Motors an
improved healtn insurance plan.^^
The convergence of union militancy and NLRB insistence
that benefits were subject to collective bargaining,
however, forced companies to deal with union demands on
these issues. Furthermore, union gains often compelled
unorganized firms to match the gains negotiated in the union
sector. Norton Company of Worchester, Massachusetts, for
example, deliberately matched the health and pension
benefits of the locally organized American Steel and Wire
workers. As a result, the number of workers covered by
pension plans in firms surveyed by the National Industrial
Conference Board jumped from twenty-three percent in the mid
forties to almost seventy-five percent ten years later.
Similarily, other benefits, like health insurance, became a
standard offering by the majority of American firms. ''^
Forced to concede to union demands, unionized firms
tried to claim credit for the new benefit policies. In
1950, General Motors president C.E. Wilson contended that
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employers nad been attempting to improve wages, working
conditions, and benefits and complained about what he
believed was the false impression that improvements for
workers "are brought about only by a union beating an
employer over the nead." Non-union firms had an equally
large stake in ensuring that they received full credit. To
insulate the workforce from organized labor, they needed to
prove that benefits came willingly and without outside
prodding. Both union and large non-union firms came to
believe benefits, if properly handled, could "be turned into
investments that bring a rich return in the form of a more
efficient, more cooperative and more stable work force. "-^^
To assure the best return, the National Association of
Manufacturers advised "a continual selling job on how well
the employee is being treated." Employers developed an
array of communication channels to disclose the "hidden"
cost to the company of the fringe benefit package and its
monetary value to the worker. Booklets, movies, letters,
newspaper articles and personal conferences made it clear to
workers that management picked up the check for their
security. Each year General Electric gave employees a two-
page report entitled "Your Personal Share in General
Electric Employee Benefits." In 1955, Esso began sending
management representatives to workers' homes to explain
benefits. Manager Tom Welsh reported that "the company has
sensed a tremendous appreciation " from workers. '-^
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Companies used individual stories to demonstrate the
ways they took care of workers through benefits. Dupont and
Sylvania Electric regularly published in their employee
magazines "graphic, dramatic" cases of the financial relief
provided by the company program. Similarily, in August
1950, Allis Chalmers recounted how the company aided
employee Steve Kalan, whose newly acquired home was
destroyed Dy fire. The company, which was in the midst of a
battle with UAW Local 248, was pleased with the lesson
Kalan had absorbed from this experience. In thanking Allis
Chalmers management, Kalan observed that "I found out who my
real friends are at a time like this," and advised "be 100%
with the management and they will be with you." In other
words, the company, not the union, had stood by Kalan in his
time of need"*-^
Like profit sharing, private welfare plans carried a
political message. Business leaders asserted that workers'
security needs could be met within the confines of the free
enterprise system, thus undercutting the need for the
further expansion of the welfare state. In 1955, GE execu-
tive Ray Bouchard explained that "a well managed benefit
program set up within the framework of the enterprise system
can contribute powerfully to employee security with fewer of
the dangers that are implicit in security programs supplied
by other sources." Standard Oil executive J.W. Myers
believed that, like profit sharing, private social systems
provided an important means by which employers could reach
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their workers and "create a better understanding of how they
may share in the fruits of private capitalism by each
becoming a capitalist and having a stake in our economic
system. "^^
II
Other forms of welfarism complemented employer efforts
to build company consciousness. In 1949, a survey of new
plants by the business journal Factory Management and
Maintenance found progressive managers committed to a good
physical environment. Ten years later the journal confi-
dently reported that "comfort for employees today seems at
its zenith
—
patios, gardens, air conditioning, escalators,
x-ray rooms, chapels, reflection pools." Such employers
believed that these amenities, as well as improved lighting,
elimination of excess noise and vibration, and maintenance
of a decorous plant exterior, not only increased producti-
vity but stimulated feelings of pride toward the plant and
the company. Management also trumpeted its new wide-spread
practice of granting paid coffee breaks. Other small
touches demonstrated company concern for worker comfort.
Stanley Home Products, for instance, supplemented the
breaks with free doughnuts in an effort to win worker
allegiance.
Some benefits demonstrated employer concern for worker
welfare off the job. Companies, like B.F. Goodrich and
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Norton, provided nurses who made home and hospital visits to
employees and retrrees. Aside from showing that the com.pany
cared about workers' troubles, this service had the added
benefit of reducing absenteeism. 2 3 Programs for the
increasing number of retired workers provided yet another
example of corporate good will. Public Relations News
observed that "it's a moral obligation and also good
business to help retirees lead happy lives." Esso, Thompson
Products, and 3M provided financial counseling to ease the
transition from full employment to retirement. Newsletters,
plant visits, special parties, and clubs encouraged retirees
continued identification with the firm and showed older
workers, still on the job, that the company would remember
them. In 1956, Ralpn C. Pratt of Charmin Paper Mills repor-
ted on the powerful impact of company recognition of its
retirees. "I have seen" he testified "actual tears of
happiness welling in the eyes of old timers as they talk man
to man with the company president" at a pensioners'
dinner . ^ ^
Industrial recreation provided another link to earlier
welfare capitalism. Management's positive experience with
recreation during the war led to a tremendous expansion of
corporate-sponsored leisure activities in the 1950s. In
1953, 30,000 firms spent 800 million dollars on recreation,
a fifty percent increase over the previous five years. The
National Industrial Recreation Association, which jumped
from eleven founding members in 1941 to over nine hundred in
200
1957, estimated that industry spent more money on sports
equipment than all the schools in the country combined. m
1952, Mcculloch Motors Corporation of Los Angeles spent over
a million dollars on its recreation building. Bell and
Howell, Kaiser Aluminum, and General Electric included
extensive recreational facilities m their plans for new
plants
.
By the mid 1950s, industrial recreation had become such
an important part of industrial relations programs that it
was a business in itself. Tne Industrial Recreation Company
of New York planned, coordinated, and packaged programs for
such corporations as General Electric and Lever Brothers,
while companies set out to convince workers that recreation
did not simply mean "getting exhausted on your own time."
Despite the growing competition from commercialized leisure,
large numbers of workers took part in the recreation
program; ninety-four percent of 3M's 5,900 St. Paul
employees for instance participated in company classes,
picnics, clubs, athletics, carnivals, and musical events. A
1949 Factory survey found that seventy-five percent of both
union and non-union workers approved of industrial
recreation . '
Recreation addressed many of tne same problems as human
relations, and many company executives believed that it,
too, would give alienated workers the individual recognition
and sense of acnievement lacking on the job. At the same
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time, It promoted the teamwork essential to industrial
success. in 1952 General Motors personnel director W.J.
Mahoney repeated a truism of the industrial recreation move-
ment, when he asserted that "employes who can play well
together can work well together, too." As m the case of
other welfare programs, advocates foresaw recreation paying
off in increased productivity, resulting from improved
morale, greater efficiency, and reduced fatigue, absen-
teeism, and turnover. 2^
Perhaps more importantly, recreation was a crucial
component in the effort to forestall or undermine unionism.
Large non-union firms like Eastman Kodak and Scott Paper
combined recreation with systematic welfare programs that
included pensions, vacations, and insurance to successfully
comJDat organized labor. Small paternalistic firms openly
boasted that their picnics, parties, and clubs helped create
a "nice, friendly attitude" that kept out union
organizers. In unionized firms, where organized labor
rather than employers took the credit for the implementation
of benefits, employers hoped recreation would offset
organized labor's influence. It helped give workers a new
group identity or feeling of status that stemmed from the
enterprise alone. Thus, after the war, new recreation
programs anchored Ford's, International Harvester's, and
Allis Chalmers' effort to win back the allegiance of their
workers following more than a decade of bitter conflict.
Ford's program grew rapidly with annual participation
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increasing from 286,000 in 1946, the first year of opera-
tion, to 2
, 156, 00 0 in 1956.
Large numbers of business leaders felt that recreation
was a crucial means for changing worker attitudes about the
American economic system. They believed that class atti-
tudes and ideology could be shaped as much at play as at
work. iManagers repeatedly emphasized that recreation broke
down social barriers that were often exploited by unions.
"We believe," declared Bakelite executive L.K. Merrill,
"that it is good business to have our folks know each other
as human beings with common drives, interests and emotions
as demonstrated on the playing field." A.H. Spinner, direc-
tor of employee activities at Armstrong Cork Company, found
that recreational activities promoted a company rather than
a class orientation. "Class consciousness, he contended,
"fades out of the picture when people are engaged in the
pursuit of common interests."^ '
Mostly, employers operated on blind faith that
corporate-sponsored leisure time improved the relationship
between manager and worker. At least one company believed
it had concrete evidence that its program diminished class
consciousness. In 1951, the personnel director of this
unindenti f ied firm reported to Factory that during a recent
strike the firm reopened the plant to workers willing to
cross the picket line. It discovered that while thirty
percent of plant workers regularly participated in the
203
recreation program, over sixty percent of the strike-
breakers were active in the company program. This rein-
forced the company's view that recreation was not a waste of
time or money. "We certainly don't consider recreation
programs as strikebreaking tools.
. . and we don't feel
recreation programs make company 'stooges' either. its'
just that those who are active in recreation programs seem
to be the employees who are most likely to stand on their
own feet and rely on their own judgement. "^2
Recreation meshed with another corporate welfare goal
of integrating families into the company. Historians of turn
of the century welfarism have explored the importance of
families in shaping attitudes toward work, but the continu-
ing significance of the relationship between tne family and
the workplace has been ignored. In 1950, a business
newsletter pointed out that "family life is the core of all
human relations.
. . the family is the major influence in
determining the course of any member of the group -- inclu-
ding the worker." It advised that the employer who
"realizes this fact, and works with it, will reap the long
run benefit of a kinder feeling toward the company." Many
postwar employers followed this advice. Like their prede-
cessors, they, too, looked to families in the continuing
effort to build company consciousness."^^
Employers reached out to families in a variety of ways.
They sent letters and company publications home, opened
recreation centers to workers' relatives, and designed and
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operate, company parks to encourage fa.Uy partxcxpa t.on.
They noped to make the company a socral center for workers'
famnxes. Particularly tnrough mass actxvrtres, Uke summer
picnics or Chrxstmas parties, managers attempted to bring
the entire company together, including executives, super-
visors, workers, and families, as a way of creating feelings
of interdependence. Such mass gatherings often attracted a
large percentage of the workforce: 60,000 Goodyear
employees and families attended the 1957 picnic; 40,000
workers and family members attended the Consolidated Vultee
Aircraft Corporation's free circus. Similarily, a 1949
preview for the General Motors family of the company's new
auto line brought out 53,000 people.^S Joseph Losito, a
General Motors worker testified as to the effectiveness of
such activities:
My family looks forward to the BLC picnics and shows
each year--we haven't missed a performance yet. My
children gain mucn pleasure out of the picnic,
especially the gala occasions specifically for them--
the relay races--the prizes which follow— hot dogs,
soda pop, candy corn. . . . Listen all of you.
This term 'job '--that covers a lot of territory.
It is your life--your environment--your form of
entertainment -- why they are all synonymous.
One can't do without the other. They all overlap
--each dependent on the other.
Tnis was the kind of message that General Motors and other
firms hoped workers would take away from company-sponsored
programs
.
After World War II, companies increasingly utilized
open houses, plant tours, and family days to personalize the
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factory and teach more explicit economic and political
messages to Kith and kin. m this way, welfarism comple-
mented the communication programs of human relations to
include spouses and children. m 1948, the Burroughs Adding
Machine Company's 133 branches held a series of Family
Nights, which provided information on the company's products
and included talks by company officials. Burroughs also
presented a company-made film, showing the American enter-
prise system in action and explaining how profits were good
for business and the public. other companies used family
factory tours to display their human relations programs to
relatives and to encourage identification with the firm by
providing insight into the plant's work. In 1952, those
touring the Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Corporation of
Chicago "saw what dad did at the plant, the machine he
operated and what he made. They shook hands with his
foreman, his supervisor, union steward, and other fellow
workers." They also met company officials and "saw the
company's facilities, its excellent working conditions, and
learned about the many benefits received through working at
Foote Bros."^^
Direct contact with workers' families, companies felt,
could enhance the corporate message and ensure employee
involvement. The Crucible Steel Company of America posted
weekly safety slogans and phoned the homes of employees
during work hours. Family members who could recite tne
slogan won a five dollar prize. The company found that the
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"w.ves and children are flattered wnen the call comes to
tnem.
... The company, once just a cold, impersonal name,
is now a neighbor who calls on the telephone." The entire
family was "avidly interested in "pop's work ... and the
employee is being goaded at home into being articulate about
his 30b." Even vacations provided opportunities to promote
family identification with the company. During the mid-
fifties, Caterpillar and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
employees pasted company stickers to their cars and luggage
to enable traveling workers to recognize fellow employees
and to publicly proclaim their attachment to the company
with slogans like "Building Quality Caterpillar Products is
my Business. "^^
Firms tried to convince employees that the company took
a human interest in their families. During the Korean War,
Victor Adding Machine of Chicago sent corsages on Mothers
Day to the mothers of fifty employees serving in the armed
forces. The card read "If your son were home, we know he
would personally bring your favorite flowers. However, in
his absence, please accept this token as a rememberance of
him on Mothers Day." Other gestures targeted children; the
General Electric recreation department in Schenactady ran a
babysitting service to help harried parents. Firms often
sent presents and cards to acknowledge new arrivals. The
Ferro Corporation of Cleveland gave a sterling silver
teething ring engraved with the baby's date, time, and
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weight at birth, while Timken Roller Bearing distributed
thousands of letters of congratulations from the company
president with banks containing ten dimes "to start your
youngster's first savings account.-^O
^^^^ ^^^^.^^
and early fifties. General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis
Chalmers, and Ford, among other firms, began providing more
substantial help through the establishment of college
scnolarship funds for employee children.
Increasingly, employers developed recreational programs
specifically for workers' children. They hoped to engender
worker loyalty, while developing a relationship with poten-
tial employees. Until the fifties, most company contact
with children was limited to a Christmas party, summer
picnic, or the occasional sponsorship of a Little League
baseball team. Expanding on this base, employers began
offering more extensive activities. IBM and Eastman Kodak
set up children's clubs. Other firms provided classes in
arts, crafts, and sports. In the early fifties. Cater-
pillar, the Allen-Bradley Company, and North American
Aviation established baseball schools, while Goodyear
offered bowling instruction in the winter and golf during
the summer.
Summer camps and tours brought children to plants
throughout the country. In 1948, the first Ford Rouge day
camp, which included a plant tour, attracted eignt hundred
children ana six years later attendance had increased to
over four thousand. The Ford Company asserted tnat the camp
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won the applause of employee parents and encouraged identi-
fication with the company. Ford found the program "effec-
tive because it reaches into the home." Thousands of
iMinnesota Mining and Manufacturing and Timken Roller Bearing
employees also brought their sons and daughters to work for
day-long programs highlighted by a visit to the department
where "Dad or Mom" works and the presentation of a shirt
with the company emblem. To ensure attendance, the Timken
personnel office sent a list of children's names, generated
through their records, to foremen, who notified parents of
the invitation to camp.'^^
In 1954, the Industrial Sports and Recreation Journal
discussed the long term salutary effect of corporate-
sponsored children's activities. It observed that upon
reaching adulthood, these children would surely "look upon
the industry wnicn has given them some of the best sports
and recreational years of their life with a warmth and
respect no company can buy." Similarily, a 1952 employee
relations handbook urged that because many of "these
children of today will be the men and women who will man the
business tomorrow," the time and effort "spent to tie them
to the company at an early age should prove a good
investment .
"
Spouses, particularly wives, remained the principal
focus of company welfarism, however. In 1946, Whiting
Williams wrote an article entitled "Who's Got Momma's Ear?,"
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warning that labor leaders were g.ving a lot of attentxon to
"selling" wife on the importance of union membership. He
contended that unions understood that wives were "a silent
but important partner in all industrial relationships." A
1951 survey of industrial workers' wives in Cleveland showed
just how the "wifely influence was wielded." it found that
sixty-two percent of wives opposed strikes, that the more
women knew about the company, the more they thought along
management lines and that these women were essentially
conservative in their economic thinking. The survey warned
that where unions filled the gaps in company communication
with the home, women tended to influence husbands along
union rather than company lines.
These observations powerfully influenced employers to
court the "invisible" employee. In 1950, Quotes Ending
, a
newsletter for company editors, found evidence of the
increasing use of features and news stories directed solely
to the home, mainly at women. Editors believed that special
pages with household hints and recipes attracted female
readers to the company paper. Similarily, letters addressed
to the spouse explained the firm's position during contract
negotiations and attempted to enlist "Mom" in the drive for
quality, safety, and productivity."^^ In 1 953, convinced
that enthusiasm for the company could never be maintained
"unless they are shared and nurtured by the distaff public,"
International Harvester invited the wives or female rela-
tives of 70,000 workers to a plant tour, lunch, and a
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meetxng „.th top eKecutives. The tour e^phasxzed interna-
tional Harvester's benefit proc,ra. and taught that increased
production meant progress and security for everyone.
Employers appealed to women by burlding up the importance of
their domestic role. The Sacony-Vacuum Oil Company's
invitation to visit the refinery read "We hope you girls
will avail yourselves of this invitation, for it should do
much to settle the age old question as to whether a man does
as much actual work on the job as the woman does in running
the household. "^"^
Companies gave wives special recognition for their
"loyalty and devotion" to the firm. Armco steel Corporation
and Victor Adding Machine presented wives of long-time
employees with gold broaches. with suggestion awards over
$1,000, Westinghouse corporation also gave the employee's
spouse a gift. In 1951, the general manager of the small
paternalistic firm, C.A. Norgren Company of Denver,
explained why his company sent birthday cards and bouquets
to employee wives, notifed them of changes in hours, and
handed them the profit sharing cnecks at tne company's
annual Christmas party; "A man's wife has a powerful
influence over her husband's reaction to his job and his
company.
. . if you do it properly, you can mold that
influence so it does you and the employee a lot of good."'^^
In times of crisis, some employers tried to draw on the
reservoir of good will developed through their attention to
211
worKers' wxves. "You would oe surprxsea," contended Ti.ken
Roller Bearing executive R.L. Frederick "at the pressure
tnat a woman can place upon her husband if he is considering
going out on strike for a half a cent an hour, or vested
right
.
. .
Mrs. Employee will often make it clear that she
doesn't care for that." m 1949, the Lionel Company claimed
that an appeal to wives was the key to overcoming a non-
sanctioned slowdown. It sent home a series of cartoons
called "Talking it Over with the Wife." The cartoons
implied that if husbands were making less, they probably
were "fighting the rate," which the company asserted had
been agreed upon with the union. According to Forbes
,
Lionel "did not underestimate the power of a woman, in a
few weeks the laggards were back in stride, and production
has hummed ever since. ""^^
III
Profit sharing, benefits, recreation, and the integra-
tion of the family into the firm, these were the building
blocks of welfarism. They provided tangible evidence of
employer concern for the worker. They can, perhaps, be best
understood as components of the corporate attempt to build
company consciousness. Not surprisingly, these mechanisms
often blended with those associated with human relations in
teaching workers the primacy of the company and the free
enterprise system. An important core of American industry,
led by firms like IBM, Dupont, Sears and Endicott Johnson,
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relied on human relations and welfarism to maintain their
non-union status. But, company consciousness can not
dismissed as a strategy pursued only by the non-union
sector. Firms openly fighting with their unions, such as
General Electric and Timken Roller Bearing, as well as those
that had supposedly reached an accord, General Motors, for
one, utilized company consciousness to confine organized
labor's political and economic horizons. Labor's reaction
to this corporate strategy, to which the next chapter now
turns, provides some evidence of its effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LIGHTED UNION HALL
In tne decade after World War li, organized labor
appeared to lose much of the loyalty of the rank and file as
well as much of tne vitality connected to workers' union
consciousness. while some union leaders reevaluated union
programs or blamed declining labor spirit on demographic
trends, others, like Textile Workers Union research director
Solomon Barkin cited business strategies as the most telling
factor. In 1950, Barkin asserted that management's
"humanistic" personnel policies and welfare practices con-
trived to encourage "loyalty to the enterprise and weave the
worker into the employer's social and economic fabric."
Tnese programs were simply a bald attempt "to fight a rear-
guard action against the union.
Many labor leaders recognized the danger company
consciousness posed to organized labor. They attempted to
expose the ulterior motives behind the seemingly benign
mechanisms associated with human relations and welfarism.
Moreover, unions to varying degrees sought to actively
contest business for worker loyalty. Like companies,
organized labor tried to stimulate worker identification by
communicating with their members, particularly on political
issues, by providing welfare assistance and recreational
opportunities, and by reinforcing the notion that worker
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success and security depended on the collective power of
organized labor.
Most unions, particularly within the CIO, took company
consciousness seriously, fearing that it could outweigh a
much newer and more fragile union consciousness. The United
Automobile Workers, the United Electrical Workers, and the
Steel Workers worried about the growth of programs designed
to "coax workers into accepting management policies." The
UE recognized GE's communications program as an effort "to
destroy our union so that you will have a free hand in
speedup, rate-cutting, and working conditions," and vowed
"it is not our intention to let that happen." Where
employers established successful recreation programs, the
UAW, supported by the Steel workers
,
charged "the company has
had a comparatively easy time dividing the loyalty of our
workers in the shop" and reducing the numbers of dues paying
members. Moreover, company propaganda frightened union
officials. In 1961, Ben Segal of the International Union of
Electrial Workers condemned managerial communications
programs that aimed at "belittling the union and undermining
it and its leadership. "^
Recognizing the danger company consciousness posed to
the labor movement, unions fought to maintain worker
loyalty. In part, they responded defensively, relying on
ridicule and warnings to alert members of management's
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underlying goals. Henry staffer, president of a OE Decatur,
Indiana local lampooned the goals of General Electric's
newly implemented human relations program. "We call upon
you to quit worrying about what might be in our minds and
instead give some consideration to what's in our pocket-
book."3 The UAW, also consistently scorned human relations,
calling efforts to communicate "baloney" and dismissing
supervisory training as ineffective. m 1949, the UAW's
journal. Ammunition, noted derisively that "foremen are
attending schools throughout the country to receive training
in the art of convincing workers that they are really deeply
beloved by the boss." These special classes, if anything,
asserted one auto local, taught supervisors to forget every-
thing they had learned as workers and to adopt as their
favorite song "My Company, 'Tis of Thee.'" On the subject of
company welfare work, the Federated Press, a labor news
agency, found laugnable the Container Corporation of
America's claim that cheerier colors in the shop alone made
workers happy. it quoted one old union carpenter who agreed
"Sure, its all a matter of color. Labor's black and blue
from the beating it's taking, but every time it fights for a
little more of that green stuff, they call us red.""^
Communication programs were particularly favorite
targets for ridicule. In 1952, the Steelworkers local at
the Fairbanks Morse Company renamed tne company's pamphlet
service the "trash rack" and thanked the firm for providing
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.ore fodder for the union paper to refute. The CIO .ooKed
the early eoonomic education programs by attaohrng labels
like "Freedom Forum Fascist Front" or "Operatron Gas
Chamber" and with "exultant humor" set up a "Captive
Audience Department. "^
underlying the ridicule, however, was the fear that
unless workers were forewarned, human relations and
welfarism might succeed in weakening their attachment to the
union. UAW Local 600 leaders at Ford's River Rouge plant
admonished workers not to be misled by friendly foremen for
the "trend of thought by management' is to sugar and salve-
employees. Similarily, in 1949, R.S. Black of the Rouge
Rolling Mill warned new employees "Don't Pe fooled by a
supposedly friendly arm about your shoulder. They've got an
arm around your neck at the same timel" Committeeman Alex
Semion cautioned fellow Rouge workers that human-relations
oriented supervision was an integral part of a "new
scientifc method to control and discipline the masses of
workers . "
^
Watch out, advised local union leaders, for programs
promoted by foremen that boosted productivity at the expense
of union solidarity. in 1955, UAW Local 842 warned that the
Pangborn's Corporation's newly implemented practice of
publicly comparing production records of worker's on
opposite shifts was an example of the "latest company psy-
chological trick!" to speed up production. Most worker
participation programs also fell into the catagory of
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senates that
.n^ured worKers.'^ In 1948, Macnin.sts' Pres^aent
«arvey Brown adv.sea employers that they could not gain
worKers "fuU-f ledged cooperation.,
.n efforts to improve
production methods unless a union representative was
involved
..at every phase of the plan's development..' Thus,
in 1956, SteelworKers Local 2601 warned workers against
participating in a management-sponsored safety program. The
real goal, the union charged, was to get workers into the
foremen's office to answer personal questions wxthout union
protection.
UAW Local 600 voted against cooperating with the Ford
suggestion plan, which it charged ignored suggestions for
improving working conditions and paid "peanuts" for ideas
that ultimately cost other workers their jobs. Warnings
were not always effective. The Ford plan continued to pay
out nundreas of thousands of dollars in awards each year.
Local leaders engaged in a long campaign patiently
explaining to the membership "the damage they are doing to
themselves and other by participating in the mucn glorified
'Suggestion Plan.'" With less patience, others labeled the
awards "blood dollars" and snapped "wise up, it won't work,
you won't get anything but contempt from your fellow
workers" for suggestions that eliminated jobs and intensi-
fied the pace of work.^
Unions insisted that all forms of company communication
were propaganda. The UAW education department regularly
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puoUsned exposes of the methods ut.Uzed by e.plovers .n
-e..
..secret stru^^le-- to cnan.e workers'
.deas. xt warned
tnat posters appearing
.n the shop wxth slogans, U.e .'We ve
Got a Job to DO," or letters, d.scussxng
.'Last Year Th^s Is
HOW we D.d," sought to tr.c. workers into identifying too
Closely wxth the corporation. Employee magazines also
attempted to confuse workers w.tn therr nomey,
.ntimate
appeal. General Motors, for instance, used xn .ts journal
an "old codger," who "looks like everyone's grandfather to
mouth glittering generalities about free enterprise.
According to the UAW, the idea was "to get the corporation
curse off what the company is telling you, and to make it
look as if it were just your old man giving you the benefit
of his years of experience."^
The labor press served as a bulwark against the
business community's drive to shape worker ideology. UAW,
Machinists, and Steelworkers papers analyzed the content of
company reading racks and condemned them for subtly trying
"to weaken workers support of their union" and for promoting
"reactionary Republican viewpoints." The CIO News, which was
distributed to millions of workers, tried to counter
employer economic and political education through a constant
stream of articles exposing the organizations and goals
behind the movement. In the same way. The Packinghouse
worker, advised that "hiding under the camouflage of
freedom" these courses were simply" a wicked, smear-ridden
attack on every type of progressive legislation enacted or
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proposed since the New Deal." The Wisconsin CIO News
revealed that Harding College, which created one of the
economic education programs, was a front organization for a
nation-wide iDusiness propaganda campaign, m a January 1950
radio broadcast, the UAW commentator Guy Nunn warned Detroit
area workers of this "highly organized and systematic
attempt to poison the minds of workers against liberal
government ."10
Union leaders tried to minimize the damage created by
company welfarism and propaganda by responding quickly in
kind. The UAW reacted to the automakers efforts to take
credit for the growtn of fringe benefits by reminding
workers that benefits came from union solidarity rather than
business generosity. Similarly, Steelworkers Local 1400
rushed to inform workers of the union's role in the develop-
ment of a new insurance plan "before any member of manage-
ment breaks their arm patting themselves on the back taking
full credit. "^^
Unions responded promptly to the employer letters to
their members. Local 600 advised dumping Henry Ford II 's
letters into specially marked trash cans in each department.
It urged "dont' be fooled" by this "paternalistic propa-
ganda" which sought "to lull workers into believing that
Henry Ford II is the Great White Father who will lead the
worker--misled by those nasty old union leaders from the
morass of exploitation and despair." The union at the John
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Deere Plant .n Waterloo, lowa,
.et the general manager's
Christmas message of good wrU wxth a reminder that workers
were facing the new year with a pay cut. During 1948, UE
locals held meetings to "tear apart the curtaxn of company
propaganda" issued by General Electric. More specialized
communication mechanisms, like economic education, also
brought a sharp response. Swift Company locals answered
the "phony claims and arguments" of management with mimeo-
graphed leaflets prepared for distribution immediately after
the classes. The UAW education department conducted a
series of discussions to arm Allis Chalmers stewards with
answers for questions raised by the company economic educa-
tion program. -'^
At times union-staged counter actions subverted company
intentions. A union organizer, for example, asked unauthor-
ized questions at a Thompson Products company dinner, while
stewards disrupted GE employee meetings by firing half-a-
dozen difficult questions in a row. Although uninvited, UAW
Local 887 helped reshape North American Aviation's 1953
Family Day. Before reaching the plant gates to view a
"bunch of Company exhibits" emphasizing management's story,
60,000 workers and family members met clowns, a band playing
hill-billy music, and trade unionists distributing balloons
with union slogans and a special edition of the local paper.
The company later carefully eliminated the balloons from
their pictures of the Family Day. Finally, some unions
undercut profit sharing or employee stock ownership schemes
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by demanding that they be included in the collective bar-
gaining agreement
^
unions also looked to the industrial relations and the
political systems rn the struggle agaxnst company conscious-
ness, particularly in the area of economic education.
Forced to participate or lose pay, Swift and AlUs Chalmers
workers filed grievances complaining that "forced listening"
was a violation of their rights. Allis Chalmers responded
with a declaration that it would continue to exercise its
rights of freedom of speecn. Unable to gain relief through
the grievance system, in 1951, the Wisconsin state indus-
trial union Council, with the support of the AFL, advocated
passage of a bill by the state legislature outlawing captive
audiences. At a hearing, state Senator William Proxmire,
one of the bill's sponsors, explained that it "would
guarantee the fundamental freedom not to listen." A Repub-
lican majority controlling the Assembly Labor Committee,
however, killed the measure and employers retained a free
hand in the area of economic education.-'-^
One of the more effective tactics utilized by unions
involved turning the language and principles of company
consciousness against employers. Trade unionists compared
the promises of human relations and welfarism witn the
reality of the shop floor to demonstrate the emptiness of
the employer's commitment to the worker. CIO columnist Max
Ruskin observed that employers spoke often of the
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partnersnxp between managers and workers bat when the unxon
representative asked, as a partner, to examine the company
books, the employer snapped "No" they're
"confidential."
Partnership, then, was a misleading concept that failed to
include workers in decision making that affected their work
1 ives . '- ^
unions asserted that the principle of freedom, a
central tenet of employer economic philosophy, also failed
to carry over into the factory. UAW Local 248 observed that
Allis-Chalmers emphasized freedom during its economic educa-
tion program, but when workers sought to exercise their
"American freedom" to use the grievance system the General
Foreman resorted to threats of layoff. m 1951, William H.
Harvey, a GM industrial relations manager, in the best human
relations tradition, declared that "The most valuable asset
of Electro-Motive is their employes." if so, asked UAW
Local 719, why were grievances over working conditions
ignored? UAW Local 600 also exposed the limitations of the
Ford Motor Company's commitment to human relations at the
River Rouge. Union representatives complaining of health
hazards and abusive supervision demanded that Ford "practice
what you preach." Following layoffs in 1948, workers at the
Gear and Axle department asked "where is this big happy
'human-engineering' teamwork and cooperation stuff that we
are supposed to be or are we just not pals anymore ?"' ^
Labor realized that weaning workers away from company
consciousness required more than rebuttals and ridicule.
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however. Organized labor needed to pose a pos.txve alterna-
tive. Some unions, most notably the United Automobile
workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers and to a
lesser degree the Steel workers
, sought to resist the new
cultural politics of the workplace through labor education.
They comoatted human relations through education programs
that promoted organized labor's economic and social agenda
and developed union consciousness among workers. These same
unions countered employer welfarism oy encouraging workers
to rely on union-sponsored or collective activities to ful-
fill their material and social needs.
Post-war labor education, in many respects, merely
served the narrow, utilitarian needs of the labor move-
1
7
ment. its development, however, needs to be examined
within the broader context of the ongoing struggle between
capital and labor. From this perspective, labor education
emerges as a weapon against the employer campaign to shape
worker ideology. in 1954, the Steel worker s ' Education
Department observed that to a "shocking extent" the millions
spent annually on business-sponsored educational activities
were "sheer propaganda efforts to win over the minds and
hearts of worker-employees to follow a narrow and selfish
philosophy centered about the principle of the free enter-
prise system" and ignoring "the role that Government must
play" in America's economy. The Education Department viewed
itself as part of "a fight for the minds of man" and foresaw
235
the future success of the unxon movement depending •upon the
kind Of educational programs whicn are offered to those who
work and toil, and likewise, exercise their franchise at the
pol Is .
"
Labor education grew rapidly after World War li.
Through their national and state organizations, the AFL and
particularly the CIO encouraged affiliates to devote
resources to education and also directly promoted educa-
tional activities through publications and conferences. in
1946, the Amalagmated Clothing Workers revived its education
department. At the same time, the UAW, the ILGWU and the
Steelworkers began expanding their educational activities.
By 1957, the UAW could boast that sixty thousand students
were involved in local classes, summer school activities and
weekend institutes. The Steelworkers' summer programs
began in 1946 with several hundred workers attending two
university-based institutes. Twelve years later over six
thousand workers attended summer institutes based at thirty-
two universities.-^^
These classes and institutes focused primarily on the
training of stewards and local officers. In a sense, they
were the counterpart to the rapidly proliferating supervi-
sory and management training programs that were an intregral
part of human relations. Through labor education aimed at
the secondary leadership, unions hoped to develop a core of
local leaders equipped to compete with management in botn
the economic and political marketplaces. Most programs
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dealt with tne immediate problems of stewards and commit-
teemen. They provided training m the tools of trade
unionism, including such subjects as speaKing, writing,
parliamentary procedure, grievance settlement, and job
evaluations, or helped officers with the issues arising from
the increasingly complex contracts. Classes in economics,
however, cnallenged the underlying assumptions of corporate
economic education, offering labor's interpretation of the
workings of the American economic system and emphasizing the
impact of corporate monopoly over prices and wages. 20
In addition, many of the more progressive unions
integrated labor education with political action, recogniz-
ing the dependence of labor on a sympathetic state. Unlike
the worker education movement of the twenties, however,
postwar labor education placed little or no emphasis on a
fundamental economic restructing of society or the promotion
of a third party. Political action classes were sharply
pragamatic, mobolizing local union leaders to mount
campaigns in support of Democratic party candidates or
specific legislative issues. Nevertheless, union support
for progressive politics and for an activist government
promoting "the general welfare" stood in sharp contrast to
the employer free enterprise ideology. ^ -'•
Unions hoped that labor education classes would prepare
stewards to infuse the rank and file with the union's
economic and political goals. In 1949, UAW Assistant
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Regional Director Frank Sanorske called upon the steward
body at Allis Chalmers to "talk unionism and talK Local 248"
to the members. Eight years later, UAW Education director
Brendan Sexton contended that informal plant discussions by
stewards were one of the most significant means of educating
the rank and file. 22 yet reductions in the number of union
shop floor leaders, mandated by postwar contracts, limited
the effectiveness of this approach. sheer numbers made it
difficult, if not impossible, for stewards or committeemen
to compete with foremen at a personal level for workers-
attention. In 1948, Ford Rouge committeemen apologised for
their inability to personally contact each new employee and
"explain the real meaning of unionism and its progress and
Denefits." Similarily, officers of a New Jersey GM local
expressed frustration that only thirteen committeemen were
available to protect twenty-five hundred members "while
keeping an eye on several hundred foremen at the same time."
While in 1946, the UE discussed building up the steward
organization so that "our stewards have the answers inside
the plant for our people," by 1952, it conceded that com-
panies reached new workers "immediately and were able in
many instances to influence them before they were even
contacted by a union representative. "2^
Given the structural limitations of the steward system,
unions sought more direct avenues of communication with
workers. Their goal was to raise the level of union con-
sciousness among an often indifferent rank and file. In
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1952, UAW Officer E.xl Mazey lamented that "too .any people
in our plants today don't know the difference between
unionism and rheumatism." Again and again, unions like the
UAW called for mass education to teach workers facing a
"barrage" of corporate propaganda the meaning of unionism
and the way in which "the union constitutes the ma^or safe-
guard of the individual worker's dignity." m 1952, the CIO
Observed that "one of the most serious problems facing union
leadership today is how to reach the rank and file with the
message and program of the union," and how to create
loyalty to and participation in unions. ^4
in order to build ties to the rank and file, the ILGWU
and the Building Service Employes, as well as some UAW
locals, sponsored new membership classes aimed at those who
had "no memory of the role the union has played in building
that sense of security and dignity which they enjoy to day."
Others tried to create an infrastructure of local union
education committees to inform and encourage rank-and-file
participation in union activities. Education committees
held lectures and classes, showed movies, and distributed
leaflets at the plant gate that reminded workers of labor's
history and achievements and discussed current union,
community, and national issues. Much of this educational
activity focused on politics. Local union education and
political action committees attempted to politically moti-
vate workers by impressing upon them the union's dependence
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on the state. They arguea that poUtxcal decisions made by
congress, state legislatures, and government officials on
issues, such as the union shop, taxes, unemployment
insurance, and wage and hour laws, health and housing
policy, and civil rights had a critical impact on workers.
Time and time again, Mike Novak, as president of Dodge Local
3, explained to members that to solve "our Union problems we
must participate m Political Action. it is as important as
our homes; tne furniture in our homes, the food on your
tables." Despite the best intentions of some union leaders,
however, labor education programs reached few rank-and-file
workers. Even within the UAW, local officers often had
little interest in educating or activating members. The
fact that in 1954 only thirty of two hundred international
unions had functioning education departments reflected the
limits of union commitment to education.
Increasingly, unions relied primarily on their own
newspapers to communicate with workers. During the fifties,
there were about eight hundred labor papers with a circula-
tion of twenty to thirty million. Local unions also pro-
duced newsletters or small scale shop papers. The union
press consciously competed with both company journals and
the commercial press for the attention of workers. The shop
paper was "the union's most intimate speech to the union
memper." it talked in terms of tne people the worker Knew
and worked with and "revealed the meaning of trade unionism
and progressive political action in terms of tne work and
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act.v.txes he hi.self is engaged in." According to the UAW,
labor :ournaUsm had the "special job of putting the f.nger
on sowers of racial natred, exposing all kinds of anti-
democratic words and deeds" and of providing "antidotes for
the worst poisons of the kept press." Company journals
usually refrained addressing specific legislative issues or
endorsing candidates in favor of more general economic
lessons on the dangers of socialism and the welfare state or
the importance of profits. in contrast, the union press was
openly partisan in drumming up support for its liberal
political agenda. There were certainly variations between
unions on their level of commitment to public affairs and
their political stands, but both AFL and CIO papers tended
to devote considerable space to legislation and political
action
.
Labor also relied on radio and television in their
efforts to keep in touch with the rank and file. Labor
leaders hoped that workers, who ignored labor education
programs and the union press, might be attracted to a
program that mixed union building, politics, and popular
culture. In the late forties, unions pursued two radio
strategies, one of FM station ownership and the other paid
programming on com.mercial AM stations. The Federal Commerce
Commission granted licenses to the UAW and the ILGWU, and in
1949 these unions launched stations in Detroit, Cleveland,
Chattanooga, Los Angeles, and New York City. The UAW's non-
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commercial statxon, WDET, mixed news of the union wxth
"decent mus.c and intelligent dxscussxons of community and
national problems." The weekly program, "Brother Chairman,"
took listeners into a different un.on each week, introducing
the officers who discussed the local's nistory and activi-
ties. According to Ammunition, when "some of the people
start to talk on this program, you can almost hear the
foreman coming up Dehind you in the shop, it brings your
shop experiences so close to you." The UAW worked hard to
promote its stations among workers, even offering low-cost
FM converters. Despite this, only about one quarter of auto
workers owned FM sets. Moreover, without support from
advertisers, labor's non-commercial stations proved too
costly to the CIO, and by 1952 the Detroit, Cleveland and
New York stations folded. ^"7
But, as Factory observed, labor's voice was still "on
the air waves, plenty," for unions also brought their
message to the membership via commercial AM radio and tele-
vision. Following World War II, CIO unions organized radio
councils at the city and state levels to provide support for
the development of labor programming. By 1950, there were
fifteen CIO radio programs in Michigan alone. UE locals in
Evansville, Indiana, and Rock Island, Illinois, sponsored
daily newcasts with UE news and the union's interpretation
of current events. In May 1950, Toledo UAW programs concen-
trated on explaining the newly negotiated pension and health
security provisions to members. In Waterloo, Iowa, UAW
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Local 838's daxly program sandwiched ten minutes of popular
songs around announcements of union meetings and news of the
local. Utxl.zing a sxmxlar format, by the mid fifties, more
than forty stations broadcast a half-hour UAW program, "Eye
opener," directed at day sh.ft auto workers on their way to
work and "Shxft Break" for second snrft workers. a check of
automobile radios in a parking lot of a UAW organized plant
one morning showed 87 percent of them with the dial set on
the Eye Opener station. ^8
Radio also promised access to the unorganized. Seeking
a new way to penetrate "the iron curtain of reaction that
exists" in the Soutn and Southwest, in 1950 the tail end of
Operation Dixie sponsored a series of radio programs over
seventy-five stations to present the policies and purposes
of the CIO to Southern workers. The program consisted of
folk music played by a well-known singer and a short period
of dialogue designed to overcome "the vicious and distorted
propaganda" of employers.
Television also became an increasingly popular medium
for unions during the fifties. CIO unions in Elkhart and
Evanville, Indiana attempted to undercut NAM and Chamber of
Commerce programming with a television series directed at
"Mr. and Mrs. Wage-Earner. Beginning in 1951, the UAW's
weekly "Meet the UAW-CIO" and later the daily "Telescope"
programs carried union and general news and interviews. The
lUE used television during a 1957 organizing campaign at a
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Garden Cxty, New York, plant. Factory observed that "there
was no denying
.ts abUxty to get attention, not only from
every worker who tuned xn, but fro. hxs whole fa.ily as
well." Nevertheless, the workers stxU rejected the union.
Facrng rank-and-file indifference, as well as a grassroots
insurgency movement, in 1957, the Steelworkers began a "TV
Meeting of the Month" to bring the union to its members. 30
II
Undergirding this union campaign to influence workers-
economic and political ideas was a more subtle attempt to
build worker allegiance to the union as an institution.
Unions, like employers, hoped that by addressing workers-
social and economic needs beyond the realm of the factory
they would strengthen their organization, while improving
workers' lives. Traditions of union involvement in the
health and welfare of their members reached back to the
nineteenth century. During the postwar period, a core of
unions, that included the UAW, the ACWA, and the ILGWU,
tried to make organized labor a way of life for their
members. At times, they competed directly with employers
seeking to build company consciousness.
After World War II, some unions challenged the indivi-
dualism of employer free enterprise ideology by urging
workers to rely on their own collective institutions in
meeting their material needs. In this way, organized labor
sought to politicize consumption, while strengthening
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unionism. The inflationary wave immediately after war
initially stimulated widespread union interest in coopera-
tive buying. The UAK sold low-cost food at local union
halls to prove the effectiveness of "buying solidarity."
indeed, the QAW built member loyalty by appealing to workers
as consumers. Autoworkers eagerly snapped up the outboard
motors, refigerators, and coats the union sold at wholesale
rates
.
^ '
The UAW and the Rubber Workers were at the forefront of
a movement to channel worker protest against high prices
into a consumer-run democratic system of distribution. m
1948, they joined with representatives of AFL and CIO
unions, including the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, the
Steelworkers, and the Sleeping Car Porters, to form the
Council for Cooperative Development to promote cooperativism
within the labor movement. By 1949, Detroit had four large
cooperative food warehouses backed by one hundred union
locals, and union cooperatives were operating in other
cities across the country. At the same time, Racine, Wis-
consin, South Bend, Indiana, and New York City trade
unionists were building cooperative housing. Within three
years, 250 UAW locals had formed cooperative credit unions
run by workers "interested in the welfare of their union
brothers and sisters." The UAW urged mem.bers to support a
movement that fought monopoly and worked to create "a world
organized to serve the needs of the many and not the profits
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Of the few." When the FUnt, M.chxgan, co-op opened, Roy
Reutner declared that rt was a symbol of labor's "unity and
solidarity." it would make FUnt a co-op c.ty "where people
live happily-instead of a GM town." Cooperatives streng-
thened the union movement by giving workers a chance to deal
with their own organization instead of with those "hostile
to the aims of trade unions. "^^
Provision of services that improved or eased members-
lives reinforced the notion of the centrality of the union
to workers. in the early fifties, Toledo auto workers could
pay their utility bills, borrow money, and pick up hunting
licenses or driving licenses and plates at Local 12's five-
story union hall. The local's Flying Squadron visited the
sick and furnished pallbearers and "a committee that will
mourn your passing sincerely." For UAW Local 200 of
Windsor, Canada, visiting ill members provided proof that
"all this business about brothers and sisters really means
something" and helped create the "deep sense of loyalty the
members feel toward their local. "^^
Union concern for health went beyond visiting the ill.
Most workers received their health care from commerical
insurance secured through collective bargaining. In some
cases, unions stipulated that claim.s pass through the local
office to ensure proper adjustment and to give workers a
greater feeling of union involvement in their health care.
A group of unions, however, directly provided medical care
to workers. After World War II, the ILGWU, the United Mine
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workers, the ACWA, and the Hotel Workers began offerxng
health services, while St. Louis and Philadelphia labor
organizations established medical centers open to local
unions through subscription.^^
Generally, limited resources prevented the development
of such elaborate union health and welfare programs. stUl,
the CIO envisioned a labor movement that reached out to
workers with personal problems having nothing to do with
collective bargaining issues. it resolved to serve as a
liason between the rank and file and the greater resources
of the community. The CIO's National Community Services
Committee, which emerged during World War Ii to help members
cope with wartime dislocations, grew rapidly thereafter.
Following the merger of the AFL and CIO, it became an AFL-
CIO department. The Community Services program trained
counsellors, who directed fellow workers in need to appro-
priate community agencies and then ensured that workers
received full access to the health and welfare services
supported through taxes and voluntary contributions.
Counsellors dealt with the problems of unemployment,
illness, debt, and housing that often struck workers and
their families with catastrophic consequences. They aided
workers through the often confusing task of applying for
unemployment benefits or public assistance. By 1954, 20,000
workers, representing a wide range of CIO unions, had
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graduated fro. unxon counsellor training courses. Three
years later the number of un.on counsellors had doubled.35
The CIO used the Community Services program to
encourage workers to turn first to thexr unron with their
problems. One of the early union counselling classes, con-
ducted in 1 944, stressed that counselUng represented the
glue that kept the union strong. Harry Block, of the Phila-
delphia industrial Union Council, charged that management
had spent large sums of money on "so-called counselling
services" that often were used to combat labor. Unions, he
contended, needed to perform tnese "services themselves."
instructor Anne Goula, declared that labor "must do a far
greater job than collective bargaining" and advised that if
you "help your members with their domestic problems it will
help to hold the union together." We now have, she con-
tinued, "a trememdous influx of workers who are not used to
unions or to industrial life. it is your job to make the
union a vital thing in their lives. "^^
Community services provided an avenue of access for
organized labor into workers' homes. Unions had long recog-
nized the importance of family support and participation,
particularly that of wives. in the early twentieth century,
craft unions had women's auxiliaries which organized unicn
label campaigns; during the thirties, the "emergency
brigades" of women workers and wives provided critical sup-
port to emerging CIO unions. ^"^ After World War II, the AFL
regularly passed resolutions supporting the activities of
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Its auxxlxarxes. But, AFL interest was more form than
substance. m 1948, the vice-president of the Amerxcan
Federation of Women's AuxUiarxes complained of "neglect" on
the part of the labor movement, and the Massachusetts Feder-
ation of Labor substantiated this cnarge, finding only one
AFL auxiliary in the state.
Like employers, many CIO unions sought to court the
family more seriously. Taking what Business Week called a
"cradle to grave" approach to union organization, auto,
clothing, and New York City retail worker locals invited
wives and children to meetings, and ran classes and movies
for "toddling ClOers." Union papers, like those of
companies, published special women's pages to attract family
readership. in 1949, UAW Local 600's Ford Facts declared
that "today the Union needs 'Union Home' as well as Union
Shops. Today the Union needs the support of wives and
families, who will read Union, buy Union, and vote Union!"
It asked "will you carry the message by word and action.
Are you a member of a Union family?"-^^
CIO auxiliaries, organized in the Congress of Womens'
Auxiliaries, taugnt the principles and ideals of trade
unionism. Most performed stereotypical women's work within
the local, organizing social events and refreshments. But,
like their sisters of the thirties, postwar auxiliary
members bolstered their husbands and brothers during times
of labor conflict. In 1955, autoworker Ben Michel's wife.
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who was .arcn.ng on a Harvester picketline with her husband
and son, declared "if my husband dxdn't get out on the
picket line and help f.gbt for better wages and conditions
.
.
.
I would lock him out." The UAW credited the Windsor
auxiliary for exposing and defeating a back-to-work movement
during a 1954 strike and in 1956 asserted that Sheboygan,
Wisconsin wives played a key role in the long running boy-
cott against the Kohler Company.
AS early as 1944, the CIO recognized the political
potential of auxiliaries. But, the 1952 election made clear
tnat organized labor's political message was not getting
through to most women. Union wives, in contrast to their
husbands, tended to favor the Republicans. A steel worKers
'
survey showed that during the campaign, 87 percent of
members' families failed to receive union political litera-
ture, and political problems were not a topic of family
discussion. Beginning in 1954, the CIO's Political Action
Committee began making special appeals to CIO women. The
CIO issued "A Call for Mom" to attend "family participation
conferences" to activate women voters. Workshops, like
"Does Politics Affect Our Family Life?" tied current poli-
tical issues with the bread and butter problems facing the
average home-maker. Effective political action declared the
CIO was a family affair that required "the integration of
husbands, wives and other voting members of the family into
a working group. "'^'•
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Following the merger, the afl-CIO set up a Women's
Activity Departments within its Committee on Political
Education at both the national and local levels. Like
auxiliaries, WADs provided support to local COPE political
initiatives. Lack of interest m women at the local level,
however, often undercut the national organization's effortl.
in 1960, COPE director James L. McDevitt admitted that too
often unions ignored members' families. "We are fighting
with one hand behind our back so long as we don't make this
a family fight with every member of a trade union family on
the team. "'^2
Expanding the union to include the retired workers
also enhanced organized labor's political as well as econo-
mic power. Union programs for the elderly kept retirees
connected to organized labor. The UAW launched its program
m 1953 with three Detroit "drop-in" centers in local union
halls, a newspaper, monthly information-recreation meetings,
and two city-wide parties that attracted upwards of 10,000
participants. By 1959, the autoworkers operated drop-in
centers in thirty cities open to all elderly workers. The
Garment Workers, the Textile Workers and the Clothing
Workers ran similar programs for their retirees. UAW
retirees retained their union membership and the union
encouraged their continued activity as a crucial link to the
struggles of the thirties. UAW Secretary-Treasurer Emil
Mazy asked a 1953 gathering of retirees to "tell the younger
men and women what conditions were like before the union.
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b.tter struggles to reach the standards we have now." mUx-
tant retirees bolstered the un.on xn .ts ongoing struggles.
During the 1958 negotiations, UAW retrrees fro. across the
country "slow marched" in considerable strength around the
General Motors Administration Building to express thexr
solrdarrty with the union. Unions also recognized that
retired workers, like women, represented an important poli-
tical force. During the fifties, retired workers in
Michigan were mobilized in special campaigns for liberal-
izing social Security, housing legislation, and the develop-
ment of a state program of services for the elderly. ^3
After World War II, like their corporate counterparts,
unions looked to recreation as a means of earning the
loyalty of workers and their families. Recognizing the
danger the growing company-sponsored recreation movement
posed to unions, segments of the labor movement moved to
contest business leadership in the realm of leisure. The
CIO urged its affiliates to promote more systematically
recreational activities in an effort to draw workers from
the company orbit. CIO recreation councils and sports
leagues emerged in many cities. City central bodies, like
the Milwaukee Industrial Union Council, frequently sponsored
tournments in Softball, bowling, or golf that at times
attracted thousands of workers. Local unions also estab-
lished activities committees. United Electrial Workers
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Local 450 forced its connmittee in 1948, and durxng its fxrst
year of operation organized a bowling league, and sponsored
a Christmas party, horseback riding club, and the local's
first annual picnic.
In 1946, the United Steel Workers established a recrea-
tion program to compete with the company- sponsored indus-
trial leagues. It promised athletes participation in a
"sports program sponsored exclusively by our union" and
assured the rest of the membership of the opportunity to
root for "union made" baseball or basketball. m response
to tne post-war managerial offensive, the UAW revived its
moribund recreation department and developed the labor move-
ment's most extensive program. when employers said to
workers "Look at the recreation program we have for you!,"
the union wanted its members to reply "Thanks just the same,
we re not interested in your paternalism. Our local has a
great recreation program, too."^^
The Autoworkers' recreation department hoped to infuse
members and their families with the spirit of unionism. It
encouraged the formation of local union recreation commit-
tees and regional recreation councils and provided training
for volunteers at workshops and conferences. By 1953, the
UAW asserted that four hundred golfers and 2,400 bowlers
matched skills in UAW International Championships. One
fourth of the union locals sponsored interdepartmental
basketball, softball, or bowling leagues, while 900 locals
fielded industrial league teams. Moreover, family "fun
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nites" and three UAW summer camps gave children a •union
view of the world. ""^^
The "lighted union hall" was a central tenet of UAW
recreation. Locals reported that open bars (or m the case
of Lockport, New York, a night club, complete with floor
snows, movies, dancing and a callroom) made the union hall
"the social center of activity" for many workers. AH the
CIO locals, including steel and rubber supported UAW Local
644's club in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. in 1949, Wisconsin
sociologist C.W.M. Hart reported that Windsor auto workers,
instead of going inside "beautiful plants" to find the "more
satisfactory and stabilized life," went to the union hall.
"There, within his union, he is finding his own ways of
building a more satisfying social life."'*'^
Like other unions, the UAW looked to recreation to
unite the membership. Aware that one of the wedges dividing
workers was racial prejudice, the UAW recreation department
fought discriminatory practices. It condemned management
programs that condoned racial discrimination, observing that
"There are no black and white home runs," and in the factory
"there is no black production or white production." The
recreation department vowed to bring together workers in a
"situation in which runs scored, or pins knocked down, or
strikes taken, not the color of a man's skin nor the altar
at which he kneels will be the criteria for acceptance."
Accordingly, the UAW led the CIO in a five year boycott of
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segregated American Bowling Congress tournaments, it ended
in 1951 with tne elimination of the "whites only" rule.48
At times, union and company programs directly competed
for worker participation. Such was the case at the River
Rouge, where UAW Local 600 clashed repeatedly with the Ford
Motor company. indeed the struggle over recreation symbol-
ized the larger conflict between company and union. with
sixty thousand members, Local 600 had one of the UAW's most
fully developed recreation programs, offering a wide variety
of activities ranging from ballroom dancing classes and
bridge tournaments to an annual water carnival. while thou-
sanas participated in the union-sponsored activities, even
more turned to the company, which boasted a more elaborate
and better funded program. in 1950, for example, the union
sponsored one bowling league with twenty teams, while Ford
had sixty men's leagues and thirteen women's leagues. Union
officers pleaded with the membership for support. R.S.
Black of the Rolling Mill asserted "We can call it loyalty
for a good union member to confine his sport likes to his
Local Union activities." In the Plastic Plant, Bill Jackson
asked why "some workers prefer to participate in the company
sports plan even when they are contacted by their own union
brothers . " ^ ^
Department picnics were another arena of contention.
In July 1951, plastic department foremen were encouraging
worker attendance at an upcoming Family Day Picnic. Union
officials warned that it was "strictly a company affair" and
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a ruse to gain employee consent to intensifying production
by improving relations between worker and supervisor,
unionist James Simmons asked "how can you go to a picnic
day and feel good about the mean tricks those very same
fellows play on you and your fellow workers?" The union
countered with its own picnics. That summer the Stamping
Plant contended that despite a small budget, its picnic,
which excluded supervision and featured greased pole climb-
ing, chicken catching and a jitter bug contest, "was just as
successful and well or better attended as any put on by the
Company." if company picnics boosted production and
enhanced company consciousness, union picnics enhanced union
solidarity. Following the union-sponsored Rouge stamping
plant picnic, a Local 600 member observed that "events of
this nature do more to weld friendship and promote unionism
than all the speeches our politicians feed us" but lamented
"too bad, we don't have picnics more often. "^'-'
Unions, however, had difficulty competing with manage-
ment over recreation. Many had neither tne means nor com-
mitment to contest employers for worker loyalty in this
realm. In many local unions, recreation consisted mainly of
occasional picnics or Christmas parties for children or a
baseball team fielded in the local industrial league. At
the national level, only the Clothing Workers, the Ladies
Garment Workers and the Textile Workers matched the UAW's
commitment to recreation. Even the UAW's program suffered
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fro. underfund.ng. m 1952, Walter Reuther admitted that
the "entire recreation program of the UAW must operate on a
budget so low its total would appall the average person
connected with industrial recreation." Few unions had the
recreation buildings or facilities that were a common fea-
ture of corporate-sponsored recreation. Local 600 was
unusual in employing a recreation director. m contrast, a
staff of fourteen ran the Ford Company program at the Rouge.
The political and social message of union recreation also
tempered its ability. The UAW's stand against discrimina-
tion offended less enlightened workers. in 1948, a UAW
official chided members who didn't participate in the union
social affairs on the grounds that they couldn't bring their
families "out in that kind of group.
. . with all races,
creeds, and different types of religious training. "^^ These
workers, perhaps, felt more comfortable in company programs
which often separated black and white workers.
Ill
The overwhelming advantages capital brought in terms of
wealth and power to its campaign to build company conscious-
ness made labor's opposing efforts seem insignificant.
Indeed, the social unionism of the CIO has almost been
forgotten as historians have tended to dismiss the social
consciousness and social vision of the postwar labor move-
ment. It has been too easy to read the rise of business
unionism and the steady decline of organized labor back
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into the immediate postwar era. But, this was no foregone
conclusion. Well into the fifties, despite the efforts of
business, the inhospitable political climate of the Cold
war, and labor's internal divisions, a segment of organized
labor embraced social unionism and defended a liberal, demo-
cratic vision, which placed the social needs of the people
above profits. Their efforts to make labor's voice heard
among workers contributed to organized labor's maintenance
of a significant level of status and power in post-war
America. That the lighted union hall began to dim in the
late fifties should not diminish organized labor's struggle
against the managerial onslaught of the post-war years.
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CHAPTER 7
MEET YOUR CIO NEIGHBORS
in 1946, more than ever before, organized labor
understood the importance of publio support. At the begin-
ning of the year, unions waged a long battle for much-needed
pay increases. By the summer, they were locked m a losing
struggle to maintain price controls while launching attacks
against their own members who failed to toe the liberal
political line. A decisive Republican victory in the Con-
gressional elections in November culminated a frustrating
year for unions and prepared the ground for the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act. A labor movement that had come to
rely on liberal government awoke to the fact that its public
support was diminishing rapidly.
The labor press issued repeated calls for union members
to recapture the good will of their local communities.
Wisconsin CIO vice-president Malcolm Lloyd, UAW leader
Victor Reuther, and International Ladies Garment Workers
Union education director Mark Starr all focused on the need
for better labor-community relations as the first key step
in reversing trade unionism's political and econcmdc for-
tunes. Minneapolis mayor Hubert Humphrey put it most empha-
tically: "Labor must first become a part of its community --
of all the organizations and enterprises that go to make up
the life of a community -- the PTA's, the Community Chest,
the School Boards, the City Planning groups, all the rest.
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Labor must show that .t wants a good community." Un.ons
must also rerne.ber, continued Humphrey, that "they must sell
themselves to the farmers, the white collar workers and
businessmen. This requires work and education not only in
the union hall, but in the clubs and farm meetings. "2
Despite the gloomy events of 1946, organized labor had
a solid community base upon which to build, indeed, the
mixed reaction of many towns and cities to the postwar
strike wave sent no resounding message to either labor or
business. Unions still had a reservoir of good will from
their war-time community activities. Furthermore, many
local unions and labor councils had plans to expand the
range of their services and increase the level of their
participation in their home towns. Labor's efforts at the
community level, then, complemented its program to develop a
union consciousness among its rank and file.
The support labor received in many communities during
the strike wave of 1945-46 dramatized just how far
unionism's influence had spread since the emergence of the
New Deal. In many towns and cities, groups that had form-
erly been friendly to industry ignored the inconveniences
caused by work stoppages and took the side of the workers.
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation reported that in one of
its plant communities, small businessmen aligned themselves
with the strikers. Up and down almost every business
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street, placards placed xn saloons, stores and shops pro-
claimed sympathy for the men on strike. Similarly, in Three
Rivers, Michigan, over one hundred businessmen and profes-
sionals signed advertisements supporting workers in their
struggle against the Fairbanks Morse Company. Fifty pro-
minent Cleveland citizens marked the one-hundredth day of
the Westinghouse strike by sending telegrams to the company
urging settlement, and the traditionally conservative Newark
Evening News held the company alone responsible for the
continuation of the struggle.^
These strikes revealed the limitations of corporate
industrial relations policies that relied on the community
to discipline recalitrant workers. During the thirties, the
Remington Rand Company's Mohawk Valley Formula had defeated
strikes with a strategy that combined police intimidation
and court injunctions with propaganda campaigns that turned
the community and local families against workers. In 1947,
however, the company discovered a change in the political
and social climate of its plant cities. For the first time,
Tonawandas, New York, local leaders failed to support
Remington Rand's policies; community officials refused to
place the blame for strikes on workers, and police authori-
ties denied assistance to the company's attempts to cross
the picketline. Aware of labor's increased political clout,
the mayor dramatically reversed the practices of his pre-
decessors and maintained a strictly neutral position. The
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es
so
normally anti-union Evening News, which in past struggl
had forecast dire predictions of plant shutdowns, was al
unusually restrained in its editorial policies/
Elsewhere, local officials moved beyond neutrality.
The mayors of Pittsburgh and Cleveland publicly backed
organized labor against the Westinghouse Corporation.
Cleveland city Councilman Richard Masterson and mayoral aide
James McSweeney participated in a mock funeral burying a
rejected Westinghouse offer, leading the United Electrical
Workers Union to express delight at the "most unusual dis-
play of public support for a strike. In Anderson,
Indiana, Mayor CD. Rotruck employed financially strapped
UAW strikers in the city park department, furnished lighting
for the picket stations, and appointed UAW members to two
vacancies on the city council. in many communities, public
and private welfare agencies also provided assistance to
strikers. When Racine, Wisconsin, Mayor Francis H. Wendt
interceded on behalf of J. I. Case Company workers, company
president L. R. Clausen accused him of "partisanship" and
decried his "failure to act as a public official in behalf
of all citizens of Racine."^
Hostility from the community during the 1 946 strike was
a "shocking surprise" to General Electric. The company had
felt secure in the belief that it ranked high as a good
employer and good neighbor. But at many strike sites,
clergymen joined the picket line while local merchants ran
ads criticizing the firm for prolonging the strike. Several
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stores even removed G.E. products from their shelves. m
some locations, c.ty councils passed resolutions on behalf
of the united Electrical Workers Union. General Electric
believed that these unfriendly acts resulted from wide-
spread distrust and misunderstanding not only of General
Electric but of business in general. a survey conducted
during the strike confirmed the company's fears. Community
neignbors charged that "wages are as low as G.E. can
possibly keep them; prices are kept as high as G.E. can push
them; G.E. profits are unwarranted or excessive; G.E. has
no concern for the welfare of its employees; G.E. has no
interest in its plant communities." Finally, and most
troubling, the company discovered that its plant communities
believed that "G.E.'s motives are dishonest and contrary to
public interest."^
Labor's war-time patriotic activity as well as a
lingering distrust of business, helps explain support for
strikers. Participation in war bond drives, scrap salvage
drives, and Red Cross and United War Chest campaigns boosted
the presence of organized labor in communities across the
country. Philadelphia unions, for instance, dedicated them-
selves to the war effort. Union leaders, as well as thou-
sands of members of the rank and file, gave generously of
their time and money on behalf of war-time charitable
agencies. Built and operated by trade unionists, the USO-
Labor Plaza, one of the city's most popular recreation
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centers for service personnel, served as a vrsible example
of labor's commxt.ent to victory. These efforts won the
local labor movement numerous accolades from community
leaders and the press.8 similarily, in Tonawandas, New
York, the Site of the Remington Rand strxke, the AFL and the
CIO formed a new organization, the United Labor Council, to
facilitate trade union voluntary activity. This organiza-
tion helped give labor an increased voice in the town's
civic affairs. In early 1946, after evaluating labor's
behavior during the war, Charles Cooper, a UE Local 308
officer, declared that "labor in Tonawandas has earned a
right to community support."^
During the war, the development of closer cooperation
between labor and social welfare agencies enhanced the
effectiveness of union patriotic activity while streng-
thening organized labor's prestige within the community.
Previously, organized labor often had little relationship
with these agencies. In most communities, business and
professional people controlled the policy making boards of
governmental and voluntary organizations. In 1940, for
instance, only 90 CIO representatives served on the boards
of the many thousands of local, state, and national health
and welfare bodies in America. Business leaders also pro-
vided most of the funds for voluntary agencies, like Com-
munity Chest and the Red Cross, through either private
donations or corporate fund raising campaigns. Workers,
however, resented both the solicitation process, which in
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many companies was largely a "shake-down" affair w.th a
foreman ordering employees to "fork over," and management s
claims of full credit for their gifts an<- =tc . Antagonism typically
Characterized the relationship between workers and the
social service agency staffs, who often identified with the
business and professional classes and assumed an attitude of
paternalistic benevolence towards those in need, barely
hiding their suspicion and distaste for unions. 1°
Mobilization for war began to break down old suspicions
and barriers. Just before the United States' entry into the
conflict, the CIO and the AFL developed war relief commit-
tees to aid workers in countries fighting Fascism, to pro-
vide special services for America's armed forces, and to
meet the needs of America's defense workers. in 1942, the
government's War Relief Control Board encouraged combining
all war-related appeals into one cordinated drive adminis-
tered by a single newly created agency, the National War
Fund. With the assistance of the National War Fund, the Red
Cross, tne Community Chests and Councils of America, as well
as numerous smaller agencies began pooling fund raising and
relief efforts. '^ Labor committees reached a national
agreement to cooperate with the Community Chests and Red
Cross. This agreement provided substantial funds to the AFL
and CIO committees to facilitate their work and facilitated
labor representation on all governing boards, campaigns, and
allocation committees. The agencies promised to publicly
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credxt un.ons for worker contributions and to encourage
solicitation by joint employer-union committees. 1
2
The war, then, provided the labor movement with the
opportunity and resources to begin integrating itself into
community service networks. At the national level, the AFL
and the CIO built a cooperative relationship with the top
leadership of important health and welfare agencies, in
particular the Community Chests and Councils, inc. At the
local level, AFL and CIO committees, working closely with
their community counterparts in fund raising campaigns,
gained representation on community and war chest boards of
directors. By 1945, for instance, Ohio unions led the
country in board participation with 109 CIO representa-
tives . -'• ^
National War Fund agencies provided the CIO's War
Relief Committee with an annual operating budget of almost
$600,000, enabling the Committee to move beyond fund
raising and to establish an outreach organization, the
Division of Community Services. This division set up
regional offices throughout the country and organized fifty
state and city industrial union council comm.unity services
committes which were responsible for working with community
agencies on programs of service to industrial workers on
out-plant problems. These committees initiated the union
counselling programs, discussed in an earlier chapter, which
were developed further after the war. During the 1945-46
strike wave, unions drew on the relationships established
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and
with both pubUc and private agencies to secure health
welfare services for strikers. At the request of the United
Steel workers, for example, the Buffalo and Erie County
council of social Agencies provided a counselling and infor-
mation service in union halls during the steel strike.14
The war-time rapprochement of labor and community
agencies augured well for the CIO's postwar plans. in late
1945, the national Community Chest's Committee on Future
Relations with Organized Labor proposed that local chests
support labor community services committees in the same way
they funded organizations like the YMCA. The report argued
that health and welfare agencies could not afford to ignore
labor for unions were "a basic sociological necessity in a
free society such as ours, not merely a colossal grab
bag.'" Moreover, their "permanency may well prove to be a
very vital feature of the continuing health and stability of
our industrial progress. "^^ Encouraged, in early 1 946, the
CIO proposed a budget of $240,000 a year for its National
CIO Community Services Committee. The Chest's National
Budget Committee approved the CIO's request, which was then
considered by local community chests, which would actually
raise and allocate the funds. -"-^
The commitment of local community agencies to the CIO,
however, was more fragile than an alarmed business community
realized. Despite strong support from the National Chest's
board, president and staff, the majority of local chest
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leaders refused to endorse the national organization's plan.
Leo PerUs, national director of the CIO's Committee, disap-
pointedly acknowledged that although community chests and
organized labor had come to know each other better during
the war, "some very real fears and some deeply ingrained
prejudices still remain." He also suspected that lurking
behind the local chests' refusal to fund the CIO Community
services Committee was the business community. The profes-
sional staffs of social workers who comprised local chests
reported to boards of laymen often controlled by business
leaders. Perlis charged that some "financially powerful lay
leaders/' disturbed by recent industrial unrest and by the
assistance given strikers by some social service agencies,
had brought "great influence ... to bear upon the insecure
shoulders of some community chest leaders." As a result,
Perlis bitterly concluded, "doubts, fears and prejudices won
out -- at least for the present. "^"^
Out of this impasse between the national and local
bodies of the Community Chest over the form and level of
institutional relationship with labor came a compromise.
They agreed that rather than providing direct financial
support to the CIO's Community Relations Committee, the
national chest would set up a small Labor-Employee Partici-
pation Department. It would serve as a liasion with between
the National Chest and organized labor and would promote the
active participation of unions in the health and welfare
activities of local communities. In addition, the National
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Chest encouraged local chests or councils nf .^-ouncii o social agencies
to hire special labor staff to set noL up advisory labor
participation committees to facilitate cooperation between
the agencies and organized labor. Furthermore, the Depart-
ment gave unions the power to choose labor staff persons to
represent the interests of the afl and the ciO, but tne
community Chest would pay their salary. The Community
Chests and Councils Inc. launched the Labor-Employee Parti-
cipation Department in January 1947, but as late as 1955
local coordinating councils for private social agencies
employed only 52 full-time labor representatives. ^ 8
During 1946, without the financial support of the
community Chests and Councils, inc., the CIO had to practi-
cally dismantle its National Community Services Committee.
The Committee's Pudget dropped from its wartime peak of over
half a million dollars a year to $12,500. Consequently, it
was forced to liquidate all its regional offices. Leo
Perlis later recalled, "We had to start, in a very large
sense, from scratch. "^^
II
Starting from scratch meant defining the broad goals
which would characterize the CIO's community service program
for the next decade. First, the CIO wanted to ensure that
all workers gained access to health, welfare, and recrea-
tional services. Second, the CIO hoped to establish a
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positive i.age of labor .n the co..un.ty. Extending trade
un.on.s. beyond the plant gates and
,ob-centered ob.ect.ves
would help establish unions as important
.axnstrea. c.vxc
organizations. Moreover, by integrating
.tself xnto the
co..un.ty, the CIO hoped to demonstrate that unions were not
like selfish special interest groups, but instead were con-
cerned "about the welfare of the coinmunxty" as a whole, a
strengthened, more politically powerful labor movement would
be the byproduct of union's improved xmage. Joseph A.
Beirne of the Communications Workers contended, "looked at
most crassly, community service is one way of convincing
one's fellow citizens that a union's economic program,
legislative program, political action program or organizing
program is deserving at least of thoughtful consideration if
not outright support." Community service, he continued,
might "make our political action and legislative work a
little easier, and thereby make our collective bargaining
and grievance work a little easier. "^^
Without its large wartime budget, the national CIO
Community Services Committee acted primarily as a policy-
making and facilitating body. it served as a liaison
between the CIO and the national organizations in the health
and welfare field such as the chests and the Red Cross. The
committee emphasized mobilizing local trade unionists for
civic activism and acted as a clearing house for information
and guidance on programs and policies. Initially, despite
the gains made during the war, it was difficult to interest
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so^e labor officials social welfare services. They
Viewed the CSC as be.n, removed fro™ the ^ainstrea™ of union
actxvrty. But, gradually, durxng the late forties, under
the leadership of the National ciO Co.^un.ty Services Com-
mittee, city level industrial union councils and local
unions across the country began to set up community services
committees
.
^^
community service committees pursued a variety of
programs that promoted unions in the community. Illinois
labor activities can serve as an example of the growing
presence of organized labor, m 1947, Chicago United Pack-
inghouse workers Local 28 organized a Boy's Club that was
operated out of the union hall. At the same time, in the
Clearing section of Chicago, UAW CSC members formed a Com-
munity Council that succeeded in improving street lighting,
reducing traffic hazards and industrial smoke nuisances.
Locals across the state established blood banks and held
blood procurement drives. During times of crisis, the local
committees stepped in to aid their fellow citizens; in the
spring and summer of 1952, when major floods hit East Moline
and Rockford, Illinois, local CSCs aided in evacuation and
housing and made collections of food, money, clothing, and
furnishings. The Rockford social service agencies publicly
commended the trade unionists for their actions. Elsewhere
in the country, unions participated in similar activities,
sponsoring little league teams, operating dancehalls for
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teenagers, and giving Christmas parties for h^ ^^^^ t needy community
children. ^2
Fund raising for voluntary health and welfare agencxes
helped organized labor demonstrate good citizenship. Pr.or
to world war li, wealthy
.nd.v.duals provided the majority
of support for volunteer agenc.es, but during and after the
after the war the burden shifted to corporations and
employees. At the national level, leaders of ma^or trade
unions, like David J. McDonald of the Steel workers
, served
on national fund raising committees. At the city level,
local industrial union councils set up labor participation
committees which cooperated with business committees and
agency personnel to decide on labor's fair share of the fund
raising campaign goal and to work out campaign procedures.
If good labor-management relations reigned within the
plant, union counsellors worked with supervisory staff in
soliciting funds or pledges. in all cases, unions were
committed to giving without coercion but, in turn, demanded
full credit for labor's role in raising money.23
With organized labor's assistance the level of workers'
contributions to charity increased significantly. in 1950,
Detroit UAW Local 600 alone raised ten percent of the city's
eight million dollar Torch Fund Campaign. That same year,
Akron workers' gifts totaled thirty-six percent of all money
collected. The 1953 National CIO Community Services Commit-
tee annual report proudly announced that CIO members had
283
over the past twelve years contributed
.ore than four
hundred mUUon dollars to voluntary agencies.24
TO ensure that workers had access to the health and
welfare services that they supported, local community
services committees sought labor representation on the
boards and committees that governed social agencies. These
ranged from the tax-supported public welfare and health
departments to the community chest-supported family and
cnildren's agencies, settlement houses. Red Cross and Salva-
tion Army chapters. Boy and Girl Scouts, and the YW and
YMCA. The CIO argued that since workers supported these
agencies with their tax dollars and their voluntary contri-
butions, labor had a right to participate directly in the
policy making and budget decisions of these organizations.
Essentially, union members would represent the consumer of
welfare services. Their participation would help "democra-
tize" social agencies, making them more representative of
the community and more responsive to popular needs. 25
Unionists believed that labor's participation would
help reduce the influence of business over social agencies.
On the one hand, unions could protect sympathetic social
workers from undue pressure applied by the large donors from
the business community. in 1 950 the Ohio CIO's CSC observed
that "sometimes social workers who are liberal in their view
or friendly to Labor, are subjected to coercive treatment by
reactionary givers and the presence of Labor representation
can assure them a greater measure of security." On the
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other hand, union community activism could help develop an
appreciation of the labor movement among indifferent or even
hostile social workers. In 1953, for example, Treva Berger,
the Chairman of the IlUnois Lake County Community Services
Committe, recalled that her commrttee had worked closely
with a director of the Public Axd Commission. impressed
with the CIO CSC program, this director had helped change
"entirely the minds of the members of the Council of Social
Agencies "about people in unions and in [the] CIO in parti-
cular . "26
Unions succeeded in increasing labor representation on
social and welfare agencies boards and committees. Whereas
only 90 CIO members sat on agency boards at the beginning of
World War II, by 1 95 3 , 1 5 , 000 CIO members served in various
capacities with national, state and local welfare organiza-
tions. To a lesser degree, AFL unions also provided repre-
sentatives to the agencies. Still, even this level of
representation was only a beginning. in 1953, in Chicago
alone, five thousand citizens made up the agency boards,
making the 140 CIO volunteers seem almost insignificant.
The CIO hoped that increased participation in the
administration and funding of community agencies would pay
off during labor conflict. Even financially strong unions
were unable to fully support strikers. A cooperative social
service sector, however, could strengthen immeasurably
labor's ability to sustain a long-term work stoppage by
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was
as "a
prov...n,
.eUef for workers. The CIO National Cc.un.ty
services Committee's sought to ensure that assistance
given on the basxs of need, regardless of the cause,
community responsibl ity to .ts cxt
.zens...28
nized, however, that the extent to wh.ch community welfare
agencres within their legal and financxal means wrlUngly
gave assistance to strikers was a measure of the communxty's
acceptance of the prrncxple of the strike as a lawful step
in the collective bargaining process. Here the changing
image of labor and the degree to which unions had estab-
lished prior relationships withm the community came into
play. The CIO increasingly found that social agencies were
more "responsive to a union which is a vital and integral
part of the fabric of daily community life. "29
As strikes approached, the CIO Community Services
strike assistance program swung into action. At the plant
level, a strike steering committee appointed and arranged
for the training of strike counsellors who referred workers
in need to appropriate social agencies. in some plants the
work of strike counsellors meshed with the established
union counselling program, another important CSC activity.
Union representatives then met with local public and private
agencies to set up procedures for relief and to make certain
that social workers understood their responsibility to
workers on strike. In 1952, the Labor Participation
Department of the Community Chest asserted that "to the
credit of many social agencies ... in large measure" the
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pr.nciple of need as the basxc eligiMUty for assistance
had been accepted. Unions, U.e the Amalgamated Clothing
workers, the UA„, and the Steelworkers credxted the csc's
strike programs for sustaining often prolonged labor
struggles. The United Steelworkers, for instance, noted
that the strike relief program contrrbuted to the successful
conclusion of its 1 952 strike, until then, the longest in
the union's history.
Although the CIO did not intend for its CSC to be a
political force, the quest to improve community welfare and
to gain access to services at times pushed local committees
into the political arena. while supporting voluntary
agencies, the CIO contended that security for all could be
achieved only through an activist government. Moreover, it
considered government agencies responsible for the major
burden of financial assistance during unemployment and
strikes. 32 Again, the example of unions in Illinios
suggests the range of CSC political activity. During 1952,
in the face of inflation set off by the Korean war, com-
munity service committees across Illinois, in towns like
Alton, Moline, and Galesburg, led the political struggle to
maintain rent control. in Chicago, the CSC fought for
increases in workmen's compensation, for funds to build a
tuberculous sanitarium, for a liberalization of residency
requirements for public assistance, and for state aid for
slum clearance and public housing. The CIO CSC in East
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Moline helped guarantee access to pubUe relief for the
unemployed by electing six CIO people to the Town Board
responsible for approving relief expenditures. Politrcal
power also caBne into play during strrkes. During 1953
strikes involving clothing, electrial and auto workers,
committees in Kenawee, Aurora and Freeport placed consid-
erable pressure on township supervisors who initially
refused to provide assistance to needy strikers and their
families. Chester winski of ACWA Local 651 of Kewanee
reported a change in policy "after the Township Supervisor
had been properly educated. "^^
III
Community services was the core of labor's slowly
growing local-level public relations campaign. Political
failure in the 1946, 1950, and 1952 national campaigns had
convinced many trade unionists that they were laboring "in a
climate that is completely hostile to our point of view."
By the early fifties, both the AFL and the CIO believed that
unions needed to change the climate of opinion in America.
Consequently, both houses of organized labor launched
national-level public relations programs to promote labor
and liberalism. The CIO, in particular, complemented
national efforts by targetting more localized public rela-
tions activities. It believed that business penetration
into the community helped shape the political atmosphere.
The CIO urged local unions to compete with business by
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trumpeting labor's contributions and po.nt of v.ew w.thin
the community.
community services served a public relations function
by transmitting a subtle message to the community, one that
attempted to establish unions as useful, responsible, and
Civic-minded organizations. For the ciO, the beauty of this
program was that it allowed unions to demonstrate through
their actions the "mutuality of interest" between labor and
the public. Henry Fleisher, National CIO Director of Publi-
city, consistently urged local unionists to take advantage
of all the potential goodwill that could be generated by
publicizing their community service work. He advised CSC
representatives at a 1953 institute to "cultivate newpaper
(sic) and radio contacts" and furnish them with "good human
interest stories." Union insistence on receiving credit for
its fund raising activities and contributions was another
manifestation of labor's drive to gain community goodwill
and acceptance.
As part of its efforts to alter the local community's
perception of unionism, organized labor realized the poten-
tial benefits of communicating directly with the public.
The UAW encouraged its districts to organize speakers-
bureaus and offered the services of the national union's
Education Department in providing resource materials and
training. International Harvester UAW Local 6 of Melrose
Park, Illinois, energetically attacked the task of changing
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pubUc op.n.on;
.ts officers spoke regularly oefore Mgh
school soc.al sc.ences classes, college groups, and gather-
ings Of
.xnrsters. m June 1 950, as part of its pubUc
relations program, the Mrchrgan CIO Councxl began maiUng
CIO literature on economic and political xssues to key
people, including ministers and educators, throughout the
state. Reverend Walfred Erickson of the First Baptist
Church in Lawton, Michigan, admitted that his sympathies
were not "one hundred per cent pro-union" but appreciated
receiving material which represented "fairly and fully the
union viewpoint on the issues which confront us as
citizens." Another Baptist minister. Reverend Robert D.
Retelling of Midland, Michigan, found it "healthy to hear of
a different viewpoint than that consistently maintained by
the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce. "^^
The CIO council in Grand Rapids, Michigan, worried
about the "many misrepresentations about the CIO," intro-
duced itself to the community through a widely distributed
pamphlet entitled "Meet Your CIO Neighbors." The pamphlet
pointed out that the "CIO isn't just a bunch of initials.
It isn't something far away. CIO is your neignbor, or the
fellow who lives down the block. The family next to you at
church, your friend in the club, your fellow straphanger on
3 7the bus." Similarly, beginning in 1949, CIO unions across
the midwest began reaching out to neighboring farmers by
sponsoring exhibits at highly popular state and county
fairs. Relief from the hot sun or rain, free cold drinking
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water,
.ovies,
"gi..ic.s",
.nclud.ng gux. shows and raffles
and giveaways like shopping bags or ballons wxth a unxon
imprxnt, promoted attendance at the CIO fa.r tents. m one
tent, Michigan CIO CouncU representatives strategically
placed near the drrnKrng fountarn a large display chart
illustrating the comparative incomes of farmers, big bus-
inessmen and the "middle men." The unronxsts reported that
"this chart caused considerable comment." Farmers left the
CIO exhi^ts with literature pointing out the close rela-
tionship between farm income and high wages for workers. One
CIO Education Committee Chairman summed up his comments on
his union's fair booth this way: "We don't feel that we can
expect to convert people to CIO thinking in the few minutes
we can hold them in the tent. For that reason, we feel that
the entertainment we provided was important as a means of
breaking down prejudice and preparing the way for a little
more sympathetic feeling toward [the] CIO" and for a "more
receptive audience to a year-round program of public
relations
.
"^^
In most cases, however, unions equated public relations
principally with the mass media. Radio and later television
provided a point of contact not only with the union member-
ship but with the broader public as well. Increasingly, as
the post-war corporate anti-labor assault intensified, AFL
and CIO locals and city councils began sponsoring programs
"geared at showing the ordinary citizen just what unions are
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ana now they
.enef.t the co.„™ity...
,,,,,
Lansing, Michigan, u.w locals began a rad.o prog.a™ ".abo.
speaks,., initially to support the autowor.ers strike against
General Motors. Maintained as a regular offering after the
Struggle, it brought labor's point of vi^^w ^yuj. x. t e on economic and
political issues to union members and the public. m 1950,
the Michigan CIO Council contended that the sixteen labor
'
programs broadcast throughout the state were beginning to
have an effect
..upon the political picture in Michigan...
According to the Council, letters from listeners indicated
that for the first time many people were hearing labor's
point of view.^^
A television program served as the core of a public
relations campaign in Cincinnati. m early 1952, as the
Ohio labor movement geared up for the forthcoming election,
the Cincinnati CIO Council broadcast a thirteen week televi-
sion program, "What's Your Answer?", in which labor repre-
sentatives debated opponents on subjects including price
controls, civil rights, academic freedom, and farm supports.
At the same time, Cincinnat ians saw advertisements in the
local press depicting the role of the CIO in the community
and listened to spot radio announcements explaining how the
CIO helps workers and their families. Local papers also
featured the CIO contributions to the polio fund, while the
public library ran an exhibit demonstrating the influence of
30,000 unionists on the city's life.^°
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Even .ore ambitious in ter.s of pubUc relations were
tne lanor-operated fm radio stations. As noted earUer
during the late forties, unions launched stations xn
Detroit, Cleveland, Chattanooga, Los Angeles, and New Yor.
Cxty. Labor stations guaranteed un.ons, which at t..es had
experienced drffrculty
.n purchasing air time, access to a
mass audience. The UAW, which vigorously promoted labor
radio, envisioned that these stations would "enhance the
cause of our political, economic and social democracy
through affording to all groups and classes such freedom of
speech and opportunities for discussion as to be unparal-
leled in the history of the radio broadcast industry."
Walter Reuther believed that the UAW could make its Detroit
station, WDET, "a powerful instrument for propaganda free
news." The UAW president asserted that impartial coverage
"cannot be overestimated," especially "in a city like
Detroit where the daily newspapers consistently distort the
news." In the same vein, the ILGWU's station in New York
City, which symbolically took the call letters, WFDR, pro-
mised upon its debut in 1 94 9 to be a voice for labor and
liberalism. Thus, labor's FM stations presented five
liberal news commentators, several of whom had been fired
from commercial stations. They also typically carried the
AFL and CIO's national news commentary programs as well as
local union programming.'^-'-
In their appeal for public support, unions promised to
devote their stations to community service. This stood in
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Sharp contrast to trad.t.onaUy-run com.erc.al AM stations
that emphasized profits over public interest programming.
The ILGWU intended to ma.e WFDR "the most articulate town-
feting hall, the outstanding mus.c hall, the most attrac-
tive cultural center in the community." Simxlarxly WDET was
to be the "people's station, where all the problems, social,
political, economic-which affect labor and the community
generally can be talked about openly and honestly."42
indeed, labor FM stations provided a significant amount of
educational and cultural programming while serving as an
outlet for communication with union members. m 1950,
WDET's schedule, for instance, included "Community clinic"
and "Let Freedom Ring," both designed to combat discrimation
and bigotry; the "WDET Roundtable," a panel discussion of
national and local legislative and economic issues; several
children's educational programs; a show produced in coopera-
tion with the city's health department; and a daily musical
series featuring the Detroit Public Library Symphony. ^3
IV
All of this suggests that labor appeared to pose a real
threat to business' domination of local communities. But
often labor's influence was more shadow than substance.
Labor's widely heralded FM radio stations folded after only
a few years, the victim both of the manufacturers' and
broadcasters' unwillingness to embrace FM and of wariness
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fro. advertisers that the stations would
.e union propaganda
outlets. Moreover, in the late forties and fifties, the
cold war atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance towards
liberal causes impeded union access to outlets of mass
communication. Particularly m politically conservative
communities, local television and radio stations at times
refused to sell air time to unions, stiff resistance from
advertising agencies and television stations almost kept the
Cincinnati CIO television series off the air.^^
Even in the realm of community services, there existed
many barriers to labor's attainment of community recognition
and power. Until the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955,
division within the labor movement impeded the growth of the
community services program. Although some AFL members
served on the labor staff of the national and local com-
munity chests, they did not officially represent the Federa-
tion. It wasn't until 1953 that the AFL even enunciated a
policy on community activities. Continuing hostility and
competition between the AFL and the CIO also hindered the
development of unified labor program.
Following the merger, the AFL-CIO committed itself to
an expanded community relations program. By 1957, the
number of labor representatives on voluntary boards and
committees had increased to 75,000 and the number of full-
time labor staff on community agencies to 135.'^'^ But as
labor educator Alice Cook observed in 1959, "judged by a
variety of standards.
. . this representation is small--
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small .n proportion to the number of workers in these
communities and of the contributions they make m support of
these agencies." she continued that "while labor represen-
tatives had been readily accepted in a few communities,
generally they have won only grudging acceptance." Leo
Perlis admitted at the AFL-CIO's inaugural convention that
agencies viewed labor as a "junior partner."48 contemporary
studies of community agencies revealed that trade unionists
were often letterhead or token representatives with little
impact on policy making. On the whole, they failed to
present a new set of interests, a new program or a new
ideology.49 p^^^, this reflected resistance from social
workers and the business leaders who often dominated board
membership. in 1959, the Indiana state AFL-CIO observed
that although labor contributed millions to agency coffers,
the "leaders always look at us as something aside from the
community." Furthermore, agency boards and committees made
participation difficult for workers by scheduling board
meetings during the day or by creating an atmosphere at the
meetings that made the labor representatives "so uncom-
fortable that they no longer wished to attend. "^^
Labor's ambivalence about its role in the community
also helps explain its failure to gain a significant level
of influence. Lack of interest was one factor. Joseph
Beirne of the Communication Workers Union, who became chair-
man of the CIO's Community Services Committee in 1953,
296
complained repeatedly of the refusal nft o unions to "exploit
part of the opportunities that exist n n ^-k ^i the Community
services field."50 p,.,,,,^,,,,^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
created contradictions for organized labor. Unions
presented their representatives as advocates of the com-
munity's broader interests. indeed, labor's manifesto was
"The union member is first and foremost a citizen of his
community." To prove their non-partisanship, labor repre-
sentatives frequently yielded to other groups and failed to
consistently promote the needs organized labor. By
emphasizing the common interests of labor, business, and the
middle class, unions tended to lose their class identity.
Those few employers who recognized this contradiction
welcomed labor's involvement m community affairs, believing
that participation brought a cloak of repectabi li ty and
responsibility to union leaders which might have a mod-
erating influence on their behavior during times of indus-
trial conflict.^-'-
For all these reasons, then, labor's community services
failed to tap the potential public support that prevailed in
the strike wave of 1945-46. Facing a generally conservative
social atmosphere in the 1950s, contemporary commentators
like sociologist C. Wright Mills even denied that local
communities still had important influence. A bureaucrati zed
mass society had rendered citizens voiceless and small towns
powerless, according to Mills; labor could compete as a less
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potent large-scale institution,
.ut .t was unU.ely to en.oy
much success through a community-based strategy.52
There rs, of course, another explanation for labor s
inabUrty to atta.n power and political fro. its community
activities. Business leaders were neither dismissive of
community relations nor sanguine about labor's inability to
compete. indeed, the National Association of Manufacturers
'
chairman of the board. Cola G. Parker, asserted that it "is
in the local communities that the work must be done, and the
union leaders know it.
. . . This kind of community
activity pays off in politics too. it makes the union
leader an important and influential figure, and it helps the
union machine do the job at the polls. "S^ j^^^j^^^ ^^^^^
dismiss local community efforts, employers and corporate
managers in the post-war era embarked on an aggressive
campaign to shape a pro-business environment in the nation's
cities and small towns.
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CHAPTER 8
A BEACHHEAD IN THE COMMUNITY
Dur.ng 1950 top International Harvester executives
traveled across the South and Midwest to participate in town
-etin.s. The purpose of these co.pany-sponsored
,atherin,s
was to introduce International Harvester management to com-
munity leaders and to encourage the excnange of information
and attitudes between company and community. Typically, the
company invited about two hundred local people to a luncheon
meeting. Guests included public officials, county agents,
local business and professional people, teachers, clergy,
members of women's clubs and civic groups, labor leaders,
and representatives of the press and radio. Local and
divisional management officials sat scattered among the
guests, serving as hosts at eacn luncheon table. interna-
tional Harvester President John L. McCaffrey or Chairman of
the Board Fowler McCormick began the meetings with a snort
talk outlining the company's place in the community and the
current state of business. what followed was an opportunity
for community leaders, in a "no-holds barred" atmosphere, to
ask questions of the "highest authority in the company"
about issues ranging from Harvester's attitude on social
security to soil conservation.
According to the company, these forums helped "create
an impression of neighbor liness" that went far in correcting
misunderstandings "commonly held about corporations." After
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one sue. co...„.,,
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
.as .aae a te„.Me
.ista.e ove. t.e yea.s
..3
.aUu.e tointerest
.tsel. „ore .n t.e co..unity
we want to teU the people
.n the twent,-^our co^.unit.es
whe.e we have plants that the., prohle.s a.e ou. p.ohle.s."
industry, he declared "can no longer continue to rgnore the
community in which it operates."!
international Harvester's interest rn its plant
communrtres arose from a widely shared fear among postwar
employers that they had lost authority not only on the shop
floor but also beyond thexr factory gates. Community
sympathy for workers xn the 1945-1946 strike wave as well as
the growing union presence xn communxty agencxes appeared to
business alarming signals of public support for liberal
values and organized labor. Community, then, took on a new
importance for business leaders worried about the decline of
corporate power. At the 1948 Congress of American Indus-
tries, National Cash Register Company President S.C. Allyn
rallied fellow business executives to the struggle,
declaring that the community had become "a beach-head for
the recapture of American ideals; for the acceptance of
industry in its true and ordained role as leading citizen. "2
Business strategy in the community followed two inter-
twined paths. One path was an aggressive public relations
effort threatening the decline of American values, morals,
and freedoms due to government's and labor's attacks on the
free enterprise system. This effort was especially vigorous
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-the period fro. 1945 to 1952. and was the product of
national organisations, in particular the
.at.onal Associa-
tion Of Manufacturers. However, other
.usrness
.roups and
individual frr„s also joined the crusade against collec-
trvrs™ and state rntervention.
. second path e.phas.zed
business- effort to shape co.^unity relations in a .ore
positive fash.on. ^.ploying in the co.^unity at large pro-
grams ai^in to the welfarism and human relations used in the
plant, individual companies constructed a more favorable
image of the importance of business as a good neighbor.
Together, these two facets of community relations axmed to
create the proper climate for the domination of corporate
America
.
Business took labor's community activities much more
seriously than subsequent historians have. m the years
immediately after World War II, business felt besieged by
labor's political and economic power. The community
response to the strike wave confirmed employers' fears,
epitomizing the crisis facing the continuation of the
"American way of life/' as they perceived it. The growing
presence of labor in the community, even if at times only a
form of tokenism, served notice to the business community
that unions had become a force to be reckoned with in their
own backyards. Employers feared that greater union prestige
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would mean greater union power in the plant n • .L.ne . One industrial
relations handbook warned of the danger posed by labor's
public relations which sought, it charged,
"to keep the
community class-conscious... Unions, it contended, wanted to
make the public believe that
.'employers as a class are out
to skin the shirts off the backs of workmgmen
, and that
business was "as cold-blooded as a fish m a cake of ice..'3
Faced with this challenge, the public opinion of the local
community became immensely important to business leaders.
The community, they believed, was crucial in shaping atti-
tudes and m determining the economic and political environ-
ment. Government, which played an increasingly intrusive
role in the operation of the economy, started at the grass
roots in towns and cities. m early 1946
, C.C. Carr of
Alcoa warned that "public opinion of industry takes root
where industry lives, and from this root will stem the
freedoms granted to industry ... or the restrictions
imposed upon it." Similarily public relations consultant
James W. Irwin reminded employers that "in our industrial
communities we may be made or broken. with the support of
our neighbors, who regard industry as a good neighbor, we
can win many battles. Without the support of our neighbors,
we stand to win none."'^
Employers matched their efforts to influence the ideas
of their workforce with a pledge to restore community
confidence in business. As in the shop, this required
teaching the public about the centrality of the company and
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the free enterprise system to cc.un.ty wellberng. indeed
these two efforts were closely interrelated; employers saw
'
.ndustrxal relations and co..unity relations as o.erlapprn,
spheres. WorKer attitudes toward employers served as the
base from whicn communities formed their opinions of
business. Advocates of human relations argued that an
employer's reputation and influence beyond the plant gates
could oe built on the goodwxU generated by a contented and
loyal workforce, m turn, they believed that a community
favorable to the company could set the boundaries for
acceptable worker activism within the plant, m a sense,
they saw corporate community relations as a form of company
consciousness writ large.
^
Not surprisingly, in the years after World War II, many
of the same businessmen who promoted human relations and
welfarism stood behind the dramatic growth in corporate
community relations. Most active were the umbrella business
organizations like the National Association of Manufac-
turers, the Chamber of Commerce, the American Petroleum
Institute and the American Iron and Steel Institute. The
nam's community relations program, designed to "merchandise"
the business story to the public, was the most ambitious and
far reaching. it overlapped with community relations
campaigns devised by city and regional business associa-
tions, like the Associated Industries of Cleveland, which
urged its members to "sell the principles of free enterprise
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as a real and living force...6 Both national and local
.us.ness organizations provided guidance and support to the
many f.r.s who established their own community relations
activities in the ensuing decade.
The dr.ve to sell the free enterprise system at the
local level meshed w.th and xn turn gamed momentum from a
campaign to arouse communit.es rn defense of Americanism,
in the late forties and fifties, the ma, or threat was
communism. After the war, business had latched upon anti-
communism as a way of strengthening its own appeal and
legitimating its attack on liberals and organized labor who
it tarred as col 1 ecti vi st s. Business groups, like the
Chamber of Commerce, joined with veterans organizations,
patriotic societies, civic clubs, and religious bodies to
battle communism at home. The American Legion the General
Federation of Women's Clubs, the American Bar Association
and others formed Americanism departments, charged with
exposing and rooting out subversion in communities across
the country. In 1948 the Chamber contributed to the struggle
by publishing a Program for Community anti-Communist Action,
which included directions on how to compile a filing system
on local suspects.^
If one part of defending Americanism involved exposing
its detractors, the other part encompassed promoting the
values associated with the American way of life. Key were
the concepts of individual freedom and liberty. Community
organizations mobilized to reaffirm the public's commitment
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to these values.
,,31, the Klm^.a
tee, born in the El.ira Assoo.atron of Commerce but
,
.nclud.ng c.vrc, religious, veteran, farm, fraternal, youth
and patr.ot.c associations, organized a mass.ve demonstra-
tion Of community solidarity in
"opposition to forces that
would destroy freedom m America.- 25,000 people m a
community of 49,000 joined in a mass "Pledge of Allegiance
to the Constituton." The pledge read:
"Before God and in the sight of mv f^i i r..
reaffirm my devotion and loyalty^L the riaht. . .obligations of freedom under law granted bv^h/Constitution of the United States^of America andreassume my personal responsibility to cSeri^h^heblessings of liberty and to preserve themundiminished for posterity." 8
According to defenders of Americanism, communist
ideology was just the most obvious threat to freedom.
Ranking second was economic illiteracy. The often
unthinking, apathetic, and misguided citizens that populated
America's cities and town were unable to fend off the
attacks on industry by labor and government. These attacks
undermined the whole economic order and ultimately the
American way of life, business asserted, because the loss of
economic freedom and individualism inexorably led to the
loss of political and social freedom. Thus protecting
American freedom became intertwined with protecting American
business. The General Federation of Women's Clubs called for
a defense of industry through education, particulary in
communities. "There," according to GFWC President Mrs.
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Hiram Houghton, was •where the danger must be met." The
Federation and others looked to companies and business
organisations like the NAM to "save the Freedoms" and "keep
our American way of life."^
The NAM certainly intended to fulfill the GFWC's
mandate. its xnterest rn community relations preceded the
postwar social crxs.s, but previously consisted mainly of
mailings and a few regional meetings. At the end of the war,
however, the NAM began paying increased attention to organ-
izing local communities in support of the private enterprise
system. m 1947, it formed a national Committee on Coopera-
tion With Community Leaders. Goodyear president E.J.
Thomas, a member of the NAM's Public Relations Advisory
committee, stressed the significance of this change in NAM
policy. "No amount of activity at the national level," he
contended, "radio talKs, advertising, or even personal
appearances' by a national figure— can take the place of
hard work in the home town by local talent;" that "applies
to selling a political ticket or selling a product--or
industry's point of view."-'-^
The nam's local efforts had two closely linked goals.
One stressed bolstering business leadership within the com-
munity; the other aimed at aiding these r einvigorated
business leaders shape the local climate of opinion. in
niid-1947, the Association launched an Industry Leaders
Program, designed to mobilize business leaders as shapers of
public opinion in their local communities. The program gave
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local employers the "factual a..un.t.on and platfor. techni-
ques to beco.e better cha.p.ons of the A.er.can way." To
acco.pUsh th.s, the HAM for.ed tea.s consisting of two
experts, one in the field of economics and labor relations
and one in the field of public spea.ing. opon invitation
fro. local employer associations, the NAM representatives
Offered two-day rnvitation-only seminars to key industrial
leaders. Advance men preceded the team to aid in making
local arrangements for the conference. 1
1
NAM experts began each conference by distributing an
industry Leaders Manual which was to serve as the local
business spokesman's "bible." This loose-leaf "sales kit,"
was essentially a treatise on the NAM's economic and poli-
tical philosophy and a guide to the organization's position
on legislation. it explained the nature and philosophy of
the "American Individual Enterprise System" and, through a
series of discussion outlines, provided explanations of
issues like prices and profits, the relationship between
wages and productivity, employment stabilization, monopoly
in collective bargaining, taxation, and the growing pressure
towards centralization and government controls. This infor-
mation provided employers with sources for speeches and
panel discussions aimed at local audiences. To keep bus-
inessmen current on the changing political scene, the NAM
sent all conference participants updated material with which
to amend their guidebooks. 1^
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Tne manual also included xnstructions on how to sell
the free enterprise philosophy. it suggested that appeals
Should be .ade to the heart so strongly
"that it xs not
inconsistent with intelUgence to act upon it." indeed,
according to the Industry Leaders guide, thinking was
difficult for the average person. To see clearly the rela-
tive value Of contending pnilosophxes, the guide advrsed
People n,ust be lead through a thinking process." The
industry leaders program provided businessmen with the means
to lead the public.^^
Wnile the manual provided the "factual" ammunition, the
meetings themselves served to wrtip up employer enthusiasm
and provide practical lessons. NAM experts pointed to
opinion polls revealing a crisis. One team member then
dramatized "with some wild soap box forensics
. . . 'The
Voice of the Opposition/" while the other exposed the
fallacies of collectivist philosophies. After discussing
issues raised in the manual, the participants used it to
compose and deliver short speeches. NAM experts and fellow
conference members provided businessmen with "coaching in
the art of meeting the forensic tirades of the left-wingers
with the truth about what has made this nation great. "^'^
Testifying to the impact of the Industry Leaders
program was the participation by over 9,000 businessmen in
260 cities during the first two years. Some employer asso-
ciations even requested repeat performances. Martin P.
Murphy, secretary of the Janesville, Wisconsin, Chamber of
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commerce, reported that the program was "a dxstxnct
success... He observed that participants are enthusiastic
,
•
.feeung that at last they have been grven the weapons
With Which to do an effective Job in the co.^unity.^. The
group, he continued, was now anxious to follow up as
Missionaries of the free enterprise syste™. i hope we can
have an encore.'^ si™ilarily, reports fro™ the f.eld con-
vinced NAM Official T.M. Brennan that participants were
instilled with an inspired fervor to spread the message of
private enterprise."-'-^
in many communities, the program's graduates followed
up the seminar by forming speakers' bureaus. The appearance
of manufacturing executives at grass roots gatherings of
organizations like the YMCA and YWCA, Rotary and Exchange
clubs, Parent-Teacher associations and church groups not
only facilitated the spreading of the free enterprise
message but also served to strengtnen the influence of the
local business community. The Tristate Industrial Associa-
tion of Pittsburgh, for example, formed a bureau of twenty-
eight business representatives who had offered their ser-
vices to combat false propaganda with facts." Similarily,
within days of their Industry Leaders conferences, employers
in Davenport, Iowa, Bridgeport, Connecticut, and San Diego
established speakers' bureaus and reached out aggressively
into their local communities. By the end of 1949, 195 local
employer associations had developed speakers bureaus.
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secon., elose.y
.elatea
1-7, .elped local e^plo.e.s' assoc.aUons esta.Usn compre-hensive cc^unity P..UC relations pro,„„s. Upon
.e.uest
N.M representatives
.appe. out a plan of act.on ana a.aea
local employers
.n such communities as Ouincy, niinois, san
D.ego, California, Tacoma, Washington, ana
.ynchburg,
Virginia. To learn where industry stood in each locale, the
program began by recruiting local college students to
conduct an opinion survey of the local population.!'
in Reading, Pennsylvania, the public relations drive
co.batted popular support for unions and for a Socialist
city administration. Drawing on the information generated
by the survey, the Manufacturers Association of Berks county
organized a "frontal attack" on business critics.
Employers worked to convince Reading residents why wages
were at their current level and why unions were inevitably
linked to racketeering. To promote the image of local
industry, the Manufacturers Association created an Indus-
trial Sports League and encouraged members to respond to
complaints about factory noise, dirt, and unsafe working
conditions. To show that employers were more interested
than union officials in the community, a Community Social
Progress Committee publicized the extent of management
involvement in civic and charitable organizations and
encouraged employers to extend their efforts. Within six
months of its implementation, Frederick H. Klein, president
of the Manufacturers Association, claimed that the program
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"i^as .ade our association a .rivin,
,orce
.n our co^^unity."
Kle.n noted the association's influence; local newspapers
long partial to labor "now see that all •rn stories about enter-
prise that are in any way controversial non4- •I i-iuversiai contain management's
side of the case."^^
The NAM encouraged businessmen to direct their message
at those groups considered by public relations experts as
key to molding public opinion. These "thought leaders"
included educators, clergy, professionals, local officials,
and women's leaders. The NAM even published periodicals
directed at opinion molders: Trends (aimed at educators),
and Program Notes (women's club leaders), each had a circu-
lation of 46,000; understanding (clergymen) had a circula-
tion of 26,000. Recognizing that women's clubs were an
audience of "inestimable potential," the NAM also began
providing package programs to club directors designed to
stimulate discussion on issues like federal spending and
taxation or the Taft-Hartley Act. The packages included
speeches, such as one asserting that the Taft-Hartley Act
wasn't a slave labor law, hints on speaking effectively,
sample invitations, and publicity releases.
One of the more ambitious programs of NAM's Committee
on Cooperation With Community Leaders attempted to build
consensus among large numbers of local opinion leaders
through a nationwide series of town meetings. Begun in June
1948, the meetings combined the initiative of local business
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groups w.th the national organization. The the.e of the
up worth saving?" seven hundred clergymen, educators
women's leaders, students, youth leaders and businessmen
from Reading, Lancaster, York, Harrisburg and Lebanon
attended the first town meeting in Hershey, Pennsylvania. A
panel of local businessmen discussed the challenges facing
American society and afterwards fielded questions from the
audience. Over nine hundred of the "most influential
leaders of community life and opinion" of Providence, Rhode
island attended the next meeting, which was broadcast over
the radio. Audiences at these meetings raised questions
about why industry opposed the guaranteed annual wage, how
taxes could be cut when necessary government expenses were
so great, and why businessmen denied that organized labor
promoted a better standard of living for workers, which
indicated work still facing the business community. Never-
theless, the NAM concluded that "these local leaders of
thought" left the town meetings having rededicated "them-
selves to the traditional concepts of American liberty. "^0
On the eve of tne 1 948 election, the NAM was convinced
that its community relations program was reshaping America's
political landscape. But Truman's reelection stunned the
NAM, leading it to question its public relations strategy.
Reflecting the members despondancy. Association director
Thomas J. Bannan asked NAM President Wallace F. Bennett
"whether we were so far down the road to Socialism that
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tnere was no return or whether freeao. stUl existed^-^l
So.e pubUc relations experts argued, however, that Tru.an 's
campaign provided proof of the significant-^ „fynir noe of communication
efforts armed at the individual at the local level The
Democrat's victory, they asserted, could be attributed to
organised labor's effectiveness in influencing individual
members and more symbolically to Truman's whirlwind
"whistle-stop" train tour. That trip enabled Truman to go
to the grassroots, face-to-face with the people, to sell his
vision. According to Public Relations News, his success
proved that public relations campaigns could change
attitudes
.
After a period of study and reevaluation, the NAM's
Board of Directors and staff vowed to cast aside "defeatist-
attitudes. Particularly at the community level, which they
believed was the only place where "genuine confidence in
industry [can] be engendered," they planned to redouble
their efforts at convincing "the American people that only
through the operation of a competitive capitalistic economy
can lasting national prosperity and the basic freedoms of
the individual citizen be assured." America, declared one
local NAM leader, was not yet really ready to "adopt the
Fair Deal motto, 'The state is my shepherd; I shall not
want. '"23
An invigorated and enlarged Committee on Cooperation
With Community Leaders reflected the NAM 's commitment to
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co.„un.ty-level action. The
..M boosted the sx.e of the
co^^ittee fro„ 250 to 2,000 leading industrialists xn
hundreds of c.ties and towns. These business leaders
.or.ed
local tas. forces devoted to reshaping public opinion. The
NAM'S expanded co^.unity program featured „ore town meetings
places like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Houston, Texas
Colu.bus, Georgia, and Lakewood, Ohxo, and an rntensified
industry leaders program, with four instead of two tea.s of
experts in the field.
Begrnnrng in 1949, Tru.an's legislative proposals in the
fields of agriculture, housing, and health brought a special
urgency to NAM's warnings about state interference in
economy. The Davenport, Iowa, speakers bureau presented a
panel discussion on "What Price Security?" before the YMCA
Men's Club of that city. As a direct result, the club went
on record with a resolution "opposed to any legislation
which subsidizes government in business or which is designed
to reapportion the wealth of the nation for the benefit of
special interest groups." The national YMCA then sent this
resolution to over 300 YMCA's Men's Clubs throughout the
United States. in Lakewood, Ohio, the NAM town meeting
kicked off a "Free Enterprise Week," during which citizens
"were given many evidences of the blessings of the system to
community and nation. "^^
In early 1 95 0, the NAM launched one of its most suc-
cessful community relations efforts in the Southern states,
partially in response to the CIO's Operation Dixie, the last
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-:o. ef.o.t to o.,an..e. Sout.e.n wc.e.s -
..e p.o,.a.
wh.c. ca.e to .e calle. the "HoanoKe Plan" afte. the c.ty L
.
^ts or.g.ns, was a sustained year-long integrated pubUc
relations ca.pa.gn that brought together tested co..un.ty
relations techniques with the goal of reaching every segment
Of society. m early January I950, several business organi-
zations, aided by NAM staff, for.ed the Roanaxe American Way
Of Life Co^.ittee which plunged into a February through
November schedule of weekly activities to create economic
understanding throughout the area. An industry Leaders
workshop opened the schedule and was followed closely by the
organization of a Speakers Bureau, which heavily promoted
its offerings among civic clubs. Next, came a five week
radio round-table of business and economic problems. April
and May were Economic Education Months featuring a Town Hall
Meeting, the distribution of NAM pamphlets and posters to
schools, and the showing of NAM films to schools and
colleges. During May the close relationship between com-
munity relations and company consciousness became clear as
the Roanake Plan moved into factories, offering NAM-run
Employer-Employee Communications Clinics.
The Roanoke Plan gathered momentum through the summer.
June was Church Month with a luncheon for the city's clergy-
men, plant tours and film showings in the churches and an
introduction of the NAM 's journal Trends . July and August
brought an industrial exhibit and more radio programs. The
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A.e..can Way of
.,,e Co...ttee also p.ov..e. ,U.s to ,out.
summer camps including the boy gin scouts.
W.nd.ng up .n the fall, the Committee targeted schools
in early September, the Committee sponsored a Bus.ness-
Industry-Bducation Day, a new program developed by the
...
and the Chamber of Commerce. On BIE day schools closed whUe
teachers toured local plants and learned at luncheons or
dinners about the part that business played xn the welfare
Of their community. October was School and College Month,
dur.ng whxch local businessmen participated xn vocational
guidance forums and spoke to local Roanoke college students
about national economic and social trends. The year's
program climaxed in November, the "Thanks for Freedom-
month, with community-wide meetings, newspaper, radio,
church activities and special school assemblies with
business speakers. The program ended with "Thanks for
Freedom Sunday" in all Roanake churches on November 26.27
Throughout the campaign, the Commitee reported on the
campaign's impact. in May, for example, it asserted:
"Roanoke people are talking to their fellow Americans about
the values of freedom and the American way of life. They
are taking to them direct—where they work, where they
play, where they worship and where they are educated."
People were "talking to them in such terms that they can
understand what free enterprise means to them personally, to
their families and to the future of America." The Rcanoke
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Plan was such a success the NAM used i-h.the campaign in sixteen
other Southern cities. ^8
Few groups could match the NAM's efforts to bolster
bus.ness leadership and shape public op.n.on at the local
level, but other business groups came to understand the
..portance of community relations. The Chamber of Commerce,
Which after the retirement of Erxc
.ohnston from the presi-
dency in 1946, drifted bac. towards economic and social
policies Closer to the NAM's, also strongly advocated the
expansion of localized business public relations, m 1949,
the Chamber began its "American Opportunity Program," and
later followed it with "Explaining Your Business." These
programs provided training, resources, and plans to local
chambers for community relations campaigns. its affiliates
also often cooperated in the programs developed by the NAM.
Then, in 1954, the Chamber of Commerce began promoting
Economic Discussion Groups. These groups, like the NAM's
earlier Industry Leaders Conferences aimed at developing
"articulate, persuasive spokesmen" for business. Between
1955 and 1960, fifteen hundred groups of businessmen,
organized by individual companies like Caterpillar, Eastman
Kodak, or Alcoa or by local chambers, met weekly for eigh-
teen weeks to discuss economic problems using materials
supplied by the Chamber of Commerce. After executives from
his company participated in one such group, E.R. Lehmann,
vice president for industrial relations for West Point Manu-
facturing Company of Georgia, concluded that the program was
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em
was to
•-re tnan an unseUisn patriotic
.esture."
.,3
..a weU-
Planned approach to the solution of a very real prohl
facing business and industry." Lehman felt that it
the advantage of every businessman
"to .now and to let'rrbe
known that our system is the best for all-and why."29
Other employer groups believed they could promote their
free enterprise vision more effectively xf organized inde-
pendently of established business organizations. m the
immediate post-war years, many of these groups were parti-
cularly effective in pushing anti-communism and linking it
to any ideas that business could define as subversive. m
1947, for instance, the New Jersey Manufacturers Association
quietly formed "The Work and Unity Group," then denied any
connection with it. Believing that Communist cells were
burrowing throughout the country spreading "poisonous misin-
formation," the Group vowed to "fight fire with fire."
Consequently, local businessmen formed "cells" at private
luncheons to provide an antidote to left-wing ideas.
Manufacturers Association director Robert W. Watt explained
that his organization was working underground "to set off a
chain reaction of public opinion." The group sponsored
meetings before church, consumer, and veterans groups, pro-
vided speaker kits, and passed out 50,000 copies of a
pamphlet called Free Men or Slaves
, which denounced
government planning and excess profit taxes.
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Similarly, 1347 Syracuse,
.e„
.or., businessmen
-™ea
.,e Cit..en-s Poun.at.on
.o avo..
.e.n,
.a.elea „i.,
any name the public was familiar with " p,. Financial support
came from such businessmen as Cloud Wampier of carrier
corporation, but the Foundation asserted that it represented
•public spirited citizens,., rather than employers. These
citizens were appalled by the
..apathy, of the general public
about What they believed were fundamental American economic,
social, and spiritual values. The Citizen's Foundation
devoted itself to defending the country's freedom-economic,
political, and moral-which was slipping away in
..return for
promises of a life of less personal responsibility... its
active enemies were
..fhe communists, their allies and their
dupes;., its passive enemies were '.ignorance and indiffer-
ence...31 working behind the scenes, the Foundation's Anti-
Subversive Committee defended its definition of political
freedom by orchestrating attacks on Syracuse labor and
liberalism. During 1948, it stopped the proposed broadcast
of
..communist-front., programs on a local radio station and
exposed the .'misuse and abuse.' of the names of a score of
prominent Syracuse citizens in connection with a Henry
Wallace campaign meeting. it distributed '.The Red Package,.,
a folder explaining the evils of Communism to 50,000
workers. Finally, in a campaign tarring the International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers as subversive, the
Foundation convinced Precision Casting Company workers to
reject unionism altogether. ^2
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In the wake of Truman's 1 948 victorv k •y, business leaders
forced ot.e. non-part.san.. cc.unity o.ganxzat.ons with
even ™ore expUct political goals, within a yea., bus-
inessmen organized "Forward Hamilton" in Hsmi,.a lton, Ohio, and
the American Guard m Anderson, indiania, to promote public
understanding of the economic system and bolster their poli-
tical effectiveness. Both also tapped increasing community
anxiety over communism. Forward Hamilton, quietly financed
by General Motors, Ford, the Lima Hamilton Company and
Champion Coated Paper Company, took credit for defeating
mayor Eddie Beckett, a UAW member, and restoring business
dominance to the city council. it poured 20,000 dollars
into the city election, trumpeting its free enterprise
message with car cards, radio time and an intricate network
of small meetings. The Indianapolis News reported that the
American Guard, organized about the same time as Forward
Hamilton, operated with a budget of 590,000, much of which
was supplied by General Motors. The initial impetus behind
this "educational movement" was organizing community opposi-
tion to a proposed liberal state unemployment compensation
3 3bill. The Guard claimed to be a "non-partisan patriotic
group" formed to "obtain good government and worthy office
holders by education of the voter." According to Charles
Harbaugh, who resigned as manager of the Anderson Chamber of
Commerce to take charge of the Guard at a salary of $15,000
a year, organizers initially met secretly. They feared that
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•as businesss^en they woul. ,ust .e
-s.tt.n,
.uc.s' ,or
those ,a.or people who f.,„e that any businessman or capi-
talist is against us.. By late »4S, the ^„er.can Cuar. „as
on the ai. with two raaio programs a wee.,
.hey also too.
their message, which mxxed attacks on socialism with a
defense of business, to churches, school children and civic
betterment groups.
individual firms shared the concern about their rela-
tions with local communities. m 1946 and 1947 surveys of
its readers Public Relations gews found evidence of growing
interest in the "grassroots approach to PR." companies
pulled back from million-dollar industry-wide programs
designed to "play tunes on the minds of 141,000,000 people"
in favor of going directly to the community. indeed, 77
percent were committed to inore^oin^L c as g their community rela-
tions budgets for 1948.-'5
For many of these firms, the immediate impetus for
action was "the continuing threat to Free Enterprise in our
country, the growth of ideas leading to the Welfare State,
creeping Collectivism and a continuation of high taxes."
Shortly after witnessing community leaders support their
workers during the 1946 strike wave, Allegheny Ludlum Steel
Company and General Electric woke up to the importance of
community opinion. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Company attempted
immediate repairs to its reputation by conducting an inten-
sive two-week campaign which included meetings between the
entire executive staff of the company and the local "opinion
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-eat.n, people"
.3 well as a se.ies pa,e adve^.^se-
.ents toutin, the ccpan^s cont.i.utions to the co....itym all the local papers.
Labor's growing stature xn the communxty and xn the
Plant, combined with the Democratxc Party's 194B vxctory
encouraged companies to devote ever greater resources to
economxc and polxtxcal education.
..erxca's entrance xnto
the Korean War xn 1950 only added to their efforts. The
attendant economic dislocatxon, including a return of infla-
tion, meshed wxth surging anxxety over the "communist
menace" to make busxness leaders even "more fully aware of
the importance of telling the free enterprxse story."37
Eisenhower's election in 1952 removed some of the
urgency from the business community's campaign to sell the
free enterprise system to its neighbors. Alarmists never-
theless remained; in early 1953, for instance, Public Rela-
tions Journal reminded employers that the "long, hard battle
against socialism was all but lost by business' neglect of
its public relations opportunities and obligations for many
years prior to the depression and for a long time after
that." It warned that if business slackened "in its well-
organized efforts to keep the public informed, nothing
better can be expected than a swing again to the left--for
the forces of bureaucracy and socialism are forever at it—
and they are masters of propaganda. "^^ But in general, the
business message in the community was less hysterical by
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mid-decade. However, business interest
.n-Liiceres m community rela-
tions, albeit in a slightly differenty uxrr form, continued to
g.ow. one 1955 survey revealed that seventy percent of
companies designated an executive in charge of plant
community relations. ^9
II
The fUp side of the aggressive selUng of the free
enterprise system was a community relations strategy empha-
sizing rn a more positive way the need to create a more
sympathetic polrtrcal and economic environment for business.
Obviously, company involvement in communities was not new to
the mid-twentieth century; from the earliest mill villages
business had been intimately linked to the communities that
produced its goods and services. what ai st inguished the
post-war corporate community relation programs was the
"degree of conscious commitment, initiative, organization
and sophistication which companies were now prepared to pour
into them.""^*^
Industry's program to become a good neighbor looked
very much like the campaigns to build company consciousness
within the plant among workers. One part, the equivalent of
welfare capitalism, consisted of philanthropic and welfare
activities that provided tangible evidence of company
concern for the community. A second part, akin to human
relations, emphasized the importance of direct communication
with the public. "We must" declared Frank W. Abrams,
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Of t.e Board Of
..ustees,
..reestaMish the oo..on
^
touch With our feuow
.en. we ™ust reappear in the role of
war™-hearted hu.an bein.s-wh.ch rs what we are." companies
couia
.raw upon the reservoir of ,00. wUl ana un.erstanain,
generated by effective co^.unity relations to reestablish,
xn Abra.s words,
'.genuine public acceptance" of the business
community's economic leadership. ^ 1
A wide range of companies participated in this drive to
improve community relations. There rs no simple formula to
predict which firms would develop community programs. Union
as well as non-union, large and small, single and multi-
plant companies practiced community relations. shortly
after the war, for instance, Bigelow-Sanf ord Carpet Company,
Keystone steel and Wire, Ford Motor Company, International
Harvester, General Foods, and General Electric, to name but
a few, organized community relations departments or embarked
upon their first planned community relations program. ^2
Commitment to human relations within the plant was
certainly one factor. Companies developing human relations
programs saw community relations as an extension of their
inplant communications and welfare activities, in 1948,
International Harvester chairman John L. McCaffery advised
one works manager that "our community relations are impor-
tant not only from the standpoint of good public relations
but also from the standpoint of good industrial relations
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within the plant. The general attitude ofcicLXTiua the community
colors ana helps to shape the attitude of e.plo.es them-
selves towards us... Employers U.e MoCaffery sought to
recapture the sense of identification and common interest
that they believed business used to share with its employees
and Its neighbors.
company size and plant location were faotors determin-
ing level of commitment to community relations. Large
multi-plant firms created programs hoping to alleviate
hostility Which they feared existed towards "foreign owned"
branch plants. General Foods found that the "bugbear" of
absentee ownership was the attitude of local people who felt
that "outfits like ours are big, remote, impersonal money-
making machines that take all they can from the community,
care little about the individual worker's wellbeing, and
less about the community welfare.' A 1953 Bureau of
National Affairs survey also found that the level of company
community activity varied with the size of the community.
While both large and small firms (large defined as over
1,000 employees) were likely to develop full-scale programs
in mid-size or small cities, generally only large companies
with greater resources operated community relations programs
in metropolitan areas. Small firms doubted their ability to
have an impact in large cities like New York or Chicago. '^^
The new concern with human and public relations contri-
buted to a growing interest in the decentralization of
production away from major industrial cities like Detroit.
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Many employers believed that dispersing plants among smaller
communit.es would increase their ability to influence what
both workers and the public thought about American business,
in 1946, Factory pointed out that factory decentralization
promised to solve not only production and distribution
problems but also industry's social problems. People xn
smaller centers were "closer to realities and understand
that they cannot have what they do not produce." But many
companies further hedged their bets by locating in southern
and western states where unions had yet to make any
headway
.
so fundamental was the concept of integrating company
into community to some firms that it affected the appearance
of the factory itself. Believing that unsightly plants
might irritate neighbors, firms like Bethlehem Steel and the
Borden Company began extensive programs of landscaping and
beautif ication. The Bournville Works of Cadbury Brothers
Ltd claimed to have created a "suburban landscape" around
Its factory with "masses of crocuses, daffodils and
flowering trees" that not only lent color to the immediate
surrounding of the plant but also made "the grounds one of
the beauty spots of the community." Many companies, parti-
cularly when building near residential areas, designed new
plants so that they blended into the surrounding landscape
and architectural patterns. The streamlined look of the
factories of the fifties was part of this effort to create
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Within the co™™unity a „o.e visuaUy pi.as..,
..a,e of
industry.
companies often attempted to cu„y p,,Uc favor by
providing services ana g.fts directly to the co^.unity
Ansu: Che.ical Company's co^.un.ty program,
.e,un shortly
after World War IX, for instance, featured a volunteer
emergency rescue squad, trained, equipped and operated at
company expense, yale and Towne Manufacturing Company
.ade
Its auditorium available to Stamford civic groups for
meetings, similarly Caterpillar Tractor Company of Peor.a,
Illinois, loaned xts trucks to the city for clean-up drives
and to the Post Office to assist in the department's
Christmas rush."^"^
Business routinely won friends by supporting local
recreation programs. Many companies gave or leased at a
nominal charge park land to local communities. m 1949, the
Peerless Woolen Mills of Rossville, Georgia, the town's
leading industry, began a project to build an eight thousand
seat stadium, Softball and baseball fields, a running track,
a field house and other sports facilities for use by the
community as well as company employees. Dow Chemical
Company also generated goodwill by opening its facilities
and programs for use by the community. The West Point
Manufacturing Company of Alabama made "itself responsible
for the reacreational activities and general welfare of the
25,000 inhabitant of the area, known as 'The Valley.'" it
provided lighted playing fields, swimming pools, gymnasiums.
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tenn.s courts, and croquet laws, in addition to other
located
.
Programs for children built good will with the local
communities of the present and of the future. m 1946,
actors advised management to learn more about chrldrel.
"Kids,- it contended,
.'are the biggest common denominator of
community Ufe." Nearly everything revolves around the
community's kids." Local industry would do well to get
into the orbit if for no other reason than "today's kids are
tomorrow's workers "^^ Hp =; i t- -< n rr uijvtixb. ues ri g to become more closely
allied with the community's life, companies initiated
recreation programs for local children. The Wyandotte
Chemicals Corporation conducted a sports program that
offered basketball, volleyball, wrestling, boxxng, tumbling,
weight lifting and gymnastics in its gymnasium at Wyandotte,
Michigan. Companies like General Electric, Olin Industries,
Motorola, and North American Aviation, among many others,
became closely associated with the developing youth sports
movement in the areas of baseball, basketball, football, and
soccer. in 1947, United States Rubber Company stepped into
the Little League baseball picture, promoting the activity
nationwide and picking up the cost of the annual World
Series in Wi 1 1 iamsport
,
Pennsy 1 vania.
Social programs also encouraged children and their
families to identify with companies. in 1950, a Bloomfield,
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—-
Westin,hou.e plant,
.ou,.t
..,i.,e. acceptance oftne company as one of the co^.unxty's good neighbors" by
running a Teen Canteen with dancing, ga„es and free
refresh.ents.51
^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
and the Al Us-chal.ers Manufacturing Company, located in
miwau.ee, Wisconsin, each began sponsoring post-pro.
parties for area high school students, treating the. to a
midnight supper, professional entertaxn.ent and dancing 52
Raybestos-Manhattan, inc. "carved a solid niche in the town
Of Stratford," Connecticut, when in 1947 it for.ed the Knot
Hole Gang, a club for all children in the neighborhood of
its plant. The club .et three ti.es a week under the super-
vision of volunteer workers from Raybestos. The company
also sponsored a Sea Scouts program and eight Little League
teams, complete with special field, uniforms, and a banquet
at the end of the season featuring a major league ball
player as the principal speaker. 5^
Participation in a broad range of community affairs was
another important avenue to community acceptance of business
and its values. Companies encouraged their employees, both
rank and file and managerial, to become involved in the
community's civic, service, fraternal, professional, and
social organizations. General Electric maintained a file of
employees active in civic projects which enabled supervisors
to personally congratulate workers on their accomplishments.
In some firms, leadership of community organizations was
seen as a prerequisite for professional advancement. Key-
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stone steel and Wire of Peor.a, ilUnois, expeoted its
Dunior executives to ta.e an active role with local
groups.54
^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
..nportance of Keystone's actrvrty. i„ ,,,,,
zatxons, company representative became better acquainted
with the communrty-s
"thought leaders," doctors, clergy
merchants, educators and others. The Institute claimed 'that
through the resulting friendships "much of the mystery about
What goes on within the walls of the company plant will
gradually be dispelled. More importantly, these people will
become missionaries for the company in the community."55
Companies expected their senior executives to sit on
the governing boards of community agencies. Business repre-
sentation on these boards was hardly unique to the period
after World War II. Local business leaders as individual
philanthropists always had been the major force in private
welfare activities. During the twenties, however, partici-
pation shifted from individuals to corporate representatives
acting as officials of the company. in the post-war decade,
this practice increased in the face of labor's challenge.
Represention on policy making boards ensured decision making
congenial to business interests and served as a device for
changing attitudes in the community towards business. ^6
Fund raising provided corporations with a means to
acquire greater influence over voluntary agencies while
increasing their community prestige. During and after World
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war II, corporate giv.ng expanded dra.atroally. Crvxng rose
fro.
.35% Of profits .n 1941 to 1.08.
.n 1960. m ooUar.
thxs represented a ^u.p fro. 5239
..llion to 5555 million
.n
the decade after 1948. in part this was a result of war-
born profits and tax incentives, but aesxre for an improved
public image was also an important factor.57 corporations,
like unions, had played a ma, or part xn the National War
Fund and were drawn into the fund raising drives of the
community Chest and other voluntary social welfare agencies.
Facing multiple appeals, in the late forties, com.panies Irke
Ford and U.S. Steel began promoting United Fund drives.
Despite some labor participation, businessmen felt these
drives consolidated the giving process and provided even
greater opportunity for business control. As these
federated fund raising drives grew larger, executives repre-
senting the largest companies assumed leadership by
providing both the largest donations and most of the staf-
fing. In 1956, Humble Cil Company lent a full-time staff of
one hundred people to organize the United Fund drive in
Houston, Texas. 58 Corporations exacted a price for their
high levels of support. In most cities, business leaders
overwhelmed labor participation and gained a larger voice in
the allocation process. Central financing, then, provided
"a channel for the expression of business interests in the
spending of welfare funds. "^^
Through corporate philanthropy and other welfare acti-
vities, companies tried to create the image of themselves as
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benevolent, car.n,, trustworthy organisations. They hoped
that tnis positxve
..age would enhanoe the seoond part of
their co..unity relations strategy, that xs oo..unioating
with the pubUc on economic and political xssues. These
cc.un.catron efforts overlapped wrth those emanating fro.
the national business organizations like the NAM and the
Chamber of Commerce. with the encouragement of these
organizations, companies attempted to teach the public about
the economic principles of the free enterprise system, its
superiority, and the necessity for its preservation. They
also sought sell the company itself to the public.
Employers tried to familiarize the public with the products,
policies, and objectives of the firm, while also emphasizing
the company's economic support of the community through
payrolls, taxes, and contributions. Companies believed that
the payoff from greater public understanding of business
would result in increased product sales, improved workforce
recruitment, and favorable treatment from local governments
on issues like taxes or zoning. Finally, companies hoped
they could rely on community support in times of labor
struggle.
Companies relied on all sorts of media to send a wide
variety of messages into the community. Institutional
advertising surged in the years immediately after World War
II as companies made a concerted effort to sell themselves
and their values to their neighbors. In the late 1940s,
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.any ads dealt w.th the specter of spreading cc.un.s. and
the threats Tru.an's pcUc.es posed tc
.nd.v.dual freedom.
General Electr.c advertisements, for instance, explained
"the facts about Mdden taxes" and how "the profit
.otive is
the driving power of our free socxety." They also .ade
clear that their opposition to "compulsory unxonxsm" was
related to what GE decried as the way "Communxsts seek to
get and keep control of labor unions." During 1950, Locke
inc. of Baltimore sponsored a series of ads warning readers
that the "cradle-to-grave security" and the "free medical
service" promised by the government meant "socialism-the
end of your individual freedom."^! The International Nickel
company's Huntington, West Virginia, campaign avoided
broader political issues in favor of ads reminding the
public that "your Inco friends and neighbors help in many
ways to make Huntington a good place to live in." Companies
tended to step up advertising just before elections and
prior to or during strikes as they went to the public with
their side of the issues.
Other advertisements targeted special audiences.
Pittsburgh steel companies, for example, wooed friends from
the black community with ads in the black press. During
1954, U.S. Steel bought space in the Pittsburgh Courier
, for
the picture of a black supervisor consulting with an assis-
tant superintendent. Below was the statement:
On the production line, in our mills, or in offices,
or in transportation, quality people, for a quality
product, are our first consideration. Numbered amcnc
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great tea. dedicated to the TeVvTcVo'f T:e'n"ti°on
'
Earlier that year. Republic steel pra.sed "Negro Progress"
.n an ad stating
..Greater Safety and better working condi-
tions
..ean increased security for Republics 68,000
employees, thousands of whom are Negroes... The company
then pledged its "continued suDoort in h^i •pp m helping you continue
to progress. "^^
increasingly, radio and later television carried the
business message to the community. Local business associa-
tions used radio to showcase industry, m Wisconsin during
the late forties, "The Cavalcade of Racine Industry" radio
program dramatized "the history and romantic growth" of
local industry, while the Oshkosh Associated Industries'
"Wings of Industry" brought "industry right into the home."
Eacn program focused on a member firm, beginning with a
description of the company, the investment required for each
employee, and details of plant growth and sales volume. An
interview with workers taped "right on the job" created a
first hand view of the part played by industry in community
life. According to one employer, the show demonstrated that
"what is good for business is good for everybody. "^
^
Individual firms found radio an effective community
relations tool. Some, like The Ger ity-Michigan Corporation,
simply used radio spot commercials to sell free enterprise.
Others associated the company with popular community activi-
ties. Armco Steel and The Gardner Board and Carton Company
344
broadcast high school football and basketball games, using
the commercial time to explain what the problems, accom-
plishments, and contributions of industry meant to community
welfare.65 ^^^ms also inagurated weekly or even daily radio
programs in a variety of formats to help integrate the
company into the community. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Com-
pany's, Keystone Steel & wire Company's, and the Mooresville
Mills' programs intersperced the sounds, voices, and news of
the plant with public announcements of forthcoming community
activities. In 1948, Armstrong Cork launched a program which
soon reached three of every four listeners in the Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, region. It mixed company reports with musical
entertainment, featuring company employees as well as pro-
fessionals. In the mid fifties. Caterpillar company moved
into television with a weekly half-hour Sunday night news,
weather and sports program that carried messages about the
firm instead of product commercials. Timken-Roller Bearing
was probably the most ambitious company in the media field,
blanketing Ohio with five radio programs.
Some forms of company communication were similar to
mechanisms used in the in-plant human relations programs.
Two Nebraska firms, the Kelly Ryan Equipment Company and the
Formfit Company, used stunts, like paying employees in
smaller cities and towns with silver dollars. These dollars
then circulated am.ong local businesses dramatizing the
economic impact of company payrolls. Companies also used
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plant tours and open houses to educate the community and
humanize the factory. Even before World War li, some com-
panies had a tradition of opening their doors and displaying
their products to the public. After the war the number of
firms offering tours skyrocketed. Opinion Research Corpora-
tion reported that among the companies it surveyed the
number sponsoring tours increased from twenty-six percent to
seventy percent between 1948 and 1950. Companies widely
advertised their open houses and attracted the public with
promises of child care, refreshments, and souvenirs. Atten-
dance at some of these events testifies to their popularity.
In a single day, the Youngstown, Ohio, plants of the
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation and the Lynn General
Electric plant each attracted 30,000 visitors. A three day
open house conducted by the S.D. Warren Company, employing
2,800 workers manufacturing paper, brought 14,000 visitors
to Westbrook, Maine, a town of 12,000.^^
Unlike prewar tours that concentrated primarily cn
technology, post war open houses stressed ideas. A. D.
LeMonte, of the Mullins Manufacturing Corporation, advised a
1949 conference of public relations executives that "the
modern open house . . . actively, not passively, attempts to
create opinions or develop action that eventually, will
profit the company that's paying the bill." S.C. Allyn of
National Cash Register was more blunt about corporate objec-
tives. The goal was to "indoctrinate citizens with the
capitalist story." He asserted that "experience shows that
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people are eager to go through factories; that when they are
taken through and given an indoctrination in the sociology
of the industrial system, they are able to play back the
story with remarkable fidelity. "^^ Tnese new "interpretive-
public tours overlapped with those targeted at employee
audiences, teaching the same kinds of lessons. The goal was
to show plants as working models of capitalism and to point
out benefits flowing to people from the free market system.
Exhibits, signs, films, and handouts addressed "misconcep-
tions" about profits and wages or the relationship of
machinery to jobs and prcducti vity ."^^
Following the business associations, individual
companies appreciated the role of community leaders or
"opinion molders" played in shaping ideas. They sent copies
of plant papers or special newsletters to business, educa-
tion, club and church leaders. Caterpillar's mailing list
included over 6000 names. Noting that "barber shops were
the idea crossroads of America," in 1950 Caterpillar began
inviting Peoria barbers to special plant tours, lunches, and
discussions to ensure that they could "talk factually about
the company and its policies." Other firms sponsored
7
1
special open houses for teachers, clergy, and doctors.
General Electric, Johnson and Johnson, and Republic Steel
established speakers bureaus that addressed the gatherings
of these professionals as well as other groups. Over a
three year period Republic Steel representatives made 3,000
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talks to an audience of more that one-quarter of a million
people •
The occasions that brought together all aspects of
corporate community relations were the ceremonies attendant
to the opening of new plants or company anniversaries.
These events symbolized the mutuality of factory and com-
munity. In 1950, Wichita, Kansas, designated a "Coleman
week" with activities honoring Coleman Company's fifth anni-
versary and the founder's eightieth birthday. Bigelow-
Sanford Carpet Company's 125th anniversay began with a
special "Influence Group" dinner for 140 leading citizens.
An open nouse attended by 12,000 visitors capped off the
celebration which, according to the company, demonstrated
"the hign degree of friendship between the company and the
town" and "emphasized the interdependence of the two for
maintaining prosperity in the community.""^
^
Typical of a community wide celebration of a new plant
was the dedication in 1952 of the Parker Pen Company plant
in Janesville, Wisconin. A Citizens' Planning Committee,
representing business, labor, youth, and women's groups
sponsored the event, while school children participated in a
contest naming the factory. On opening day "factory
whistles tooted" and "church bells rang." Finally,
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation's 1949 celebration
brought together the entire community in the towns of
Dunkirk, New York and West Leechburg, Pennsylvania: schools
declared holidays; mercnants, who had installed street
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decoration and window exhibits, closed shop to permit
employees to attend the event; volunteer firemen and members
of local civic clubs served as special traffic police;
women's clubs set up free baby sitting in churches to care
for children; high school students and other organizations
presented the company with flowers, and newspapers printed
special editions in which merchants placed congratulatory
advertising. ^4 Events such as these epitomized the intri-
cate connections between business and the community, parti-
cularly in smaller cities and towns.
The business campaign to emesh itself into local com-
munities attracted the attention of liberals and labor
activists. As early as 1946, sociologist Robert S. Lynd
cautioned trade unionists about business infiltration at the
grass-roots level. Lynd observed that the NAM had "suddenly
become vastly solicitous about local people." He contended
that its concern was part of a long-range strategy to syste-
matically capture grass-roots public opinion. Sympathetic
local comm.unities, Lynd believed, could be manipulated to
provide political support for the people and issue business
favored. Business leaders sought to establish in every-
body's mind "that 'freedom of initiative' is what America is
all about," and to put labor in the doghouse in public
disesteem up and down the Main Streets of the United
States--and to keep it there." Of the entire spectrum of
the business community's attempt to reshape political
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culture, Lynd believed that most dangerous of all was this
movement "to capture-body and breeohes, mind and sould-the
local community."'^^
Trade unionists responded strongly to the NAM's early
community relations campaign. m 1946, Irvine Kerrison of
the Detroit Teachers' union, charged that "high-powered NAM
speakers" were appearing in the high schools "expounding
subtle but effective anti-labor and pro-NAM propaganda."
Particularly after 1946, when the NAM took the advice of
public relations experts and played down its sponsorship of
the local campaign, labor found business propaganda even
more insidious. Labor worried that pro-business ideology
might be more persuasive if local people thought it
orginated in the community. Thus, the CIO charged that ads
carrying the names of local business firms actually were
prepared by the NAM. The Guild Reporter published an
expose, which was reprinted by a number of other labor
papers, of the NAM's attempt to "hoodwink" club women with
propaganda. Through program kits distributed to over 36,000
women's club program directors, the NAM planted anti-labor
speeches, "ostensibly prepared by women who have standing in
the community as the studied opinion of the speakers." The
kits. The Gui Id Reporter derisively noted, even suggested
planting people in the audience to ask specific questions
for which the kit provided the answers.
The Harrisburg Central Labor Union issues broader
warnings about NAM underground work. It cautioned: "So
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watch out for the new look on big business propaganda. Look
out also for phony committees which will rise in the com-
munity. Pretend to be interested in public welfare and get
a lot of publicity in the daily press.
. . We must not be
fooled by the new line. it must not happen here."^'^
Throughout the fifties, trade unionists worried about
industry's "unending efforts to get people to accept its
ideas as their own." Unions warned members about the "pro-
paganda" that poured forth from newspapers in the form of
institutional advertising and editorials. The Connecticut
CIO Vanguard, for instance, attacked a series of ads
sponsored by an organization of manufacturers called, Indus-
tries of Naugatuck Valley, which charged that the stock-
holder got too little because workers got too much. The UAW
reacted as strongly to company community economic education
as it did to the inplant education efforts. In 1955, it
warned autoworkers of the ways companies used the mass
media. They used radio and television, often "to sell the
corporation's ideas more than its products." The UAW
charged that many huge corporations, which sold only to
other companies and not to the public, "now sponsor lengthy,
expensive programs as well as those featuring news analyses
or commentaries." It was not surprising, then, that "the
corporation's economic, labor and political ideas turned up
on these broadcasts in the form of "comments" or com-
7 fi
mercial s . °
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Industry's community relations clearly irritiated
labor, but what tangible benefits did business attain
through its increased attent i veness to community? As with
the campaign to reshape workers attitudes witliin tlio shop
through building company consciousness, ompioyors oLton h>id
difficulty pointing to specific achievements. Eaiiy on,
however, some saw an impact in both the political and
economic realms. In 1950, the Associated Industries of
Alabama reported to the NAM convention on the aftermath of
its free enterprise communications program. Tt claimed th.it
since the inception oL the campaign, which stressed the
"tremendous federal tax burden corporations are carryin^i,"
there had been no additional taxes levied on industry by the
state legislature. Ohio business leaders could also link
campaigns like Forward Hamilton to the suprising reelection
of Robert Taft in 1950, despite heavy labor opposition. The
business community was also convinced that its efforts
within the community were critical to the election
7 QEisenhower . ^
Especially m the area of labor relations, business
expressed satisfaction with its community relations
programs. Within a few years after developing I he most
ambitious and wide ranging corporate community relations
programs. General Electric believed that it created a much
better understanding among its neighbors of the company's
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aims, policies and objectives. Proof, according to GE
spokespersons, was the community response to union strife m
1950, 1951 and 1952. It asserted that community leaders
urged workers to refrain from striking and, in the few
places where plants struck. General Electric claimed "we
found public sentiment in our favor." Unlike 1946 "there
were no clergymen in the picket lines. Merchants did not go
against us. Newspapers did not run stories and editorials
against us. Most of them knew about our offer and urged the
union to accept it." This, General Electric proclaimed, was
"the real pay-off. "^^
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CHAPTER 9
A MATTER OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
By 1956, despite a decade of campaigns designed to
capture the hearts and minds of workers and their communi-
ties, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars on
"economic education" and other public relations, despite a
veritable flood of words and images extolling the benefits
of American capitalism, business leaders remained uncertain
of the loyalty of ther workers. To be sure a Republican was
in the White House and the nation's political atmosphere
seemed more conservative. Moreover, the passage of Taft-
Hartley and the defeat of Operation Dixie had helped stem
the labor movement's growth. But, union membership remained
high and the public had yet to view industry as "the symbol
of progress and hope for the majority of people. Most
importantly, many business conservatives saw in the merger
of the AFL-CIO the specter of a labor juggernaut that would
challenge the leadership of business both on the shop floor
and in the halls of Congress. In January 1956, Kenneth R.
Miller of the NAM proclaimed that "one of the gravest
threats to management's right to manage is the vastly
increased size and power of organized labor, now that the
AFL and CIO have merged into one giant organization." Labor
unions, he continued, "possess a private power of
unprecedented scope and influence. The potentials of this
power are in themselves crucial and confront industry as
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well as the country, with problems of far reaching
signxfrcance."2 it was against this background that conser
vative business leaders launched yet another major campaign
to capture public opinion and redraw the laws governing
labor relations at both the state and federal levels. This
campaign, and labor's response marked the decade's final
effort by both sides to shape the nation's understanding of
postwar labor relations. As such it reveals both the
character and limits of America's postwar consensus.
There were opposing interpretations of the AFL and CIO
merger's long term implications. in December 1 955 as the
two organizations officially united, The iron Age observed
that "labor unity opens a chapter in the American labor
movement which will frighten some industrialists and
encourage others." More moderate business leaders, who
believed that unions had a legitimate and important role in
society, predicted the merger would result in more respon-
sible unionism, in a decline in jurisdictional strikes, and
in better informed and more creative collective bargaining.
They felt that George Meany, the new head of the AFL-CIO,
was much more conservative than the CIO's Walter Reuther.
Meany, they hoped, would use methods "other than strike and
bombast to make gains for labor." All this would promote
the moderates' primary industrial relations goal -- stabili-
zing labor-management affairs. Political liberals tended to
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reinforce this interpretation, emphasizing that the AFL-CIO
was actually moving away from militancy and that its
political and economic objectives were quite limited. They
dismissed the idea that Reuther's more militant social
policies would become incorporated into the new
organization-^
While business moderates applauded the merger of the
AFL-CIO as a step toward "responsible unionism," business
conservatives, which is to say the majority of American
business leaders, viewed the merger as a dangerous threat
which required renewed mobilization by the business commun-
ity. To them it was clear that labor unity meant increased
union strength and militancy. No longer could employers
play the AFL against the CIO. Conservative employers fore-
saw a major organizing drive, the emergence of labor as the
most powerful political force in the country, and more
effective collective bargaining resulting in increasingly
favorable contracts for labor. Employers' ever present fear
of union power over the economy and politics was seemingly
on the verge of becoming reality. In December 1955, NAM
Chairman of the Board Charles Sligh wondered it the AFL-CIO
might not "become a ghost government, in which a handful of
people not elected, not authorized by the American people
would pull strings behind the scenes to direct the destinies
of the nation."^
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Much of the popular press reinforced this interpreta-
tion, emphasizing the danger to the public posed by "big
labor." News & World Report, for instance, predicted
that the repercussions of a more powerful and richer labor
movement would reverberate in a negative way throughout
society. Housewives would feel the effects in increased
living costs. Taxpayers would "get the impact as the
increasing political power of organized labor is translated
into Government policies and tax rates." Finally, the
nation's youth, would experience greater economic uncer-
tainty as their work "more and more" conformed to restric-
tive "union rules and practices."^
As the nation debated the implications of the merger,
the conservative wing of the business community decided to
take action. The NAM embarked upon a public relations
campaign to expose "the abuses and evils of organized labor"
with the ultimate goal of arousing the public to demand
legislation to curb labor. Employers wanted passage of
state "right to work" laws designed to weaken labor by
destroying the union shop and a national labor act that
toughened Taft Hartley and dealt with the issue of union
monopoly. The NAM's program focused on publicizing five
areas of "abusive" labor practices. These included compul-
sory union membership, coercion of employees and employers
through violence, racketeering and other "illegal,
unethical, and undemocratic activities," "monopolistic
dictation" of labor relations through industry or pattern
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bargaining, work limitations and other restrictive
practices, and the "misuse" of union organizations and funds
for political purposes. In outlining its new program, the
NAM observed that only an aroused public opinion could
assure protection against the continuation and expansion of
these "evils." A public sympathetic to management would
help strengthen politicians' resistance to labor coercion,
assist management in dealing with "giant unions," and
"oppose illegal and immoral political action of any labor
group or leader."^
"Semantics" were an important part of the business
community's new public relations campaign. Despite the
publicity associated with the merger, the NAM believed that
the public still tended to view labor as "the underdog."
Employers thus needed to tread carefully for fear of
inadvertently arousing sympathy for their opponents. To
address this difficulty, the NAM clothed its assault on
unions in a disclaimer that it was not anti-union and did
not seek to destroy or undermine organized labor. Instead,
the NAM claimed that employers simply sought to protect the
-J
values associated with the "American Way of Life."
Indeed, the business community's attack on labor
consciously drew upon traditional themes embedded in
American political culture such as the danger of monopoly
and the concept of individual rights. First, the NAM empha-
sized that unions had become a "labor monopoly" that evinced
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no concern for the public's interest. it charged that the
vast "uncontrolled" economic and political power of labor,
which made unions capable of "paralyzing a single plant, an
entire industry, or the country as a whole," was evidence of
this monopoly.8 "Today," declared NAM President Ernest G.
Swigert in 1957, "the greatest concentrations of political
and economic power in the United States of America are found
not in the over-regulated, over-criticized, over- investi-
gated, and over-taxed business corporation." Nor were they
present in "their hag-ridden, brow-beaten, publicity-fearful
managers." Instead, monopoly power was to be "found in the
under-regulated, under-criticized, under-investigated, tax-
exempt and specially privileged labor organizations," and in
"their beligerent, aggressive, and f ar-too-of ten lawless and
corrupt managers."^
Secondly, employers characterized their drive against
labor as a crusade to protect the freedom and the rights of
the individual, which they characterized as the "bulwark and
foundation of the whole American system." According to
business leaders, unions invariably ignored individuals.
Experience had shown, claimed the NAM, "that as a labor
organization and its officials increase in size and power,
the freedom of individuals is correspondingly diminished."
Employers thus argued that their main concern was protecting
the rank and file against exploitation by union leaders, an
emphasis which flowed naturally from employers' use of
personalized human relations in the factory. -^^
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In Its campaign to create an atmosphere intolerant of
unions and to win support for new anti-labor legislation,
business leaders sought to reach the state and local
community leaders whom it had been targeting for almost a
decade. NAM departments drafted new literature including
booklets and flyers on "the existing evils and potential
threat of Big Labor." They sent them to employers for
distribution to workers and for publication in company
magazines and newspapers, to leaders of women's organiza-
tions, to farmers and farm groups, to educators, to politi-
cians, and to opinion leaders. One such flyer entitled
"Monopoly is Always Wrong!" showed two tiny workers and an
even smaller employer facing a giant AFL-CIO. It observed
that laws prevented business monopoly but exempted unions.
This double-standard, it continued, was "directly contrary
to the concept of equal justice under the law." Monopolies
enabled a company or union to impose its will on the public
and the flyer concluded: "V\?e, as a nation, must be consis-
tent. Every instance of monopoly, whatever its source
, must
be stopped in its undemocratic tracks!" The NAM also
provided pattern speeches for employers to use at meetings
and on raaio or television, and supplied material to news
and broadcast journalists to ensure that the general public
was "properly informed, alerted and active against the real
and potential threat to the national welf are."-"-
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The NAM believed that one of tne best ways to signal
the public about the "abuses of monopoly power by labor
unions" was to throw the "cold light" of publicity on actual
cases. It began searching the labor and general press for
material and also called upon employers to help provide a
steaay flow of reliable "human interest stories." By 1955
the Employers' Association of Chicago was already collecting
"documented" case histories and publishing them in a series
of folders headed "MR AND MRS CITIZEN: IS THIS AMERICA?" for
distribution to employees and opinion leaders. "The Heroic
Story of Mrs. Esther Quigley" told of one family's experi-
ence in a strike called by "a handful of union biggies" to
force "the company to knuckle." Mrs. Quigley, determined
not to let "a handful of local union bosses lead 450 people
around by the nose," organized a successful back-to-work
movement. She reported that the experience taught her that
"we working people have a job to do in ridding ourselves of
bad union bosses" and getting "real responsible leaders."
If "our men can't or won't do it" resolved Mrs. Quigley, "I
think it is time we housewives took a hand. With more guts
and with the help of public opinion, we can do this."-'-^
In 1955 and 1956, the NAM believed that despite the
publicity about the merger there was not yet enough public
understanding of the implications of union "monopolistic
abuses" to successfully implement a drive for national
legislation. '^ But the business community was ready to
proceed at the state level on the issue of "compulsory
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unionism/' feeling that targeted drives might have success
in particular states. Hence, the mid-1950s witnessed a
major business campaign to spread "right-to-work"
legislation in heretofore union states.
II
Right-to-work laws prohibited contract provisions
compelling union membership. Although the first two right-
to-work laws were passed in 1944, it was really Section 14b
of the Taft-Hartley Act which ceded to states jurisdiction
over union security restrictions. Thus, as anti-union
sentiment was on the upswing, states could prohibit the
closed shop, the union shop, and maintenance of membership
agreements. By 1947, fourteen states, mostly in the South
and West, possed right-to work laws. Between 1948 and 1954,
six more states followed, but state labor movements helped
repeal several of these statutes, including ones passed in
the northern states of Delaware and New Hampshire. Unions
opposed right-to-work because they believed that these laws
were designed simply to weaken the labor movement and drive
down wages. Trade unionists argued that union security
provisions provided a "sound basis for a collective-
bargaining relationship that benefits both workers and
employers." Moreover, they asserted, non-closed shop
relations bred suspicion and created constant conflict
between the union and the employer and union members and
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non-unionists. Such conditions made it difficult for
organized labor to grow and prosper.
Prior to 1954, most of the activity surrounding right-
to-work took place at the local level in states with weak
laDor movements; there was little national debate over the
issue. However, interest increased in 1954 as local employer
organizations helped enact legislation in three states. In
1955, impressed with their success but fearing a labor counter
attack, the NAM, the Chamber of Commerce, and the newly
formed National Right to Work Committee began coordinated
national educational campaigns to assist local employers
promote or defend right-to-work. When Louisiana and
Washington unionists succeeded in "repealing and repelling
union security provisions" in 1956, these national organiza-
tions redoubled their efforts.-'-^
Conservative national business organizations sought to
shape the debate over right-to-work. Business leaders
asserted that they had little personal interest in the issue
but were concerned with protecting the public interest and
the moral right of the individual to choose. The question
was simply one of personal freedom versus force and compul-
sion. It was "an American tradition" asserted a Chamber of
Commerce spokesman, "that no person should be forced to
support opinions and policies with which he disagrees." In
1957, NAM Board Chair Cola G. Parker put it even more
bluntly: "compulsory unionism is a blight on the spirit of
American justice; a skeleton in freedom's closet. "^^ Not
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only did union security clauses attack individual rights;
they directly contributed to the concentration of power in
the hands of union officials. Here employers played on the
popular fear of labor's "bigness." Employers argued that
"compulsory unionism" increased the chance of corruption
since the membership was a captive audience and worker
allegiance did not have to be earned. The NAM believed that
by emphasizing corruption and the union boss's "domination
over the individual member," union security would "not be
tolerated by many of the American public. "'
While the The National Association of Manufacturers,
the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Right to Work
Committee did not directly participate in internal state
legislative battles, they provided financial support,
advice, and educational materials to the companies and state
affiliates involved in campaigns. As a way of providing
more generalized assistance, the NAM tried to publicize the
issue. It encouraged national organizations like the Bar
Association, the American Legion, and the Daughters of the
American Revolution to take a stand on right-to-work and
attempted to interest national magazines and newspaper
chains in exploring the impact of the issue. Regional
offices of the NAM encouraged company communications to
employees and the association sent right-to-work kits to
1 8
schools throughout the country.
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seeking support for their attacks on union security,
employers focused especially on the religious community.
The clergy had assumed a particularly prominent role m the
debate over right-to- work. The 1954 struggles on the issue
touched off a discussion that continued for some years
thereafter in the religious press. Numerous religious
leaders from all three major faiths came out against the
statutes, fewer in support. Stung by the their stand, the
NAM cited the "recent interest taken by the clergy" as an
important reason for national business organizations to give
"full-scale attention" to the right-to-work drive.
Of the three major faiths. Catholic clergymen were
loudest and most persistent in their opposition to laws
banning union security. The Church itself did not adopt an
official position with regard to right-to-work legislation.
But, since the 1920s, the Catholic Church had forged strong
ties to the labor movement. Citing Catholic social
doctrine, the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC),
the coordinating agency of the bishops on secular problems,
had spoken out on labor's side in most controversial
issues. ^'^ Monsignor George C. Higgins and Father John F. '
Cronin, directors of the Social Action Department of the
NCWC made clear their personal opposition to right-to- work
on the grounds that such laws were contrary to the Christian
principle of social justice. The "net effect of these laws
would be very bad for the cause of peaceful and orderly
industrial relations in the United States," they argued. 21
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A host of other priests joined in denoucing right-to-
work. Archbishop Henry J. O'Brien of Hartford, Connecticut,
flatly rejected the claim "that a fundamental right of the
individual is invaded if he must join a union." He argued
that "it is neither immoral nor unethical to require union
membership for the greater common good of the group." in
our modern and complex society, O'Brien continued, "everyone
is subject to prohibitions and rstraints, as well as to
mandatory rules of conduct based on the common good of the
group." An editorial in the Catholic paper, St^ Louis
Register
,
stated plainly that it was the "constant and clear
teaching" of the Catholic church that workers had a natural
right to organize. According to Father William J. Smith in
his La Crosse Register column, those advocating right-to-
work only pretended to be concerned with protecting indi-
vidual workers; their real aim was "to destroy unions, or
at least to weaken them to a point tantamount to destruc-
tion." He and other Catholic writers saw right-to-work as
introducing chaos into "what should be an ordered economy"
by creating strife and suspicion among workers and between
2 2labor and management.
Unions were greatly encouraged by the support of many
Catholic clergy as well as other religious leaders. In
their attacks on right-to-work, they regularly turned for
justification to the higher authority of the Church. In
1955, when Maryland was considering open-shop legislation,
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the International Association of Machinsts sent each legis-
lator a booklet containing moral studies of right-to- work
laws by Father William J. Kelley, Rabbi Israel Goldstein,
and the Reverend Dr. Walter G. Muelder. The Baltimore
Federation of Labor also sponsored a rally at which Father
William J. Kelley was the principal speaker, and distributed
recordings of his speech throughout the state. Unions paid
close attention to the discussion in the religious press and
sought to quietly bolster their supporters. The Steel-
workers, for instance, provided Father Jerome Toner, author
of an anti-right-to-work study. The Closed Shop , with
information for his study. In another case, Steelworker
officials, concerned that the strongest argument for the
union shop be crafted for a debate to be published in a 1957
issue of The Homi letic and Pastoral Revie w, interceded witn
Monsignor Higgins to ensure the engagement of the most
"competent theologian with a thorough social and economic
background ."2 3
The National Association of Manufacturers also sought
to influence the clergy on the question of right-to-work.
It widely distributed a pamphlet entitled "Ethics,
Economics, and the Church." The pamphlet, which quoted an
1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, brought a sharp rebuke
from some it was supposed to influence. Monsignor Francis
J. Lally, editor of the Pilot, a Boston Catholic weekly
paper, called it "a totally absurd piece of propaganda." He
went on to say, "it is almost unbel ieveable that serious
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i'aLhoi I'Mwaid A. Ko 1 1 01 ol Notro Daiiio 11 11 i v< • 1 ; ; 1 I y wa:; poiliai':;
Lho most well known 1 o|)i o:;ont ative ol the Cat hoi ic clergy to
dolond rigid to work. In t ho :;ummoi of 1 ')'>(>, t ho l|oiita>i'^
l.'ouiidal ion (d c-iiioacio [)uhli:;h.>(l a ;;mall hook hy K.^M.m-
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entitled The Case for Right-to- Work Laws ^ a Defense of
Voluntary Unionism which sought "to correct the impression
that American Catholics are unanimously opposed" to such
legislation on moral grounds. Prior to publication, NAM
manager Noel Sargent had met with Keller at Notre Dame for
the "purpose of reviewing various economic questions in
which industry is interested, especially Guaranteed Annual
Wage and Right to Work."^^
Protestants tended to be somewhat more tentative than
Catholics on riyht-to-work. Indeed, the liberal Protestant
journal. The Christian Century
,
repeatedly chided the
National Council of Churches for failing to take a stand.
In the mid-fifties, conservative business leaders seemed to
carry more weight with Protestant clerics than with Catho-
lics. Ironically, the Federal Council of Churches, the
organizational predecessor of the National Council, liad,
since its formation in 1 908, been a voice of support for
labor and social reform.^''' In 1950, however, as the FCC
merged with other ecumenical organizations to become the
NCC, it began moving in a more conservative direction. in
part, this reflected the influence of a group of conserva-
tive business leaders who had been invited to join a Lay
Committee. In the Council's eyes the primary function of
the Lay Committee was to raise funds, but businessmen like
J. Howard Pew of Sun Oil, Charles Hook of Armco, and Henning
W. Prentis of Armstrong Cork viewed the Lay Committee as an
opportunity to reshape the NCC. Liberals and moderate
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business leaders, liKe lawyer Charles P. Taft, opposed Pew
and, after a five year struggle, the Council disbanded tne
Lay Committee. However, some of its members, who nad been
appointed to the General Board of the NCC, remained active
and influential in that decision making body. 28
Still, conservative business leaders had little in-
fluence over the activities of the Department of Church and
Economic Life, which was part of the NCC's Division of
Christian Life and Work. The Department had been one of the
strongest proponents of liberalism within Protestanism. In
the late 1 940s, the Department had conducted a study of the
ethical issues of labor-management relations, resulting in a
statement titled "The Church Looks at Industrial Relations,"
adopted by the Federal Council in May 1949. Among its
conclusions was the statement "we believe that compulsory
union membership should be neither required nor forbidden by
law." But, Federal Council pronoucement s were not binding
on the National Council. Aware of the intense interest in
right-to-work, the Department, which included professional
staff and representatives of the clergy, business, and
labor, undertook a restudy of the issue in 1956. Standard
Oil's Board Chairman Robert E. Wilson and the NAiM 's Noel
Sargent tried to block a statement opposing right-to- work in
language similar to that of the earlier FCC statement.
Wilson asserted that "instead of reaffirming the church's
traditional position of protecting the rights of the
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individual against coercion whether by employer or union,
and backing the state in affording such protection, the
proposed statement says such protective laws are not in the
£ubUc interest !" Nelson Cruikshank of the AFL-CIO and the
other labor representatives protested the delay of a state-
ment that affected "so directly the basic welfare of the
whole labor movement." Cruickshank believed that in not
taking a stand for the union shop Protestant Churches were
"missing a very important and crucial opportunity to demon-
strate their understanding of the real heart and soul of the
labor movement. "^^
Sympathetic to labor, the Department of Church and
Economic Life eventually voted to forward the draft state-
ment on "Union Membership as a Condition of Employment" to
the General Board of the NCC for adoption as official
policy. Conservatives and liberals confronted each other at
the June 5, 1956 meeting of the General Board. An
impassioned five-hour debate ensued, the longest ever con-
ducted on any single subject. B.E. Hutchinson, a retired
Detroit industrialist led the fight against the statement
wnile Tilford Dudley of the AFL-CIO gave a "fiery speech"
denying that the object of right to work was to protect the
"little man." Moderate business men, however, like Irwin
Miller and Charles Taft, spoke on behalf of the statement.
The debate ended inconclusively when the General Board
refused either to adopt or reject the statement disapproving
the right-to-work laws of eighteen states. By a close vote
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of 40 to 32, the Board voted to refer the report back to the
Division of Christian- Life and Work. The Division, however,
was authorized to distribute the statement to churches for
discussion.
While disappointed that the statement was not entirely
squashed, conservative business leaders were generally
pleased with the Board's decision. They worked hard to
ensure that distribution of the Division's right-to-work
statement was limited and that the Council promptly
corrected "misleading" articles, such as one published in
the AFL-CIO News, implying that the NCC had taken an
official stand against right-to-work. Noel Sargent reported
to J. Howard Pew that the "Labor Union people who are on the
General Board were very bitter about the failure to approve
the report." To Sargent, it was clear that the "strong
actions" taken by Pew and the National Lay Committee prior
to its disbanding were responsible for the "substantial
improvement" in the General Board's decisions in economic
and social matters. The business community's efforts at
shaping the attitudes of the the leaders of the National
Council on economic and political issues paid off when
"forty people at the last meeting of the General Board"
voted "for recommittal of the report denouncing 'right-to-
work' laws.""^"*"
One of the most dramatic expressions of the changing
attitudes towards unions was the results of the 1957
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legislative campaigns for right-to- work. While right-to-
worKers lost in Louisiana and failed by just a small margin
in Idaho, they won a referendum ballot in Kansas for the
1958 elections and passed a statute in Indiana. The victory
in Indiana was of special significance for it was the first
highly industrialized, strong union state to enact legis-
lation restricting union security. m 1956, a coalition of
employer organizations that included the Indiana Chamber of
Commerce, the Associated Employers of Indiana, and the
Indiana Manufacturers Association formed the Indiana Right
to V\Jork Committee, (IRWC) a state level counterpart to the
National Right to Work Committee. The IRWC asserted that it
was not an employers' organization but a non-partisan
independent citizens committee.
Several factors contributed to the IRWC success. The
IRWC stimulated local business activity by holding legisla-
tive clinics in 21 Indiana communities, attended cy 2,500
employers. Throughout 1956
,
right-to-work prcpcr.er.-s
created the proper political atmosphere by conducting
meetings, publishing pamphlets, purchasing newcaper s^^ace
and radio time, meeting witn workers on the job, and
speaking before civic groups. Lobbyists cul-iv=-ed legis-
lators with a series of breakfast meetings ar.f r=ir.ei -.-.e
public support of the Lieutenant Governor ar.d Er,^=<er zz -r.~
House. Right-to-work advocates also played upcn wr.a-
Stephen C. Noland, president of the NRTVr clair^i V2= "= vave
of revulsion" against union-inspired vicler.ce assii-i-ea
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with the long 1955 Perfect Circle strike over the closed
shop. Trade unionists worked to offset the employer
barrage, but unlike the employers, labor was divided. The
state bodies of the AFL and CIO had yet to merge. Disunity
from personal animosities and differing political perspec-
tives hobbled the union defense. While immediate public
concern with labor violence in a "traditionally
. . . con-
servative, independent state" contributed to the employer
victory, William Book, executive vice president of the
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and a leader of the IRWC,
pointed to the long corporate effort to resnape tne politi-
cal atmosphere. He observed that "business organizations
here have worked long and hard to spread the gospel of
conservatism. Our new right-to-work law could not have
become a reality without such seed-planting."^^
Ill
One of the reasons the IRWC's seeds fell onto such
fertile ground was the growing public concern over corrup-
tion in organized labor. Unions had come under increasing
scrutiny during the early fifties. In 1951, the New York
State Crime Commission began hearings on the New York water-
front, uncovering evidence of money stolen from union
locals, unsolved murders, bribes, kickbacks, shakedowns and
job selling. Other investigations and hearings followed.
Eisennower's Attorney General Herbert Brownell made
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racketeering a primary focus of nis department, beginning
1,500 investigations in his first two years in office. m
1953 and 1954 House and Senate committees held public
hearings on corruption on the waterfronts and in the
building trades. Also m 1954, a Senate subcommittee began
a two-year investigation of union mismangement of welfare
and pension funds.
All this contributed to a growing public consciousness
of union corruption, piqued by the 1954 release of the
highly popular motion picture, "On the Waterfront," and the
acid-throwing assault in 1956 on a syndicated labor colum-
nist shortly after he had broadcast details of shady
dealings in a construction union. But, it was the sensa-
tional televised hearings of the Senate's Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Fields,
popularly known as the McClellan Committee, that splattered
the labor movement's dirty laundry across the front pages of
the country's newspapers. The committee held hearings for
two-and-one-hal f years, examining primarily the activities
of the leaders of the Bakers, the Textile Workers, and the
Teamsters. It discovered some unions were shot through with
theft, embezzlement and misuse of funds, infiltration of
gangsters and racketeers, undemocratic procedures, violence
and threats against employers and recalcitrant union
members, and labor management-collusion. With the
encouragement of business, it also peered into union
political practices, secondary boycotts and organizing
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tactics. Its brief look at employer anti-union devices,
however, received considerably less attention from tne press
than the labor abuses.
The business community exploited the revelations of the
McClellan Committee in their campaign against labor. Here,
at last, was proof of the impact of union "monopoly power"
In April 1957, referring to the committee's early findings,
NAM Chairman Cola G. Parker charged that "monopoly power and
compulsion are being used to maintain crooks, racketeers,
gangsters and hoodlums ... in the top positions in many
unions." With one hand, he continued, "they keep a tight
grip on the working man's throat, so that he can neither
move nor cry out in protest; with the other they reach into
his pay envelope and into his welfare fund in order to
enrich themselves." NAM official Sybyl S. Patterson cheered
on the Committee, observing that the Senate investigation
had "awakened the public to a realization that unions enjoy
extra-legal privileges which they are utilizing without
regard to the public interest or, indeed, to the rights of
individual members." The NAM, however, took care not to
become closely associated with the Senate investigation. It
quietly encouraged employers to provide evidence to the
Committee, but adroitly decided to "stay on the side-lines"
so as "to avoid the danger" of tainting the McClellan
hearings with the charge of being in the control of the
3 6bus iness community.
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Thn nr^arinys, however, provided the NAM with the ammu-
nition to promote the second part of its legislative
campaign, the drive for a national labor reform act. In
October 1957, NAM officials concluded that the time was
right "to crystallize" the "public reaction against labor
abuses into specific reform legislation."^^ To do this,
employers had to
reach the individual in the community, stimulate hisidentification of labor problems with his own economic
wel ling-being, promote his idea to action individually
in an attempt to correct these abuses by writing to his
own congressman and senator, and through that procedure
spark determination in Congress for corrective legisla-
tion at the national level. ^°
This self-consciously political effort meshed with the NAM 's
more generalized anti-labor public relations program. The
employers' association marshalled its supporters, publi-
cizing, among other items, the National Council of
Churches's resolution calling for legislation to correct the
abuses revealed by the McClellan committee.
To arouse women, "who would have a lot to do with the
kind of legislation that is passed," the NAM designed a new
women's club program entitled "Are You the Victim?" With
the shape of a frightened woman splattered on the cover, the
kit evoked the powerful image of rape. During 1958, five
thousand clubs across the country used the kit which exposed
the "uncontrolled power, wealth and political influence of
unions and union bosses" and explained how the activities of
unions directly impinged on each individual. For instance,
the NAM charged that union monopoly power, used "to restrain
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trade, to restrict production and to fix prices" were behind
the resurgence of inflation in the late fifties. The
pattern speech provided in the package demanded "Why should
the working man and woman, the consumer, -- the general
public be the victim of this restrained power?" when the
"American credo has always been that central power must be
controlled and restrained for the good of all." The club-
woman delivering this speech then called upon her audience
to take action, to "make our club's strength felt in the
fight for clean, democractic unions," by writing to Washing-
ton as individuals and as a group and by carrying the
message of the meeting home to husbands, friends, and
relatives
.
The NAM also produced a new film, widely distributed to
professional groups, educators and fraternal organizations,
entitled "Trouble, U.S.A." Like the club package, the film
and accompanying discussion material drew on the McClellan
commitee evidence. NAM advised viewers that "this is not a
pretty picture," but "a true one" depicting events that were
"vitally affecting your own community." The documentary, it
continued, "was disturbing, might provoke indignation, but
it should encourage local constructive action to restore law
and order in your own community and in the nation."^"'"
The right-to-work campaigns, the series of union
corruption hearings, and the NAM's activities thrust unions
into the limelight and fed a growing public discussion of
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organized labor's role in society. The adoption of right-
to-work as the debate topic for the nation's colleges and
universities during the 1957-1958 academic year reflected
the issue's growing significance. Not surprisingly, both
unions and business organizations provided source material
to debaters. Conservative mass circulation magazines, like
the Saturday Evening Post
, carried extensive coverage of the
Hearings and regularly published editorials condemning
unions. The image of a labor movement out of control also
seeped into popular culture. In the comic strip, Orphan
Annie
,
for instance, there was the suggestion of tyrannical
behavior on the part of a union boss.^^
Public opinion polls conducted in late 1957 provided
tentative evidence that organized labor had lost a signifi-
cant number of friends in the American populace. An
American Institute of Public Opinon survey, conducted in
September 1957, showed a twelve-point drop in "pro-union"
sentiment across the country, the greatest defection
occurring in the highly industrialized East. Reflecting on
the results of this poll, Mark Starr, Educational Director
of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
observed that in the past the public's identification with
the "little guy and the underdog" had produced a "certain
amount of sympathy for unions." Now, he worried that "all
this goodwill was in danger of being alienated by the alle-
gations about union monopoly and about the unethical
behavior of the union bosses. "^^
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The passage of the Indiana Right-to-Work Law and the
McClellan investigation goaded the AFL-CIO into addressing
the "new and intensive anti-union campaign" of "reactionary
forces and vested interest groups." m mid-1957, as a way
to isolate the bulk of organized labor from allegations of
corruption, the AFL-CIO adopted a code of ethical practices
for unions and then expelled three of the worst offenders --
the bakers, the laundry workers, and the teamsters. Having
cleaned its house, the AFL-CIO argued against the need for
federal legislation. But as attacks against labor inten-
sified, the Federation argued that the McClellan hearings
were "one-sided and overdramati zed, " and that the committee
ignored management corruption. It also contended that the
press was using the committee's findings "to do a hatchet
job on the trade union movement." Union leaders, like Louis
Hollander of the New York State CIO Council, called for
organized labor "to offset the efforts of its enemies."
Labor must, declared Hollander, step up its public relations
and its education and community activities. According to
Steelworkers President David McDonald, unions had to reach
the general public, much of which remained "badly misin-
formed or uninformed about the real role that labor plays in
the nation." He continued, "too few people have any real
understanding of what labor is actually seeking to achieve
not only for its rank and file, but also for the betterment
..4 4
of the entire nation. "^^
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In the immediate aftermath of the merger, the AFL-CIO
had put public relations on the back burner despite business
predictions of increased activity. Spending for public
relations was less, not more, under the merged budget, and
to save money the Federation briefly considered dropping one
of its news broadcasts. Pushed by the employer offensive,
the Federation reversed this trend in 1957.^^5 Previously,
national labor organizations provided little support to the
state central bodies fighting right-to-work, when Robert
Lenaghen, president of the Idaho State Federation of Labor,
sought AFL-CIO assistance, he was "frankly appalled at the
lack of a coordinated program to counter-balance the serious
attack which we were facing across the nation." But when
the National Right to Work Committee's campaign reached the
UAW's home state of Michigan, the AFL-CIO embarked upon a
program to "arouse and unify" the labor movement. The
Executive Council set up a high level right-to-work subcom-
mittee instructed to "monitor state right-to-work agitation,
coordinate defense efforts, and aid repeal drives." The
subcommittee resolved that the AFL-CIO "should engage in an
extensive campaign on a local, state, and national basis" to
bring "the true facts of this 'Right-to-Work Question'" to
the public's attention. The campaign featured a series of
canned radio and television spots, a fifteen-minute documen-
tary, a series of popular leaflets, and a handbook and
speakers manual, summarizing the principal arguments. Aware
that "labor alone will have difficulty winning this fight,"
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the Federation also initiated and funded an "independent"
anti-right-to-work citizens group called the National
Council on Industrial Peace. Led by such well known
liberals as Eleanor Roosevelt and New York Senator Herbert
Lehman, the NICP included employers, clergy, and profes-
sionals. To raise money for all this activity the AFL-CIO
created a special fund "to combat the millions of dollars
being poured" into right-to-work campaigns by employer
46groups .
^
During 1958, the AFL-CIO's anti-right-to-work drive
meshed with a more broadly gauged public relations campaign.
Upping its public relations budget by 58 percent to $1.2
million dollars a year, the Federation's revamped public
relations program looked a lot like that of its arch-rival,
the NAM. The goal was to create a new image for labor that
stressed unions' "day-by-day contributions to the whole of
society." Commercials on the AFL-CIO's news programs, for
instance, emphasized labor's community services, using
"words of positve emotional value," like "freedom,"
"America," "democracy," and "neighbors." Similarily the
AFL-CIO's new television program, "America at Work,"
portrayed workers' contribution to "America's industrial
might." This fifteen minute program, carried on 67
stations, mirrored the NAM's "Industry on Parade." Indeed,
its initial title was "Labor on Parade," Instead of show-
casing industries or companies, it highlighted the skill anc
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talent of workers on the job, while noting that they were
all union members. One year into the program, AFL-CIO
official Albert J. Zack reported that program showed viewers
"hard-working, skilled, dedicated people who are union
members, thus destroying the propaganda myth of union
members concocted by our enemies. ""^^
To gain positive publicity from the press, in June 1958
the Federation began issuing one or two television news
releases each week to 100 stations throughout the country.
The stories publicized a range of AFL-CIO political issues,
including legislation for an increased minimun wage, school
construction, and housing, as well as stressing labor's
constructive community activities, such as blood bank
drives, Christmas parties, and the community services
program. Like employers, the AFL-CIO also reached out to
opinion leaders. It initiated a direct mail campaign aimed
at influential minority spokesmen, religious leaders, and
intellectuals, and established a Speakers' Bureau that
provided union officials to speak before religious, civic,
4 8fraternal, and school groups.
IV
The 1958 election served as the first test of labor's
new program. The election took place within the context of
sharpening labor-management conflict not only in the poli-
tical realm but in the shop as well. Beginning in mia-1957,
the economy dropped into a recession even as inflation
394
surged. Meanwhile, segments of American industry, like
steel, experienced their first serious wave of foreign
competition. Many employers met this weakening economic
climate with a determination to reduce labor costs. without
totally abandoning human relations, managers shifted from
the more subtle anti-unionism of the earlier fifties to an
outright attack on organized labor. The doubling of unfair
labor practice cases in the late fifties reflected this new
strategy. In addition, companies adopted a more aggressive
position at the bargaining table, seeking to restore wage
flexiblity and to speed up production by abolishing restric-
tive work rules. To the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Depart-
ment, it was clear that employers were adopting "class war
methods on the bargaining front as the best way to bring
labor to its knees. ""^^
The struggle between business conservatives and labor
became one of the principal themes of the 1958 election.
Prior to the election, business stepped up its political
activity. Some firms, state and local business associa-
tions, and a group sponsored by fifty major corporations
called the Effective Citizens Organization, set up workshops
promoting employer political participation. In addition.
Republican politicans began an "experimental" program to
teach "practical politics" to junior executives from scores
of companies in three dozen targeted Congressional
districts. At business gatherings througnout the country.
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leaders of i h.^ conservative business u, .jan i /a L lon.s, like Lho
NAM and tlu^ Cha.nln^r of Commerce, and such business leaders
as Lemnol Boulwaro of General Khn^tric, exhorted employers
to ycL inLo politics and Liyht for all ilu>y wore worth/'"
in MJ58, the consoL va L i vo business coiiu.iun i ty 's pi iniary
goals were to promote right-to-work and to oioct a Conqi-.^ss
sympathetic to the enactment oi a strict labor rel uim act.
More broadly, conservative employers hoped to undercui
labor's political power. Thc^ Practical Politics Task i\uco
of the Manufacturers Association of Syracuse contt iui.d th.it
unions haci "renonnc(-d t h(M r historic responsibility to t h(M.r
lucMiibers" in pursuit oL political powiM'. According to Gulf
Uii Senior Vice-President Archie U. Gray, "IL we are to
survive, labor's political power must be opposed by a
matching ioicr -- among the corporations thLit make up
American l)usiness." indeed, unions hiH-amc a major issue in
the 1958 election as the campaign assumed the "coloration of
a labor-management dogfight." In a number of localities,
industrialists financed disscMii i nat i on of a "notorious"
pamphlet suuMriny w.i I ter Hc^uther, who tMuploy(H-s tagged as
the "phantom candidate" Lor a variety ol oil ices in mure
r
I
tlian twenty states.
The Republican I'arty, which was the chief bend Lciary
of corporate political activity, joined in the attack on
labor. 'I'lK^ K. 'publican Policy Comittee issued a monograph
entitled The Labor Bosses: Am erica's Third Party , which
asserted that the Democrats w(m<^ "domin.itiMl by c.M-tain
politico-labor bosses and left-wing extremists." The
choice, it warned, was between the Republican Party or going
down "the left lane which leads to socialism." Vice-
President Richard Nixon played up this theme in speeches
across the country.
Some of the most intense battles between business and
labor took place in those states voting on right- to- work.
Right-to- work advocates had turned to the referendum as a
means of placing the question on the ballot in California,
Idaho, Washington, Colorado, Ohio, and Kansas. Business
support for the campaigns was crucial. In Washington, for
instance, Boeing Aircraft revived a lagging drive for signa-
tures for the ballot referendum. Three weeks before the
deadline for filing petitions, Boeing Aircraft sent a letter
to all supervisors enclosing copies of the petition and
instructing them to get additional names. Some twenty other
industries joined Boeing in this movement. Washington busi-
ness leaders also formed an organization of "minute men" and
built a war chest of ha 1 f -a-mi 1 1 ion dollars. The General
Electric Company at the Hanford Atomic Works in Wasnington
aided the campaign by sending a letter to their 9,000
employees urging them to support the initiative. Similarly,
in California, GE sponsored a newspaper advertising
campaign, becoming the first major corporation in the state
5 3
to endorse the right-to- work proposal.
397
Perhaps the most telling battle over right-to- work took
place in Ohio. In early 1958, buoyed by the previous year's
right-to-work victory in Indiana, the Ohio Chamber of
Commerce formed the Ohioans for Right-to- Work (ORW), and
began collecting signatures to place an amendment to the
state constitution on the ballot in November. The Ohio
Manufacturers' Association, some city Chambers, and several
companies backed the ORW, feeling that right-to-work laws in
both Ohio and Indiana could start a major trend. Among the
firms active in the drive were several that had been leaders
in the business community's campaign to reshape the climate
of opinion, including General Electric, Timken Roller
Bearing, and Armco Steel. Timken blanketed their plant
cities with the story of right-to-work, and all of their
advertising carried the slogan, "The Right-to-Work Shall Not
be Abridged or Made Impotent." The Company also spearheaded
the movement to get signatures on the petitions, circulating
the first 400 petitions issued. Business support for
right-to-work, however, was not unanamious. Many large
firms steered clear of the issue, and a few moderate
business leaders like Charles P. Taft came out strongly
against r ight-to-work.
Organized labor met the challenge by forming the United
Organized Labor of Ohio (UOLO) in late March 1958. The UOLO
argued that the real issue behind right-to- work was not the
union shop or individual rights but whether unions had a
right to exist. To defend against the anti-union drive,
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Ohio trade unionists followed a two-pronged strategy.
First, they mounted a major effort to register union members
and their families to ensure a high working-class turnout on
election day. Second, labor looked to the community for
defenders. Blacks, for instance, rallied to the side of
unions; the Ohio State Association of Colored Women's Clubs
and the NAACP condemned right-to- work and aided the union
drive to mobilize the minority vote. City councils, frater-
nal orders, and civic organizations, among other organiza-
tions, also passed resolutions condemning the amendment.
Much of the religious community came out on labor's
behalf. Catholic support was strongest. In March 1958, the
six Catholic Bishops of Ohio issued a statement asserting
that the proposed amendment "would not solve our problems
but might lead to more intensifed struggle." Catholic
clergymen were active in the fight against right-to-work,
often denouncing it from the pulpit. The Ohio Council of
Churches also opposed the right-to-work proposal, but the
UOLO felt that its story was not getting to the Protestant
ministers. In a bid for their support, trade unionists
contacted their own pastors and the UOLO distributed the
Ohio Council's statement to clergy throughout the state.
Religious support often translated into broader public
appeals. The labor paper. The Chronicle, pointed out that
"The R-T-W proposal is not just a matter of economics or
politics. It lies at the very basis of man's relation to
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man. Endless numbers of religious leaders of every faith,
looking beyond the material aspects of the issue, have
condemned V iqh t-to-work as immoral." On Sundays after
services, UAW Local 12 members in Toledo passed out the
Bishops' statement in front of Catholic churches and the
Ohio Council's statement at Protestant churches. '^^
Both sides conducted intense public relciLiuns
campaigns. The ORW and the UOLO deployed speakers through-
out the state, distributed millions of pieces of literature,
and ran ads in newspapers and on the radio and television.
By late summer, however, the r i qh t-to-wor k proponents seemed
to be prevailing. in August iy'j8, they filed the petit ifMis
to place the rigivt-to- work issue on the ballot, linving
collected 100,000 more signatures than required. in 49
counties, they had twice as many signatures as needed.
Feeling that victory was assured, the ORW slakened its
public relations drive and placed more emphasis on
recruiting political allies. Some Republicans in Ohio and
elsewhere were leary of closely associating themselves with
an issue as divisive as r i g ht-to-work. Business leaders
like, Charles Hook of Armco, however, worked hard te get Lhe
support ol proiuLneiiL Republican [politicians. Hook praised
Republican gubernatorial candidate William O'Neil 1 who had
endorsed the ORW and conducted "a m.irvelous campaign in face
of opposition of the labor bosses."
In contrast, the labor movement redouhh^d its [)ul)lic
relations (HTorts. Th(^ [lOr.n kicked off tho "home-stretch
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drive" with a mass rally on September 7th in Columbus and
thc^ formation of a pro-labor citizens committee, subsidized
by thc^ Ai.-|,-Cl(^ national office. Campaicjn literature empha-
sized the dire economic consequcMices of riyht-to-work.
Aware thai forty percent of the electorate were "house-
wives," unions aimea a special appeal Lo Uumh, lio hi i nq
"Kaffee Klatches" and distributing pamphlets like "Hrs. Ohio
Homemaker: Beware the guirk in 'Right-to-Work, " whicli
emphasized that right-to-work undermined unions. Once that
happened, wages invariably foil, weakening family security.
Thc> WomcMrr, Activities Division of the state AFL-CTO did
mucli of tht^ volunteer work necessary in brinqinq labor's
message Lo women and the rest of the public, in late
October, the right-to-work proponents shilLcd from arguing
for the issue on the basis of protecting individual freedom
to a "strident attack against unionism." l n doing so, the
ORW inadvertently provided proof of the labor movement's
contention that the business community's primary goal was
tiie destruction of trade unionism.
On election day 1958 the Republican rnrty and tlie
conservative business community suffer od a major dofoaf.
Voters rejected r lyht- to-work referendums in five of the six
states where it was on the ballot. Only in Kansas, wliere
business faced a small labor movement, did right-to-work
prevail. Nationwide, Republican losses were massive, with
Democrats achieving their largest gains in congressional
4Ul
elections since 1936. The continuing economic slump
certainly contributed to Republican losses. Crucial too was
the attack on the labor movement. The right-to-work drive
and the Republican attack on unions united the labor move-
ment and stimulated union political activity across the
nation. Important also to labor's success was the creation
of broad-based liberal coalitions. in Ohio, the support of
community groups, minorities, and the clergy proved signifi-
cant. One analysis of the vote, for instance, found that
the opposition of the Catholic bishops to right-to-work had
an significant impact on the way Catholics voted.
The election taught the business community that while
there was certainly outrage over the abuses uncovered by the
investigations, the public still accepted the legitimacy of
unions and was uncomfortable with a blatant attack on
organized labor as an institution. Future efforts to limit
the power of labor needed to differentiate between unions as
institutions and the abuses of labor leaders. Moreover,
business leaders needed to cleave more closely to the idea
that they sought not only to contain the "monopoly" power of
unions but also desired to protect the democratic rights of
individual workers.
V
In spite of the victories won by labor and the Demo-
crats in the 1958 elections, business leaders renewed their
campaign for restrictive new labor legislation in the 86th
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congress. They immediately applied the lessons learned from
the 1 958 right-to-work campaigns to this struggle. One
advantage for business was the much broader base of support
within the country for labor reform than right-to-work. The
McClellan hearings had convinced even the friends of labor,
like John Kennedy and other liberals, that greater
regulation of unions was necessary. The major question was
what form such regulation would take. There was general
agreement that reform should make the labor movement more
democratic in its internal affairs. By early 1958, even the
AFL-CIO had come around to accepting the need for legisla-
tion, but only laws aimed solely at the correction of the
most flagrant abuses revealed by the McClellan investiga-
tion. Employers and their conservative allies in Congress
wanted more. They hoped to move beyond internal regulation
of unions, to further restricting the powers of labor in
collective bargaining. The NAM, for instance, wanted to
make all secondary boycotts and organizational picketing
illegal. During 1958, Congress first considered labor
reform, and the Senate passed a mild measure, the Kennedy-
Ives bill, that was acceptable to labor. This bill required
publication of detailed financial reports by unions and
regulated union trusteeships and elections. An unusual
coalition of employer groups, conservatives, and unions
still opposed to any regulation, including the Teamsters and
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Mine workers, however, rallied against the bill, helping to
defeat it in the House of Representati ves.^
0
In early 1 959, labor reform was back on the nation's
agenda. Although it had issued an interim report in March
1958, the McClellan Committee continued its hearing through
1959, keeping the issue of union corruption before the
public's eyes. At the same time, the NAM, the Chamber of
Commerce, and other business organizations continued to do
their part in raising public consciousness about labor
abuses. It became clear that there was little chance of
unions avoiding a labor reform law, as a commitment to doing
something about labor management problems became a litmus
test of political respons ib li ty for both Republicans and
Democracts. Nevertheless, the business community faced a
tough political assignment. Republican Party losses in the
1958 election had resulted in the seating of a Congress with
seemingly liberal pro-labor inclinations. As a result, the
AFL-CIO approached the political battle confident that there
was little chance of Congress passing a punitive law.^-'-
During the spring and summer of 1959 several labor
reform bills were introduced and debated in the House and
Senate. The labor movement was divided; the AFL-CIO suppor-
ted "soft" legislation while other segments of the labor
movement pursued entirely different agendas. The Mine
Workers continued to fight all legislation, while other
inaividual unions within the Federation lobbied for their
own interests. Almost to the end, the AFL-CIO believed that
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it haa enough congressional support to render unnecessary a
massive drive to mobilize the public in labor's defense.
Unions relied instead on high level consultation between
congressional and labor leadership and on lobbying to
influence individual legislators. Throughout the struggle,
however, labor tended to be disorganized, rigid, and so
zealous in lobbying that it antagonized rather than won
support. At one point, the teamsters had 400 lobbyists on
Capitol Hill lecturing and threatening the legislators.^^
The forces advocating a strict labor reform bill that
incorporated the demands of employers were much more united
than labor. The Eisenhower administration provided vigorous
and effective legislative leadership, while maintaining
close liaison with business groups. On cue from the admin-
istration, employer organizations mobilized their members to
place steady but more subtle influence on legislators.
Management lobbyists stayed in the background and relied on
somewhat less intimidating forms of communication, mail and
telephone contacts. They emphasized over and over again
that "the people" wanted a strong law. At a crucial moment,
when the House began debate on labor legislation. President
Eisenhower delivered a televised address in which he
endorsed the pro-management Landrum-Gr if f in bill and urged
the public to demand "strong" labor reform legislation. In
perhaps one of Eisenhower's most political speeches, he
presented his appeal as a "non-partisan" one. As a lame
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duck president, he could easily claim to have "no political
motivations" and to speak for the people. Eisenhower's
request brought a tremendous volume of mail and gave
"legitimacy to the fight for the Landrum-Grif f in bill,"
making "it hard for its opponents to resist. "^^
The White House also helped coordinate the public rela-
tions drive for labor reform. Outnumbered in Congress, the
Republicans realized that they needed widespread public
support to achieve their goals. The Eisenhower
administration found friends in the press. Most newspapers
editorally supported tough labor reform legislation and the
press continued to provide extensive coverage of labor
corruption. The employer associations, however, were the
foot soldiers in this campaign to arouse public opinion to
demand a strict labor bill. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the NAM, the American Retail Federation and the National
Small Business Men's Association coordinated their efforts
"to an unprecedented extent." They were aided by state and
city groups as well as individual employers. Their goal was
to flood Congress with mail demanding a tough bill. Trade
associations sponsored newspaper advertising and provided
legislative kits to members that included posters,
pamphlets, prepared speeches, advertisements and letters for
distribution to employes. In one critical Congressional
district, a corporation sent its formen out "to ring
neighbor's doorbells." The company claimed that this tactic
resulted in 3000 letters in one week, urging a stiff bill.^"^
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Radio and television were also important. in April, as
Congress began consideration of labor reform legislation,
Armstrong Cork Company's Circle Theatre ran an hour-long
drama about labor racketeering entitled "The Sound of
Violence." it concluded with an appeal from Senator John L.
McClellan to "do something about the evils shown." The
program was rerun in July, and employer associations ran
advertisements and sent out over four million letters urging
the public to watch and write to their legislators.
Beginning in August, spot ads featuring Congressmen Landrum
and Griffin and Senator McClellan ran frequently in 35
crucial congressional districts. McClellan had played a key
role in the shift in Congress from a mild to a much stronger
bill when he presented in an "impassioned speech" a "bill of
rights" for the laboring man. It was this theme that
business promoted. One Administration spokesman recalled,
"We wanted this to look like the people against the labor
bosses and not Big Labor against Big Business." Thus,
conservatives did not again make the mistake of an outright
attack on unions but emphasized defending the rights of the
individual
.
The public responded with a tremendous deluge of mail.
Congressmen reported receiving more mail on lnI)or reform
than on any other previous issue. During one week in August
1959, one million letters inundated the Capital. Most of
the letters advocated a tough labor law. Alarmed, the
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AFL-CIO began distributing a leaflet entitled "Get Crooks -
Not Unions" and urged union members to write to their legis-
lators. Still, there was little pro-labor mail. m early
September 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Grif f in Act
which substantially reflected the interests of business.
It was a major defeat for labor. To Mark Starr of the
ILGWU the adoption of the Landrum-Griffin Act showed how the
image of labor had been successfully smeared in the public
mind. He believed that as a result of the business campaign
in the schools, churches, and communities a "large segment
of the general public" accepted the fallacy that "labor
unions were a monopoly run by union bosses" and that "labor
bosses not only had too much power but were also corrupt."
The AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Action also concluded
that unions had "sat passively in the galleries while the
structure was set up to give labor a public smearing."
Labor then came into the struggle "unprepared and unor-
ganized and was out-smarted and out-maneuvered by Business
and Industry who operated in a more skillful manner, with
greater resources, better teamwork, and better support and
cooperation from Members of the House and Senate. "^^
The business community agreed that the passage of the
Landrum-Grif fin Act was the political payoff of their
efforts to forge a more favorable climate of public opinion.
According to NAM Vice President Charles R. Sligh, "a wave of
overwhelming public opinion" combined with a determined
President and an effective conservative coalition of
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Republicans and Democrats "forced Congress to take labor
reform seriously." Similarily, nAiM Executive Rudolph F.
Bannow concluded that "the major cause" for passage "was a
great upwelling of public opinion, stimulated ... by the
great conservative leadership of President Eisenhower and
helped along by the acitivity of politically conscious
businessmen . "^^
The struggles over right-to-work and labor reform
demonstrated how far business had come in the years since
the strike wave of 1946. Business had achieved solid
results from its last campaign of the fifties to limit the
power of labor. While most of the 1958 right-to- work
initiatives were defeated, the fact that business was able
to generate enough support to place the question on the
ballot in northern, industrialized states reflected a
considerable shift in attitudes about organized labor.
Landrum-Grif f in further proved, at least to business
leaders, that they had decisively shaped public opinion.
Public opinion had played a central role in the passage of
legislation that placed further limitations on the power of
labor. Although unions had won significant electoral
victories in 1958, they found little political support in
the halls of Congress. Indeed, labor fought a rearguard
battle against the erosion of its status and power; its
voice in public debate was weak and its ability to offer a
compelling alternate vision was apparently absent. The
409
business community had contained the threat a united labor
movement posed to its agenda for the nation's political and
economic future.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
In 1959 labor journalist Bert Cochran observed that
"the businessman's intellectual reconquest of America" after
World War II" was "a more remarkable achievement than was
his reassertion of long exercised power after World War I."l
In 1945, business had faced an aggressive labor movement
that sought the resurgence of New Deal liberalism. Unions
called for full employment, social planning and the expan-
sion of the welfare state, essentially a fundamental
reconstuction of American society orchestrated through the
continued growth of state power. The business community,
however, set out to build agreement around an alternative
agenda. In doing so it sought not only to recast the
political economy of post-war America, but also to reshape
the ideas, images, and attitudes through which Americans
understood their world. Employers wanted support for the
belief that economic decisions should be made in corporate
board rooms, not in legislative committee chambers. Pros-
perity was to be achieved through reliance on individual
initiative and the natural harmony of workers and managers
inherent in business's interpretation of the free enterprise
system. According to many industrialists, a socially
responsible capitalism, relying upon increases in producti-
vity and economic growth rather than on the redistribution
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Of income, would solve society's problems and brxng the good
life to all.
These ideas made up a part of the consensus often
associated with the 1950s. This work contends that this
consensus was politically constructed and was in large part
the result of the business community's
"intellectual
reconquest" of America. It had its origins in a variety of
campaigns conducted by American business (and consistently
in opposition to labor) to shape the public's political,
social, and economic ideas. The business community had two
primary goals. First, it hoped to destroy or discredit the
ideological underpinnings of New Deal liberalism. Secondly,
it wanted to undermine the legitimacy and power of organized
labor. Unions posed a significant challenge not only in the
shop but in the political realm as the backbone of the
Democratic Party coalition. Industrialists would accomplish
these goals through campaigns to sell Americans on the
virtues of individualism as opposed to collectivism, freedom
as opposed to state control, and the centrality of the free
enterprise sytem to the American way of life.
The most obvious efforts to shape ideology and to
create a more conservative, consensual political climate
took place at the national level. National business organi-
zations, like the Advertising Council and the National
Association of Manufacturers orchestrated multi-million
dollar public relations campaigns that relied on newspapers,
magazines, radio and later television to sell business and
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mass
capitalism. Yet, even as they conducted these national
media campaigns, business leaders recognized the limitations
of relying on this strategy alone. They believed that
employers needed an even more direct connection with the
public. The most logical place to begin was within the
plant with their own workers serving as a captive audience.
Even employers who recognized unions believed that organized
labor fundamentally challenged their ability to shape worker
attitudes and provide political leadership. Thus, moderate
as well as conservative business leaders sought to increase
worker productivity and undermine union power by creating a
separate company identity or company consciousness among
their employees. To win workers' allegiance, managers in a
wide range of firms reshaped their personnel policies by
blending the insights of human relations with the techniques
of welfare capitalism. Economic education campaigns sought
to build worker alleigance to the firm and to the American
economic system while welfarism provided tangible evidence
of employer concern for workers, expanding the community of
interests beyond the immediate confines of the factory to
encompass the worker's leisure and home life.
Fearing for lost authority beyond their factory gates,
employers also instituted sophisticated community relations
programs that both promoted the free enterprise system and
built good will for individual firms. In January 1960,
National Industrial Conference Board President John S.
424
Sinclair concluded that as a result of these effort business
had probably "never enjoyed a more favorable climate of
public opinion." m part, he admitted, this mellowing of
public attitudes towards business was the result of
continuing prosperity. Equally important in "the gradual
recession of distrust" was industry's willingness to help
alleviate social problems particularly in the fields of
health and education and its "efforts to assume the role of
good neighbor in the communities in which it operates. "^
Organized labor also sought to shape worker conscious-
ness, attempting to compete for worker loyalty and public
sympathy both within the factory and in the community.
During the depression and in World War II, unions had become
an increasingly potent force not only in the plant and in
national politics but also in local communities, establish-
ing connections that grew in the postwar era with such
important institutions as the Community Chests. Later,
particularly as attacks against labor increased in the
fifties, unions also began to emulate business, conducting
their own public public relations campaigns. Organized
labor attempted to resist the business community's new
consensus, promoting the notion that worker success and
security as well as America's future depended on the collec-
tive power of organized labor and on the continued ability
of the state to regulate business.
The labor movement could never match the resources
available to the leaders of American business, however. As
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a result, the political and cultural landscape of the post-
war era was increasingly dominated by the images and ideas
produced by a mobilized business leadership. This indeed
marked "the businessman's intellectual reconquest of
America." How far this reconquest went, how deeply rooted
it was, remains unclear. We know what business leaders
wanted workers and other American to believe. We know much
less about what they actually did believe, for even the most
sophisticated polls (and most of those conducted in the
1950s were scarcely sophisticated) do not begin to plumb the
private reservoirs of dissent and disengagement that charac-
terized American popular culture. what we do know is that
the images and ideas of business were pervasive, filling
much of America's cultural space with a series of selec-
tively distorted symbols that made it difficult, if not
impossible, for Americans to discover and articulate
competing visions of the American polity. To this degree,
at least, the "businessman's intellectual reconquest of
America" succeeded.
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